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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates national identification by applying psychosocial methodology to 
discourses produced in Russia during the era of ‘Putinism’ (2000- ). Existing literature on 
post-Soviet Russia frequently claims that at the heart of the nation lies an absence of 
symbolic functions or subjective formations with which Russians could identify. At the 
same time, there has been relatively little empirical work that seeks to examine national 
identification using a psychosocial approach. The study fills this lacuna by looking for 
moments of identification across different texts, such as interviews, surveys and media 
representations. Using as its starting point the conditions of possibility of post-2000 
Russia, the study pays attention to societal shifts and disjunctures, examining how they 
are reflected in discursive patterns and formations. 
 
      The dissertation’s empirical element consists of two parts. Through the analysis of 
interviews and open-ended surveys, the first part documents respondents’ ambivalent 
relationship with Russia and Russianness, which is characterized by splitting and 
disavowal. In the second part, the study deploys a case study approach. The first case 
study focuses on discourses of rejection and (dis)identification as featured in the Russian 
public’s responses to Pussy Riot. It concludes that in their policing of Russianness and 
the demarcation of features deemed undesirable as embodied by the group, participants 
in the debate have found ways of both shifting the threat Pussy Riot represents, and also 
of once again ‘enjoying the nation’. The second case study examines discourses that seek 
to elicit identification in the populace via representational mechanisms around the figure 
of Vladimir Putin. It is argued that the various strategies employed to activate leader love, 
ranging from hypermasculinity to hyperrealism, seem to indicate a void at the heart of 
the Russian president’s persona and, by extension, his national project, making them 
profoundly unstable. 
        
    Overall, the thesis provides a rare empirical contribution to the psychosocial study of 
national identification.  It addresses the interrelation between imaginary and symbolic 
identification and the pivotal role of fantasmatic processes therein. The identifications I 
locate in the thesis are precarious and fleeting, speaking of the loss of a fantasy of 
national greatness, and of an internalization of images and scenes borrowed from 
literature and history. The study also offers a consideration of the implications of such 
attachments for Russian society, thus providing further illustration of the 
interdependence of the psychic and the social.  
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Chapter I: Contemporary discourses of Russianness 	  
Despite a recurrent romantic fascination with the region, which has recently once more 
been coupled with more alarmist overtones, the existence of a Facebook forum called 
‘Why We Study Eastern Europe’ hosted by a group of a scholars of the region suggests  
that there is a patent necessity to justify this preoccupation. Indeed, it appears that too 
much scrutiny would trouble the dominant vision of Eastern Europe, and Russia in 
particular, which can be encountered in articles and photo essays such as ‘The Wacky 
World of Eastern Europe in the Early 2000s’1 and ’42 GIFs that Prove Russia is the 
Most Bizarre Place on Earth’2. The choice of such epithets as "bizarre" and "wacky" 
betrays a form of post-Cold War Orientalism, a discourse in which the post-socialist 
world, when not downright gloomy and threatening, becomes at best either darkly 
mysterious, or inviting of ridicule. Even scholars of the area are not immune to this. The 
resurgence of nationalist and patriotic sentiment, together with the unfettered 
materialism (Patico, 2005) displayed in certain circles, added to what appears to be an 
almost caricatured image of Russia. In many aspects, the level of distortion Russia’s 
image has undergone in Western public perception is reminiscent of its designation as an 
‘evil empire’ at the height of the Cold War period. There is clear puzzlement regarding 
the nature of post-soviet society, as it is still frequently referred to more than 20 years 
after the Soviet Union factually ceased to exist.  
           
While, in its parodic form such as in the 2006 film Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for 
Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan, the clichéd perception of the region can be 
turned against those most invested in its proliferation (Condee, 2008)3, in most 
incarnations these formulaic images are circulated for a reason. Speaking of the current 
fascination with the architectural legacy of socialism that has resulted in a ‘culture of 
ruin-gazing’, Jamie Rann comments:  
 
[…] Russia and eastern Europe serves as an imaginary space in which 
western nations can play out their own crises of identity, without having to 
confront them directly. In this case, the legacy of militarised imperialism and 
its decline can be explored at a safe distance by pinning a hammer and a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1http://www.slate.com/blogs/behold/2014/03/30/martin_kollar_nothing_special_examines_the_often_
bizarre_world_of_eastern.html 
2 http://www.rsvlts.com/2013/10/18/meanwhile-in-russia-all-gif-edition/#1  
3 See also: http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2006/11/12/Next-Page-Learnings-of-Borat-
for-make-benefit-cultural-studies/stories/200611120163 	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sickle to its cracked marble carcase4. 
 
This treatment of the post-Socialist world as profoundly alien thus points not merely to a 
lack of scope for ambivalence or the inability to provide a more nuanced engagement 
with the region, but rather to an instrumental use of this discourse. 
          
Other examples even closer to the geographical and thematic focus of the study include 
the continued tendency by some Western commentators to view Russia’s relationship to 
its leaders, and to Putin in particular, in Freudian terms.  Here Russia emerges as a deeply 
authoritarian country, differing profoundly from democratic traditions of the West, and 
therefore requires a different set of analytical tools in order to make sense of it. In this 
reading, the county’s population is forever in search of a father figure, and the protest 
movement of 2012 can be understood as a youthful population’s rebellion against its 
overly strict father5.  The resolution to this cyclical problem, however, is merely a 
replacement of one leader figure by another, potentially more radical one. Other popular 
references for observers of contemporary Russia are the great 19th century works of 
literature, especially Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gogol and Turgenev, which are utilised as 
sources of knowledge about the Russian national character6. This practice is then usually 
justified in one of two ways. One is to pinpoint some of the more ‘hysterical’ moments 
in contemporary Russian cultural and political life, and then to reference similar scenes in 
these authors’ works, with the notoriously feverish Dostoevsky a perennial favourite 
here7. The second move involves tracing lines of historical and psychological continuity 
between Tsarist Russia and the nation in the 21st century8. This orientalising contingent is 
by now often factored in by Russian commentators, thus creating a purely hypothetical 
conversation encompassing multiple straw men, first and foremost among them Western 
pundits ignorant of Russia.9  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 http://calvertjournal.com/features/show/2950/russian-ruins-photography#.U9qWmRa0Zg2 
5 http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/01/08/russia-father-
problem/tl6p5zMMq7OxLdqFptAnUN/story.html 
6http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/how_gogol_explains_the_post_soviet_world_and_
chekhov_and_dostoyevsky?page=full 
7 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-02-02-khapaeva-en.html 
8 http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/08/05/putin-man-who-would-be-tsar 
9 http://slon.ru/world/novyy_rezhim-994537.xhtml	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(Auto)Orientalism 
The characterisation of this discourse as orientalist is no exaggeration: in their coherence, 
pervasiveness and connection to geopolitical relations of power - themselves a direct 
product of the Cold War - some of the West’s images of Russia are strongly reminiscent 
of Edward Said’s seminal study of Orientalism (1978):  
 
These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals 
with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed 
Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon 
possessing regular characteristics. (Said, 1978/95: 50) 
 
And while Said’s comments precede the Internet, which has led to a greater polyphony 
of voices becoming accessible from anywhere in the world, this does not mean that 
hegemonic representations are a thing of the past. One of the thesis’ overarching aims is 
to investigate and analyse some of these hegemonic representations, such as prevailing 
orientalist narratives of Russia, first and foremost by presenting a sustained engagement 
with how Russians themselves speak of, and relate to Russia, thereby gaining greater insight 
into the inner workings of discourses of Russianness.          
However, while one should remain sceptical of work producing or reiterating discourses 
seeking the embellishment of a certain image of Russia, it would be hypocritical not to 
concede that at the same time the present study contributes to this body of work, and 
that, regardless of its intentions, the researcher speaks from, and is invested in a position: 
A second contradiction of Russian cultural studies concerns the Western 
researcher’s subject position, a fact that can neither be changed nor expiated 
but simply exists as an evident strain in any analysis. Potential carriers of the 
very discursive practices to which we might claim resistance – 
americanization, homogenization, globalization – we must concede in 
advance that our research does not exist uncontaminated by its point of 
origin (Condee, 2006: 202). 
 
Additionally, and as indicated above, these representations of Russia, coupled with the 
country’s traditional orientation towards an - in turn imaginary - West, have led to their 
internalisation, which is once more reminiscent of Said’s work:  
 
But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people 
who were called Orientals as well as those called Occidental, European, or 
Western; in short, Orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon 
and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine. (Said, 
	   12	  
1978/95: 50) 
This sustained element of what I here refer to as ‘auto-orientalism’ is often expressed 
through, or combined with a desire to reinforce Russia’s cultural ties with Europe.  
According to Alexander Etkind’s controversial book on Internal Colonization (2011), 
Russia has always been particularly susceptible to being influenced and transformed by 
cultural representations, making it uniquely self-reflexive: “Culture was also a screen on 
which the endangered society [of imperial Russia, MB] saw itself – a unique organ of 
self-awareness, critical feedback, warning and mourning.” (Etkind, 2011:3). Etkind 
relates this to the process of ‘internal colonization’, thereby referring to the expansion 
and exploration of Russian territory until the 20th century – with possible comparisons to 
the ‘conquest’ of the American West, but also to a colonization of one’s own, that is, 
ethnically identical people. Thus, instead of racial categories to justify and perpetuate a 
system of domination, internally Russia relied on the legal category ‘estate’, allowing 
certain individual ownership of serfs10 as a form of ‘civil slavery’ (Etkind, 2011: 105). 
Perhaps more relevant for the present study is the project of Westernisation (or 
‘overcompensation’ according to Etkind, 2011: 105) which was conducted with the greatest 
impetus under Tsar Peter the First or ‘the Great’ (1672- 1725). In its liminal location 
between Europe and Asia, Russia has always been engaged in a process of cultural self-
definition, and with the enforced Westernisation under Peter the Great, this discourse of 
auto-orientalism, that is, of a denigration or repression of the perceived ‘asiatic’ influence 
on Russian culture, began taking a hold which is palpable until today. Indeed, this ‘split’ 
subjectivity – of wanting to elevate those features that make up one’s identity, together 
with a contradictory desire to denigrate all that is Russian, is one of the characteristic 
features of the discourse of Russianness.  
            
This facet shall remain relevant throughout this thesis, which aims to track patterns and 
prevalent formations of Russian subjectivities and identifications in the era of Putinism11 
across several instantiations of discourse. The individuals and groups referred to here 
have collectively experienced the collapse of an ideological edifice, followed by an 
economic ‘shock therapy’ in the 1990s and an exposure to all the vagaries of the 
economic global cycle, either in the guise of neoliberalism, or first that of  ‘modernity at 
an accelerated pace’ (Habermas, 1990, cited in Ray, 1997). In fact, while formally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See for example Nikolai Gogol’s 1842 satirical ‘epic poem in prose’ Dead Souls. 11	  A term frequently applied to the years since Vladimir Putin came to power (2000- ), as  
well as to the political system he is seen to have created.	  
	   13	  
restricting its scope to that of the last 14 years of Putinism, such an undertaking cannot 
be achieved without consideration of the 1990s and even the 1980s, as these are 
constantly being referenced by the generation that forms the focus of this study.  The 
periods of perestroika and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the 
‘chaotic’ or even ‘traumatic’ nineties, and subsequent period of greater economic stability 
coupled with an increasingly authoritarian state, appear to have a distinct feel, and each 
of them is sometimes recruited to explain specific facets of Russianness in the 21st 
century. It is important to remember, however, that their categorization into distinct 
periods is a feature of historiography and other scholarly endeavours, rather than a 
reflection of their segregation in discursive terms.  
        The current chapter introduces prevalent explanations of how social, political and 
cultural developments since the 1980s are seen to have shaped contemporary Russian 
subjectivities in ways that are relevant to the overall concerns of the thesis. It therefore 
inquires how each of these might contribute to, or hinder the formations of conditions 
of possibility that would enable national identification to take place. 
 
Post-Soviet identifications 
 
Russian society does not exist. It is a sort of atomised substance,  
Whose elements live lives that are completely disconnected from each other. 
(Sergey Sokolov, interview with BBC Russia, 11.11.201012) 
 
 
While the end of the Soviet Union led to an increase in studies on the nature of 
totalitarian regimes, social scientists appeared to be more reluctant to apply their 
theoretical knowledge to analyses of contemporary Russian society. Existing discussions 
are united by a preoccupation with the effect the changes in the Eastern bloc have had 
on national and cultural identities. As Arel and Ruble (Arel & Ruble, 2006) have noted, it 
is through the revival of the ‘cultural perspective’ in the social sciences that the salience 
of identity has been brought to the fore. When a monolithic structure such as the Soviet 
Union disintegrates, social, cultural, political and individual facets of identity are naturally 
affected. What was once one country became fifteen separate political entities, each with 
a distinct language, cultural heritage and claim to political sovereignty. If one adds to this 
the fact that Russia alone is home to over 170 ethnic groups, then it is perhaps not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2010/11/101110_novaya_sokolov_interview.shtml	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surprising that investigations into the nature and struggle over these post-soviet identities 
have occupied scholars to such an extent. Some scholars have attempted to split the 
notion of a post-soviet identity into sub-components such as attributes, categories and 
dimensions (Arel & Ruble, 2006), however, this serves as an organisational principle rather 
than an in-depth analysis of where and how to locate and define an identity in the first 
place.  Conceptions of national identity as they have been applied to the former Eastern 
bloc countries are chiefly concerned with its usage as a form of self-definition, as a 
strategy of asserting one’s identity not too dissimilar from the ‘narcissism of minor 
differences’ commented upon by Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud, 1930).  
              
The present study argues that, while discussing issues such as minority rights and the 
causes of border struggles are certainly substantial in gaining a better understanding of 
contemporary Eurasia, they rarely seem to question the utility of the  notion of identity 
per se, and whether it adequately serves to describe the “unstable point where the 
‘unspeakable’ stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of a culture” (Hall, 
1988). This lacuna in much of the literature looks like something of a missed opportunity 
when we consider that it is exactly in times of societal transformation that identity 
categories are paradoxically both destabilised and re-established. In a more discursive 
vein, it can be said that through such experiences of dislocation “the contingency of 
discursive structures is made visible” (Howarth, et al., 2000), as new referents are needed 
to make sense of one’s place in the social world. In terms of the project’s aim to 
investigate discourses of identification from two angles, this entails looking at how 
existing societal and historical discourses unfold on a subjective level, that is, which 
signifiers assume a privileged position in the formation of new subject positions.  With 
Russia still usually placed in the category of ‘country in transition’, incapable of arriving 
at a more clearly defined national and political position, the question remains whether the 
absence of a political project or a set of clearly defined post-soviet subject positions is 
problematic for Russians themselves. 
 
Discursive referents 
Scholars such as Urban (1994) see the discourse of post-communism in Russia as one 
that is trying to define itself in terms of national identity.  Marlène Laruelle, assuming a 
historical perspective on the phenomenon of nationalism in Russia, remarks that by the 
late 2000s, what could be observed is a  “a Russian public space increasingly marked by 
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nationalism”(Laruelle, 2009: 22). In opposition to some scholars, who have remarked on 
what they perceive to be an increasing ‘fascization’ and ‘Nazification’ of post-soviet 
Russia, she analyses patriotic rhetoric in contemporary Russia with a view to its 
underlying aims, such as encouraging payment of taxes, and an increasing consumption 
of Russian-made products. She concludes that patriotic rhetoric is by now an essential 
part of politicians’ discourse:  “No public figure […] is able to acquire political legitimacy 
without mentioning his or her policy choices in terms of the nation’s supreme 
interests”(Laruelle, 2009: 1). 
       Another referent of meaning used by the regime as part of “broader political agenda 
of achieving unity” (Admiraal, 2009) is religion, and Russian Orthodoxy in particular. 
Why it should be that religion that has been successfully utilised as a signifier in the 
discourse of new Russia is explained by Galina Eremicheva in the following terms:  
 
The growth of religiosity at the beginning of perestroika was, in our opinion, 
a direct consequence of the shock of the social reforms, accompanied by 
collapse of the state social safety net and the spread of anxiety among 
various groups of the population. In conditions of structural breakdowns, 
many familiar reference points for organizing people’s lives were no longer 
operative. A feeling of instability, doubt in the successfulness of chosen 
strategies, and even the lack of resources to implement them caused people 
to turn to religion (Eremicheva, 2010: 55). 
 
 
While this may go some way in explaining what motivated so many Russians to turn to 
“new reference points” as a way of overcoming the sense of disorientation following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the statement is also representative of traditional, causal 
accounts of social phenomena. A focus on the necessity of stabilising discourse through 
the use of certain ‘master signifiers’ is in line with discourse theory. However, this 
explanation fails to take into account the effects necessary in interpellating the subject 
and activating subject positions. The tendency of political scientists to engage in overly 
rationalist explanations is also evident in their investigations of racism in Russia, with the 
minor modification of the addition of some (unqualified) psychoanalytic terminology.  
Shnirelman locates its origin in the country’s economic and political problems: due to 
Russia’s “deformed economic structure” (Shnirelman, 2009: 140), natural resources are 
viewed as national property not to be shared with foreigners; and the restricted 
democracy and lack of an outlet of dissatisfaction with the government means that anger 
is ‘displaced’ onto immigrants. 
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A more nuanced discussion is provided in Anastasia Leonova’s (2009) account of 
xenophobia in Russia. According to numerous surveys, it is mostly the “culturally 
advanced and highly educated”(Leonova, 2009: 159) Russians who display xenophobic 
tendencies.  Leonova questions the claim that this could be the by-product of 
“uncertainty and confusion about Russia’s future“. Instead, she sees its roots in a “crisis 
of group-identification “, “a continuing re-emergence and reproduction of archaic 
principles and ideas” (ibid.), of nationalist markers ranging from nostalgia for the Tsar to 
a re-appraisal of Stalinism, rather than a production of ideas less rooted in the past. 
 
How to read Russia 
 
With the end of the Soviet Union, there was a mass perception of the loss of some kind of Soviet 
communality and of a unified Soviet cultural text, a Soviet master narrative that had produced a 
distinct kind of conformism as well as a distinct form of dissidence (Boym, 1995: 150) 
 
These ‘archaic principles and ideas’ which appear to make up the ur-text of  
Russian culture have provided those who, following the cultural turn in the social sciences 
and humanities, study prevalent social and historical phenomena through the lens of 
culture, with a deceptively rich repository of explanatory means:  
 
As far as methodology goes, the concept of culture can thus be said to 
function in the recent literature as a junction box that conceals the tangled 
wires of causality and interdependence. Cultural paradigms provide 
templates that survive the passage of time (Engelstein, 2001: 392). 
Through such a form of cultural analysis, all artefacts of Russian cultural production can 
provide clues to understanding Russia, as they are all seen to form part of the larger text 
of Russianness. These artefacts range from mass phenomena to ideological 
constructions, from the socialist realist novel to architectural forms to objects kept in the 
home (e.g. Borenstein, 2007; Boym, 1994, 1995, 2005; Etkind, 2011; Figes, 2003; 
Fitzpatrick, 2005; Sandomirskaja, 1999, as well as Katherine Hodgson’s upcoming book 
on poetry and post-soviet identity). Some of the interpretations may strike one as 
fanciful, with culture here acting to return to “another form of predestination” 
(Engelstein, 2001: 393). However, these scholars at their strongest have provided those 
interested in applying the lessons of discourse analysis to the post-socialist world with 
credible alternatives to political science and area studies approaches. Nevertheless, it is 
important to be wary of any scholarly output that gets carried away by romantic, 
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personalised visions of history inspired by the tragic fate of so many of the country’s 
most outstanding figures, or that provides too smooth and linear an explanation of the 
relationship between recurrent cultural forms, and wider societal discourses.  
Indeed, those scholars recruiting individuals’ voices alongside cultural artefacts to give an 
account of the effects of discourse on subjectivity may find that there is a lack of current 
signifiers alongside the circulation of older forms. Serguei Oushakine, in an article 
published in 2000, characterises the post-1990s landscape in terms of a state of perpetual 
transition, one that fails to mobilise mechanisms of identification: 
The post-Soviet threshold, the post-Soviet transitionality and in-
betweenness thus has a peculiar nature—it does not provide any cues about 
the direction to follow, it does not channel one’s identificatory process; 
instead it outlines the paths that should not be taken.(Oushakine, 2000:995) 
 
To him, Russia represents an “arrested discursive field”, in which the “socio-cultural 
transformation of the discursive field is reflected in [..] individual discursive 
practices”(Oushakine, 2000): 
The symbolic structure of post-Soviet society apparently fails to produce 
clearly defined positions and functions with which the post-Soviet subject 
could identify. Moreover, being in its embryonic state, this symbolic 
structure cannot provide post-Soviet society with the necessary mediating 
link, thus provoking a situation of social dispersion and/or narcissistic 
withdrawal. In the absence of this mediating, intersubjective space, I argue, 
the very situation of transition might become institutionalised (Oushakine, 
2000: 1011). 
 
According to work published nearly 10 years later, only minimal change occurred in the 
meantime. Sergei Prozorov goes so far as to say that contemporary Russia represents 
simply a “disavowal of the 1990s”, marked by an absence of any “positive ideological 
construction”(Prozorov, 2009: 59).    
            
A failure to master the social world is thus reflected in a failure to produce new 
discursive signifiers. Putin’s Russia is portrayed as being stuck in a passage between a 
Soviet and a Post-Soviet Russia, in which the lack of new symbolic forms as well as the 
ability of past signifiers to draw individuals back into the past has led to a form of 
“narcissistic withdrawal” away from the public sphere.  Oushakine, in a logic that echoes 
the present project’s concerns with how changes in the symbolic order affect 
subjectivities, gives the following two reasons: 
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One is the gradual disappearance of what could be called a meta-symbolic 
framework that initially enveloped the discourse of perestroika, while the 
other has to do with the absence of the field of 
post-Soviet cultural production (Oushakine, 2000:1007). 
 
Oleg Kharkhordin, himself inspired by Foucault, argues that this withdrawal may in fact 
be the result of a process of de-politicisation, which commenced in the late Soviet period 
and is now taken advantage of by current politicians. This means that any attempts by 
current rulers to dominate public discourse must be analysed in terms of an “ideology of 
action” – as an attempt to remobilise a society whose experience is detached from the 
state (Kharkhordin, 1999).  
 
Interpellated by the nation  
Besides identifying primary national signifiers and their relative presence or absence in 
the national imaginary, this thesis is interested in the function of such Master signifiers in 
processes of national identification. This entails not only a study of the current discursive 
field as evidenced in private and public discourses, that is, a re-examination of the 
observations made by Oushakine at the beginning of the Putin period, but also an 
investigation of how certain discourses are internalised or rejected. In other words: how 
is the subject hailed by discourses of the nation, and why?  
                  
In her 2001 work on the discourse of ‘homeland’ (родина), Irina Sandomirskaja 
examines how discursive practices of its employment do not merely represent metaphors 
that dominate speech, but in fact manage to ‘suture the entire spectrum of social and 
economic relations” (2001/3).  The Motherland, in its quality as an ideal ‘empty’ signifier, 
cannot be defined or located, but can be accessed through narrative. Through its 
essential openness and crucial affective component родина has colonised objects that are 
not truly connected to it, so that its discourse speaks of family and community, of one’s 
place of origin as well as potentially the nation as a whole and any ideological values 
pertaining to it. In the context of Russia, this has ensured that all of its citizen can 
potentially be ‘hailed’ in the name of the Motherland. The Russian subject here is thus 
not an agent shaping the discourse of ‘home’ on an individual level, but instead becomes 
its effect or ‘secondary function’.  
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According to Sandomirskaja, following the demise of the Soviet Union this signifier is 
not itself disappearing, but is in fact experiencing something of a revival. It has adapted 
to embrace a type of discourse that is ‘less repressive and more seductive’. In order to 
achieve this, it assumed a compensatory function in response to the nostalgia and sense 
of declassification coupled with, or provoked by the drive towards consumption and 
commodification that characterise the post-Soviet period.  The all-encompassing 
discourse of родина has thus benefitted from the lack of new cultural and ideological 
signifiers observed by Oushakine and Prozorov.  
 
Eternal returns 
Scholars of contemporary Russia have remarked on the return of Soviet signifiers, which 
is not only related to a paucity of newer cultural forms, but also to a nostalgia for an 
actual and imagined past13. To a certain degree, this celebration or fetishisation of 
elements of a remembered and imagined history is fundamental to processes of 
identification: 
The imagined community of the nation is based as much on shared 
forgetting as on shared history. The bond of affection and collective 
identification with the nation is established not only through common ways 
of life but also through cultural myths that constitute the phantasmatic space 
of the national imagination. (Boym, 1995: 134) 
 
Julie Cassiday and Emily Johnson go so far as to posit that nostalgia, together with 
consumption, make up the defining cultural practices of post-Soviet Russia as they offer 
Russians “the opportunity to articulate new modes of subjectivity that although they 
seem to pay homage to a vanished past, also reflect contemporary social, political and 
communicative reality" (Cassiday & Johnson, 2013: 40). The two processes are in fact 
intertwined: the artefacts required by the practicing nostalgic can be subjected to 
commercialization, a process which can frequently serve to liberate the object from the 
ambivalences of history – for example “offering an image of 'easy Russia', a history 
minus its political and ideological complexity” (Sandomirskaja, 1999: 117). Ilya Matveev 
(2014) similarly insists that the identity of the new Russian middle class is founded not 
on political influence or significant wealth, but rather on the limited but defining ability 
to consume. Fittingly, Stavrakakis (2007: 199) highlights that in order to maintain a form 
of national solidarity, the community traditions and celebrations that are needed can also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Indeed, the two phenomena are mutually dependent.  
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include ‘consumption rituals’.  
        
However, in a different light, this eternal reappearance of past signifiers in lieu of the 
creation of new symbols and meanings has been read as a ‘return of the repressed’ that is, 
as symptomatic of a past that has not been worked through. Contemporary Russia is 
here understood as being plagued by the shadow of the 1990s and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as well as, further back in the past, the traumas of WWII and Stalinism that 
have not been faced. If one chooses to read large nations’ history in terms of cataclysms, 
and their populations’ collective experiences as having trauma as its foundation, then the 
Soviet Union in particular provides ample material for discussion14: 
 
A traumatic experience is one the subject repeats because he or she cannot 
work it through. Today, more than one nation carries something on its back 
it cannot see: Germany (Nazism), Russia (Stalin), France (Vichy), the United 
States (Vietnam). England still can neither face nor forget the Empire and 
loss of Empire. (Easthope, 1999: 32) 
 
Some commenters insist that this incomplete exorcism of past traumas, which is 
observed in discourse, is mirrored in material manifestations. Famous dissident Vladimir 
Bukovsky states that the regression to authoritarianism under Putin could have been 
averted had the past been dealt with thoroughly, archives opened and those guilty of 
perpetrating crimes on behalf of the state punished at the beginning of the 1990s. 15 
Those with clearer linguistic and discursive affinities, such as Gasan Gusejnov (2012) 
insist first and foremost that the violence inherent in Stalinist language has shaped Soviet 
and post-Soviet discourses fundamentally. This violence was partially repressed, and in 
the meantime continued an existence in Russian discourse due to its formulaic nature 
and catchiness. However, this inhumanity erupts at crucial moments in both private and 
public discourse. According to Irina Sandomirskaja, this includes the traditionally self-
reflexive and ‘discourse rich’ intelligentsia: 
 
It would appear that the totalitarian experience from which we have been 
trying to alienate ourselves is now being re-interiorized, re-introduced into 
the personal experience of the intelligentsia as the sole foundation from 
which self-identification should proceed  (Sandomirskaja, 1995: 57). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is worthwhile pointing out that there are also scholars opposed to such a wholesale application of the 
notion of trauma. Lauren Berlant, for example, argues against using (the discourse of)  'trauma' as 
the prescribed response to crisis (Berlant, 2011:9). 
15 Comment made V. Bukovsky as part of a discussion following screening of documentary ‘They Chose 
Freedom’ on 03.06.2014 in Pushkin House, London.	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Discourses of the intelligentsia 	  
Very particular forces came together to produce this sense of responsibility, 
 what Berlin calls the “collective sense of guilt,”  
that the intelligentsia has carried with it 
 for a century and a half (Gessen, 1997: 6). 
 
The Russian intelligentsia is of greater symbolic significance to the nation’s self-
representation and self-understanding than comparable classes in other countries, chiefly 
because of the voice it has given the country nationally and internationally for almost two 
centuries, such as in the guise of the Soviet dissidents. The voices that emerge, and which 
are certainly more polyphonic than can be documented here, document the class’ 
precarious, ambivalent position on the symbolic interstices between East and West, often 
supplemented by a transnational consciousness as well as a continued, fraught 
attachment to the country’s political and social fate.  
            
Since its emergence in the first half of the 19th century, this class has been strongly 
concerned with issues of social justice and ‘enlightenment’, while at the same time often 
being divorced from the reality of the majority of the Russian people.  Its members were 
seen to have gained an understanding of peasants’ (and later workers’) plight mainly on 
theoretical grounds, thus frequently romanticizing their intuitive goodness. Throughout 
Russian and Soviet history, the essence of Russianness, of the ‘Russian soul’ in its 
capacity for spirituality and suffering, was seen to be located with the Russian peasant, 
and to this day authentic Russianness is believed to be found in the countryside16. At the 
same time, members of the intelligentsia frequently remained barred from a more 
intuitive entry to this ‘life world’, which often saw as its result a considerable degree of 
mutual misunderstanding. This separation was to some extent retained throughout the 
Soviet Union, despite ostensive efforts to provide access to higher education to parts of 
the population that had previously been excluded from it. The paradoxical state of 
conceptualizing a future for a country of which one only knows a small part was retained 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sandomirskaja describes this condition in the 
following words in 1995: 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  http://rusrep.ru/article/2012/02/29/russians/ 	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The intelligentsia are the unique class of text producers whose only purpose 
seems to lie in generating discourse for their own consumption (as they 
generally constitute the reading public they address in their own writing or 
artistic production), a discourse, moreover, which is mostly about 
themselves (Sandomirskaja, 1995: 55). 
Texts produced by members of the intelligentsia – while ostensibly engaging with 
problems faced by the majority of Russians, are written for an audience of other 
members of that same class, thus never attaining much resonance beyond the confines of 
this enclosed, ‘non-public’ sphere. This is especially relevant if one recalls that one of the 
characteristic features of this very class is its faith in the power of the Word, which was 
in evidence for example in the 1960s as its members organized public readings of Silver 
Age poetry to symbolise defiance of the regime.        
The sense of existing in something akin to a discursive vacuum, even if experienced at 
varying level of discomfort, is accompanied by a disorientation in the post-soviet period. 
This follows decades of varying degrees of repression, but also of an unrivalled sense of 
purpose. In Dead Again, Masha Gessen surveys the subject positions available to 
members of the intelligentsia in the Russia of the 1990s during that particularly confusing 
period. While journalistic and somewhat anecdotal, the trajectories she encounters in the 
book end up mirroring some of the positions already alluded to in this chapter, such as 
nationalism and xenophobia in the form of anti-Semitism. They also include a drive 
towards mysticism or religiosity in direct response to the collapse or previous 
compromising of an ideological edifice. In Gessen’s reading, this is because: “Faith, like 
ideology, deals in symbols. In Russia and the Soviet Union, where a national inferiority 
complex found its reflection endlessly magnified, there were, for the most part, grand 
symbols”(Gessen, 1997:49). A newfound religiosity is thus seen as a substitution of one 
kind of certainty for another, here echoing Eremicheva’s earlier comments. Some 
attempted to implement their convictions, honed over decades in which they had been 
barred from political participation, through an active engagement in politics. However, 
for most, this experience was short-lived:  
The problem, as it turned out, was that the intelligentsia perceived 
enlightenment as changing through process and the state’s relationship to its 
citizens; the state, on the other hand, simply sought information that would 
aid it in perpetuating itself (Gessen, 1997: 125). 
As will be illustrated in the next section, this idea of certainty – even if it merely applied 
to certainty in who one’s enemies were – needs to be troubled somewhat. What the brief 
	   23	  
involvement in politics demonstrated above all were the fundamental differences not 
merely in visions of a potential future for Russia, but in the means used to conceptualise 
this future.  	  
Parallel Russias 
Russian society is frequently portrayed as split, with the split located along cultural, and, 
relatedly, discursive lines:  
 
The fact that the intelligentsia and managers of state-run companies both speak 
Russian is just an unhappy coincidence. They represent different countries and 
cultures. They require translators, but neither of them has the time nor the desire 
to listen to the translation, even if were they provided with one.17 
 
In order to speak of Russia, the Russian subject can make use of a number of discursive 
registers. Following the quote’s representation, these discourses do not interact, instead 
running parallel. When forced into a confrontation, this merely serves to enhance the 
sense of mutual misunderstanding and tension. Indeed, according to economic 
geographer Natalia Zubarevich there are potentially as many as ‘4 Russias’18. Both 
perspectives suggest that the divide between the different Russias is insurmountable. 
 
According to Ilya Matveev, one of the manifestations of this divide is that members of 
the intelligentsia, writers and journalists especially, tend to utilise the tools of cultural 
analysis to discuss politics and society: “They comment on politics through the language 
of culture, thus culturalizing politics” (Matveev, 2014: 191). In fact, culture as a 
repository of subject positions and language has been so influential to this class that its 
members have found themselves unable to locate their position on the sociopolitical map 
of Russia. Like their Western counterparts, this educated group of Russians feels an 
affinity with the middle class, but unlike them, it has not on the whole experienced this 
class’ degree of financial stability and political influence:  
 
The state without the state – the neoliberal Putin regime – pushed this new 
type of stateless people toward identification with the middle class, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 http://www.snob.ru/selected/entry/52681 
18 http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1467059/chetyre_rossii 
In her article, she presents them as 1)‘the Russia of large cities’, 2) ‘the Russia of medium-sized industrial 
cities’, 3) ‘the periphery’, and 4) the republics of the Northern Caucasus and Southern Siberia.  	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today many are realizing that they never will reach this imaginary level of 
social success and capitalist “happiness.” The Noah’s Ark of the 
discontented is still searching for political direction and articulation 
(Chehonadskih, 2014: 207). 
 
While a sense of political disorientation may be familiar across the global political 
landscape, and may to an extent be a consequence of neoliberalism and the increasing 
individualisation of modernity (e.g. Layton, 2014; Beck & Beck Gernsheim, 2001 ; Rose, 
1999), in Russia such a sense of feeling adrift has to be viewed in the context of a 
depoliticisation that has its true origin in the late Soviet period (Kharkhordin, 1999), and 
on which the current regime relies in order to sustain itself. 
          
An absence of formal language to denominate one’s position is linked to a disturbance in 
the discursive field, and hence to subjects’ inability to take up a subject position from 
which to speak as members of the body politic. As evidenced in the texts, one strategy 
for the Russian subject is a recurrent search for these positions in the field of cultural 
production – a field which in itself experienced a type of interruption (Oushakine, 2000), 
and which, though strongly fantasmatic in content and thus perhaps of additional appeal 
as potential vehicle of expression, is not suited to an elaboration into a set of coherent 
set of political demands.  The other approach is a complete removal of oneself – whether 
physical and/or discursively – from all that has come to represent contemporary 
Russianness, while retaining some allegiance to a more universal, and strongly 
romanticised essence of the nation. The discourse of a cultured elite versus a more 
loutish, uncouth majority with too little in common between them, which has assumed 
an almost neocolonialist character according to some (Matveev, 2014: 188), is further 
enabling of such an undertaking:  
 
The Russian and Soviet intelligentsia have always been a highly class-
conscious stratum. Being an intelligent — one of the intelligentsia — was, and 
still is, viewed as a moral obligation and a privilege, a special position of 
chosenness with respect to the non-writing, "non-thinking" majority 
(Sandomirskaja, 1995: 56). 
Cynical discourses 
One type of discourse apparently available to all groups of Russian society is that of 
cynicism. It encompasses those in government and business as much as those far from 
the centres of power and wealth. Journalist Peter Pomerantsev claims that the Kremlin’s 
ultimate ideology is that of a cynical form of postmodernism incarnate in a political 
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project: “a world of masks and poses, colourful but empty, with little at its core but 
power for power’s sake and the accumulation of vast wealth.”19 Eminent sociologist Lev 
Gudkov observes that Russians in general have become increasingly cynical with the 
hardships of a lengthy transition and its failed promises20. Rather than resulting in a 
desire to exit this condition, he sees this cynicism as being symptomatic of a stagnant 
society, which is nowhere near imminent change. Thus, while “cynicism indicates the 
erosion of traditional value systems, the destruction of former beliefs and norms, the 
beginnings of deep socio-cultural changes in society” (Gudkov, 2013), it cannot be 
regarded as heralding institutional or societal change. It may be indicative of states of 
conflict between different “value systems”, but not necessarily of their resolution. 
Instead it makes subjects more suspicious of any vision of change: “In this sense, post-
Soviet society shares the notorious "postmodernist" relativism of the 1980s and tends 
to understand any political language as purely ideological" (Chehonadskih, 2014: 201). 
           
Russia appears to be steeped in multiple layers of cynicism: post-transition, post-modern, 
and late-Soviet, placing multiple obstacles in the path towards a more active participation in 
the public sphere with the aim of instigating political change. In his work on the Cynical 
Reason of Late Socialism (1997) and later book Everything Was Forever (2005), Alexey Yurchak 
describes how for the last generation to have been born in the Soviet Union, socialism itself 
had become immutable. It was perceived as a kind of monolith against whose background a 
degree of freedom of expression could be achieved. The result was a type of non-
participation in official communist events – beyond one’s physical presence - and the 
staging of a kind of ‘parallel event’ accompanying it. Socialist ideology had achieved a kind 
of ‘hegemony of representation’, through its omnipresence - the almost complete absence 
of discourses that would contest the official narrative. However, he insists that just because 
this seemingly endless stream of representations of the same political messages was put up 
with by most citizens, one should not necessarily interpret this as a sign of any actual belief 
in their content:  
 
[…] the official reality was uncontested not because its representation was 
taken for granted as truthful, or because people were afraid to contest, it, 
but, first and foremost, because it was apparent that no other public 
representation of reality within the official sphere could occur (Yurchak, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n20/peter-pomerantsev/putins-rasputin 
20 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/lev-gudkov/russian-cynicism-symptom-of-stagnant-society 	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1997: 166) 
 
This uniquely coherent official sphere of representation tolerated no true resistance, but, 
equally and paradoxically, it also tolerated no true recognition, or active involvement. Thus 
both political activists and dissidents were regarded with suspicion, as they insisted on 
engaging seriously with an ideology which was surely so meaningless, yet so foundational to 
reality that this would equate questioning its very nature. The solution was in effect a kind 
of ‘pretense misrecognition’ – a going-through-the-motions, while simultaneously, and in 
private, constantly exposing the regime to ridicule through jokes, or anekdoty, whose 
production and private dissemination grew exponentially in the 1970s and 1980s. This is 
‘cynical ideology’ in the extreme (Žižek, 1991) – not only does the engagement in 
ideological practices largely replace the belief in them; it effectively makes it redundant. By 
the early 1980s, the political organization of the Soviet Union had come to be seen by most 
of its citizens as both eternal and essentially empty. 
      
There are, however, two potential conclusions to be drawn from this. One is that, 
according to Yurchak, the abyss between public and private discourse created a great 
amount of psychic tension. In a Freudian vein, he credits the joke work people engaged in 
so rampantly as having been able to release or resolve some of this tension, while at the 
same time “helping to sustain pretense misrecognition of the incongruous and to maintain 
concurrent official and parallel spheres” (1997:183). Secondly, while the Soviet Union 
officially continued its existence until 1992, it seems to have done so mainly based on 
institutional inertia. In this line of explanation, it appears that there is only so much 
disidentification an ideological edifice can sustain, as it will gradually hollow it out from the 
core:  
 
Geopolitical analysts are as a rule blind to what Hegel calls the ‘silent 
weaving of the spirit’, for the underground disintegration of the spiritual 
substance of a community which precedes and prepares the way for its 
spectacular public collapse. In a way, we can say that the crucial thing takes 
place, that the mole does his work, before ‘anything happens’ (Žižek, 1993: 
285) 
 
However, the relationship between identification and cynicism may not simply be one of 
straightforward antithesis, whereby the existence of one signifies the absence of another. 
The two phenomena could in fact exist on different planes. On one plane, a cynical attitude 
is avowed, and identification thereby disavowed. Yet on another this confirmation of 
	   27	  
having subscribed to the official societal discourse of Putinism does not have to signify that 
hidden beneath the surface there is no attachment to a coveted vision of Russianness. In a 
more Lacanian vein, which relies on the notion of ‘enjoyment’ or jouissance as necessary in 
sustaining any bond, there may be such enjoyment in cynicism:  
It is by means of this 'enjoyment' that ideology can take its failure into 
account in advance, that deliberate ignorance or cynicism (pre-or post-
ideology) is not outside of ideology but is the very form it takes today 
(Butler, 2005: 53).    
 
As referred to earlier, cynicism is also regarded as characteristic of Russian politicians’ 
relationship with politics and the populace. In fact, the only political figure frequently 
exempt from this is Vladimir Putin, both in the extent of his assumed commitment to 
Russia, and the response this is believed to attract in the population, where his approval 
ratings have consistently topped those of any Western leader21.   
Putin as symbol 
In 2014, almost a decade and a half into Vladimir Putin’s run as president, prime 
minister, and once more president, his presence, too, has assumed somewhat monolithic 
qualities. The Russian president has arguably dominated the public’s perception of 
contemporary Russia within and outside its borders, lending name and direction to the 
last 14 years of Putinism (Sakwa, 2007; Prozorov, 2009; Applebaum, 2012; Gessen, 2012; 
Hill & Gaddy, 2013; Goscilo et al, 2013 to name just a few). The political imaginary of 
post-1990s Russia is both characterised and constrained by his larger-than-life persona, 
as he has come to stand both for growing economic stability, and decreasing political 
freedom. Thus, for example, during his first two terms as president and later as prime 
minister, Russia’s GDP per capita increased from US$7.7k in 2000 to US$15.9k in 2010 
22, while in 2014 Freedom House awarded the country’s freedom of press a score of 81 out 
of 100 (100 being the highest possible degree unfreedom)23, thereby equalling levels in 
Sudan and Ethiopia. The political party United Russia (Единая	  Россия) is closely 
associated with Putin, having supported him and Dmitry Medvedev in presidential 
elections since 2004. It has by now become the dominant force in the Russian 
parliament, setting a conservative course for the government, and closely associating 
itself with the Russian Orthodox Church.  
             	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_performance_trends.php 
22 Source: CIA World Factbook. http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=rs&v=67 
23 http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/russia#.VDPJQVZIUak	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For many the current face of Russia has therefore come to be associated with Putin as its 
leader. However, discussions of the Russian president frequently contain a barely 
concealed suspicion and open disagreement as to the ‘real’ nature of the President’s 
agenda. His many masks, ranging from sterile technocrat to hyper-masculine, autocratic 
ruler, inspire a recurrent quest to identify the authentic political project behind them, 
with verdicts varying from the extremely liberal to the extremely authoritarian. In some 
readings, the 1990s are treated as an aberration, a traumatic episode between the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new Russia, and its long shadow as well as 
the absence of any credible alternative have ensured that a Russia without an 
authoritarian head of state has become unimaginable. While it is uncertain how much 
Putin’s attachment to certain recurrent themes and tenets is truly ideological in nature, it 
is clear that the President is conscious of the power of historical and cultural symbols, 
and that he is not afraid to recruit them when it suits his policies.  Here the president and 
his advisors were able to utilise in their favour the "semiotic chaos of post-Soviet 
society" (Baer, 2013: 170) by borrowing elements from all periods of Russia and Soviet 
history.  
             
However, more recently the political tides appeared to have turned against Time 
magazine’s 2007 Person of the Year24, Vladimir Putin, and in favour of Time magazine’s 
2011 Person of the Year—the Protester25.  Accompanying the 2011 parliamentary 
elections and reports of electoral fraud, as well as the subsequent announcement that 
Putin would be running for president for a third time26, a series of protests and mass 
demonstrations demanding fair elections took place in Moscow and other large Russian 
cities throughout 2012 before more or less dying down by 2013. Instigators of the 
protests were the same representatives of the educated, urban middle- class mentioned 
earlier.  In their latest incarnation as the ‘creative class’, the group of protesters was 
nevertheless unable to garner the sympathies of the majority of Russians. In the 
polemical words of Eduard Limonov, writer and then-leader of the National Bolshevik 
Party: 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_1690757_169615
0,00.html 
25 http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132,00.html 
26 Following his 4-year ‘hiatus’ as Russia prime minister.  
	   29	  
“Progressivism”, the desire to be contemporary, free from the past and its 
traditions by all means […] has played a mean joke with our intelligentsia. It 
separates itself further and further from the people by not wishing to 
recognise its entitlement to tradition and to spirituality. […] As for 
foreigners – well, what can you expect?  It is rare for one of them to 
understand Russia. Actually, our ‘progressive intelligentsia’ has also long ago 
stopped understanding Russia. They buried their noses in their laptops….27 
 
The urban intelligentsia is thus once more accused of false allegiance and criticised for a 
discourse that differs too greatly from that of ordinary Russians. While the official 
grounds for critique may be in part aesthetic  - Limonov goes on to condemn the 
creative class for their penchant of being in awe of all that is Western, or even Western-
sounding (“Internet, iPad, Pussy Riot, Occupy Abai”, ibid.), the reason why many people 
in Russia cannot identify with the Moscow protests is also sociopolitical. The capital’s 
middle class is demanding political changes that match its conception of the world, 
which is a vision that is not shared by everybody. Indeed, rather than giving in to the 
protesters’ demand or offer an acknowledgement thereof, the government’s immediate 
response was to introduce a series of repressive acts, “from raising the fines for 
participation in “unsanctioned” demonstrations and imposing harsh limits on NGOs, to 
the darkly absurd laws against “offending the rights of believers” and “homosexual 
propaganda “(Budraitskis, 2014: 184), as well as laws re-criminalising slander and the 
‘defamation of religious feelings’28, to name just a few. Even more recently, the call to 
search for a Russian ‘national idea’, which had been instigated by Yeltsin in 1996 and 
shelved no too long after (Smith, 2002), was reactivated under Putin29. It appears that 
after a decade of dubious stability30, fixing parameters of Russianness is now once more a 
task of national importance. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 http://limonov-eduard.livejournal.com/246726.html	  
28 This law was anticipated by the trial against members of Pussy Riot, the responses to which are analysed 
in detail in Chapter VI. 
29 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2263724 
30Maria Chehonadskih, for example, is not willing to take this characterisation at face value:  “Instead, 
“stability” is oriented toward reproducing the “chaos” that it was summoned to eradicate. The result is a 
managed instability, which on the social level appears in diverse forms of precariousness, informal 
relations, corruption, and violence. Although this managed instability is recognized to some extent, it is 
branded as “normalized” and opposed to the mythical chaos of the 1990s, which is represented as more 
extreme than any current chaos. Even skeptics are convinced that Putin is the “lesser evil.”” 
(Chehonadskih, 2014: 203). 	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Conclusion and thesis overview  
The introduction’s somewhat circular structure mirrors the temporal recurrence of many 
of the signifiers and discursive tendencies referred to throughout the chapter. The 
referents available after the collapse of the Soviet Union have, in some readings 
(Oushakine, Prozorov), not been significantly enriched or modified in the following 
decades.  Explanations for this ‘arrested discursive field’, in which old signifiers are 
merely reshuffled, range from the trauma and chaos of the 1990s, which left in its wake a 
kind of ‘aphasia’ (Oushakine, 2000) or discursive paralysis, to the depoliticisation which 
began in the Soviet period (Khakhordin) and which was coupled with a prioritisation of 
economic development, in turn enabled by steadily increasing oil prices. At times it was 
suggested that only a leader figure can ‘suture’ the free-floating, disconnected signifiers of 
contemporary Russia, which include references to an imperialist Tsarist past, religious 
imagery, consumption, and a harking back to the Soviet Union, especially the Brezhnev 
period. Due to its essential openness, the catch-all term and discourse of ‘motherland’ 
(родина) is one that is similarly able to hail the subject in the name of the nation 
(Sandomirskaja) and has been operationalised for propaganda purposes throughout 
Soviet and Russian history.         
The thesis examines the impact of these discursive conditions of (im)possibility on 
processes of identification. It argues that by studying national identification, rather than 
nationalism or national identity, one can gain insight not merely into how and where 
national signifiers are reproduced, but into which signifiers are privileged and to what 
degree they are assumed by subjects – especially if one keeps in mind the 
abovementioned ‘crisis of group-identification’ (Leonova, 1999) ascertained by some 
scholars. The current chapter’s observations point to these discourses having to retrieve 
much of their content from the past, as contemporary narratives of Russia so often 
feature varying degrees of denigration, which in itself has historical roots (e.g. Etkind). 
The following chapters will investigate which of these signifiers are internalised, and 
which are rejected. Similarly, if there are many instances of dismissal or rejection, these, 
too, may point the way to elements in discourse which must not be questioned, or which 
are perceived as inalterably authentic or pure.               
The fact that there may be both an avowed cynical stance together with, or alongside an 
identification with affect-laden signifiers such as that of the motherland initially points to 
a series of contradictions. Indeed, a similar assessment is possible of Vladimir Putin’s 
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personification of both a multitude of facets of ‘Russianness’, and simultaneously of an 
essential emptiness. However, this thesis shows that these paradoxes are symptomatic 
not just of psychic life, but of the life of a nation as well. In fact, they need not be seen as 
contradictions at all if one concedes that psychic reality operates according to a different 
logic, which in turn has an impact discourse. Much of the subsequent chapters will 
therefore be preoccupied with the methodological and theoretical implications of latent 
forms of identification across different forms of text, as well as moments in which the 
cynicism that prohibits open avowal of these attachments appears to be temporarily 
deactivated or transcended. The thesis investigates the ways in which an attachment to 
the nation can be performed or enacted in discourse, thus gaining a fuller insight into the 
“phantasmatic space of the national imagination” (Boym, 1995) of contemporary Russia. 
 
Thesis structure  
Following the present (introductory) chapter, chapter 2 provides insight into the 
theoretical underpinnings of the thesis by giving an overview of conceptualisations of 
identification in different school of psychoanalysis, with a special focus on ways in which 
these notions can be applied to identifications with the group or nation, and to the aims 
of this study in particular. Chapter 3 (‘Reading formations of national identification: a 
psychosocial approach’) examines strategies of making the analytical move from 
discourse to psyche, which is also one of the central methodological preoccupations of 
psychosocial studies. The chapter presents a summary not only of the methodological 
procedure of the present study, but also a survey of relevant of strategies to examine 
human subjectivity. It hereby follows a dual structure: after an exposition of the thesis’ 
empirical process, including reflections on the respondent selection and rationale for the 
case studies, the second part describes how to distinguish a psychosocial approach from 
other forms of textual analysis, and which methodological steps this entails.         
           
Chapter 4 (‘Natasha’s Dance: a psychosocial approach to texts on Russianness’), 
together with the subsequent chapter, forms the first of two parts of the thesis’ empirical 
element. In line with the thesis’ aim to detect instances of identification with Russianness 
and to account for passionate attachments to the nation in discourse, the chapter 
analyses eight interviews, simultaneously outlining the challenges of establishing 
authenticity of (moments of) identification in textual material. Discursive operations 
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discussed include a disavowal of knowledge in favour of a celebration of affect, the 
mythologisation of aspects of Russian national character and history, and a splitting of 
the nation into good and bad Russias. Interviewees repeatedly emphasise the 
impossibility of identifying with contemporary instantiations of Russianness, but this is 
coupled with a distinct desire to love the nation, which finds its expression either in a 
sense of disappointment, or a list of grievances against a Russia which has failed to make 
itself loveable. Aspects of Russianness that are capable of inspiring affective investment 
can be found in the realm of aesthetics and culture, so that elements from literary and 
cinematic culture are identified with fantasmatically, being first deemed worthy of 
identification, and then retroactively established as distinctly Russian. The next chapter 
(Chapter 5: ‘The Drunkard in the Rain: a psychosocial analysis of surveys on 
Russianness’) picks up threads from the preceding discussion, starting with the discursive 
operation of splitting, and relating it to the greater split in Russian society. While the 
chapter represents an enrichment of already established observations and conclusions, as 
well as a more multifaceted pool of material, due to the greater number and diversity of 
respondents, it also offers analyses of discursive phenomena such as the delegation of 
affective investment to others as a means of protecting one’s own latent identification, 
the nature and function of certain signifiers of Russianness, and the primacy of the visual 
in identification. Both chapters in conjunction also tell the story of loss, that is, the loss 
of the good nation which is set up as an ideal but perpetually fails to live up to it. 
   
Chapter 6 (‘Velvet Revolution or Frenzied Uteri – Making Sense of Pussy Riot’) is the 
first of two case studies of public discourses of identification with Russianness. It centres 
around discourses of rejection and (dis)identification as evident in the public responses 
to Pussy Riot in Russia. The emotional response to the group’s ‘punk prayer’ indicated 
that a collective nerve had been hit, especially when viewed in conjunction with protests 
that took place in Russia in 2011 and 2012. By examining the different registers of affect 
activated by the ‘punk prayer’, the chapter catalogues the ways in which Russia desires to 
see itself. The analysis suggests that in their rejection or championing of the group’s 
performance, participants in the debate surrounding Pussy Riot have found ways of both 
shifting the threat Pussy Riot represents, and of once again ‘enjoying the nation’. The 
second case study to which Chapter 7 (‘Fantastic Mr President – The Masks, Myths and 
Mirrors of Putinism’) is dedicated, examines discourses that seek to elicit identification, 
and by extension, love in the populace, enabled by the primacy of representational 
	   33	  
mechanisms to all elements of the discourse of Putinism. The chapter argues that by 
investigating the quasi-mythical instantiations and discourses surrounding Vladimir 
Putin’s persona, it is possible to encounter the investments of Russia and Russians in (or, 
vice versa, their rejection of) a certain configuration of both authority and Russianness, as 
embodied in the figure of Putin. Examining the multitude of representation of Putin that 
have been produced during his presidency and stint as Prime Minister, the Russian 
president emerges as the master signifier of Putinism – a non-ideological, highly 
personalised edifice. This links it to the underlying theoretical concern with processes of 
identification with a leader or authority figures, as well as later variations on this, such as 
Adorno’s examination of fascist propaganda.  
Finally, Chapter 8 (Conclusion) summarises the thesis’ major findings, highlighting its 
theoretical and methodological contributions. One of the most surprising findings 
identified is the prevalence of image-rich discourses and signifiers. Their significance in 
subjects’ discourses reinforces their role in imaginary identification, while recent events 
in Russia also point to the consequences of the construction and proliferation of 
mythological narratives. The conclusion also discusses the issue of temporality and 
temporal location in order to link the discourses analysed in the thesis – most of which 
were produced between 2010 and 2013 - to the developments of 2014. It is shown that 
the antagonisms and tensions of Russian society have not been resolved, but merely 
obscured by enjoyment in nationalistic sentiment and the recovery of a coveted ‘lost 
object’. 
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Chapter II: Identification 
 
 
By asking the young people to perform this act of imaginary identification, I wanted to see 
how/where this largely post-Soviet generation would (or would not) locate itself on the 
available symbolic map. (Oushakine, 2000:992)  
 
 
In times of societal transformation, identities structured by previously existing roles and 
affiliations can become redundant, and new referents are needed to make sense of one’s 
place in the social world. In terms of the project’s aim to investigate discourses of 
identity from two angles, this entails looking at how existing societal and historical 
discourses of identity play themselves out on a subjective level, that is, how new 
identities are formed, and which signifiers assume a privileged position in these processes 
of identity formation.   A psychoanalytic angle, with its emphasis on the unconscious 
mechanisms at work in any instance of identification, can provide useful insights, which 
an investigation relying on the self-transparency of subjects might overlook. The present 
chapter consists of two sections: the first part details conceptualisations of identification 
in psychoanalysis, and the second part discusses ways in which these notions can be 
applied to identifications with the group or nation, and to the aims of this study in 
particular. 
 
 
Identification in Psychoanalysis 
 
The unconscious constantly reveals the “failure” of identity. (Jacqueline Rose, 1987: 90) 
 
But something we have learnt from the whole discussion of identification, in feminism and psychoanalysis, 
is the degree to which that structure of identification is always constructed through ambivalence. Always 
constructed through splitting. (Stuart Hall, 1988:47) 
 
Since Freud’s initial conceptualisation, identification has become one of the fundamental 
concepts of psychoanalysis, regarded as integral to an understanding of the human 
psyche. In psychoanalytic thought identification is what enables individuals to mentally 
assume the place of the other, to relate to a world outside themselves, to make a move 
from monadic experience to inter-subjectivity: “A path leads from identification by way 
of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of 
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which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life.” (Freud, 
1921:110) 
        
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud postulates that: "Identification 
is known to psycho-analysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another 
person" (Freud, 1921:107).  One’s caregivers become the original sources of one's ideals, 
as well as one's first love objects, in that taking one caregiver as an ideal appears at the 
same time as a libidinal attachment to the other. In fact, during the first mode of 
identification, “… in the individual’s primitive oral phase, object-cathexis and identification 
are no doubt indistinguishable from each other “ (Freud, 1923:29). In the infant the 
affective bond takes on the form of identifying with the parent. At the same time it 
develops a “true object-cathexis”, an attachment, to the mother, which according to 
Freud eventually results in the wish to replace the father, of wanting to have what he has. 
The initial positive identification then takes on a “hostile colouring” - "identification, in 
fact, is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as 
easily as into a wish for someone's removal" (Freud, 1921:105). The failure of gaining 
possession finds expression in the child’s attempt to be like the parent, say, to take the 
father as his role model and emulate him in his behavior – this sequence of jealousy and 
subsequent identification continues in adulthood: 
 
Even today the social feelings arise in the individual as a superstructure built 
upon impulses of jealous rivalry against his brothers and sisters. Since the 
hostility cannot be satisfied, an identification with the former rival develops. 
(Freud, 1923:37) 
 
As a result of repression, certain characteristics of the beloved person are adopted as a 
way of incorporating, of ‘having’ some features of the individual to which one is 
attached. In other words, in the second mode of identification, “in a regressive way it becomes 
a substitute for a libidinal object-tie” (Freud, p.1921: 107). The third and final, hysterical 
mode of identification discussed by Freud refers to instances when a libidinal tie is not 
the founding characteristic of the relationship, and instead it is rather the case that “one 
ego has perceived a significant analogy with another upon one point” (ibid.). For 
example, identification can thus be constructed on a shared openness to experience 
certain feelings. The case used by Freud to illustrate this point is a group of girls in a 
boarding school, whose hysterical fits are not based on wanting to be like each other, but 
on wanting to have what one of the girls possesses, i.e. a secret lover. Put succinctly, the 
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difference between the second and third modes of identification is whether assuming the 
place of the other would allow the subject to have something or to be something.  The 
second mode requires an object-tie, whereas the third mode requires an awareness of, 
and identification with, the place of another. 
          
In groups, specifically those groups Freud discusses (the church and the army), he makes 
a distinction between two types of identification. Identification with the leader is of the 
vertical kind: the group member feels a strong attachment to the leader, but as no true 
reciprocation is possible, individuals retain the bond by making the leader their ideal, 
installing him (or her) in their egos. It is useful to remember that the qualities of this ideal 
have much in common with one’s first objects of love, and of subsequent identification, 
thereby retaining a similar degree of authority. The second, ‘horizontal’ type of 
identification, the mutual bond between its members, is based on the recognition of 
an "important emotional quality" - the shared love for the leader: 
 
A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one 
and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently 
identified themselves with one another in their ego. (Freud, 1921:116) 
 
The feelings group members have for the leader are perhaps more equivocal than initially 
indicated. The key word here is ambivalence, similar to that the infant experiences in the 
relationship with its parents – in the case of the group these feelings are repressed, or 
projected onto outsiders, as they would otherwise threaten to destabilize the group’s 
coherence. 
 
 
In his analysis of the phenomenon of melancholia (Mourning and Melancholia, 1917), Freud 
also provides an illustration of pathological identification "with an object that is 
renounced or lost, as a substitute for that object" (Freud, 1921:109)  - the lost object is 
introjected into the ego, as a way of not relinquishing what is lost, in other words, "the 
shadow of the object has fallen upon the ego" (Freud, 1917:249). The self-denigration 
that represents such a characteristic feature of the melancholic is thus in fact a 
denigration of the object. This theorisation of melancholia as a pathological form of 
object-relation, as a failure to relinquish the object with which another type of 
relationship cannot be established, was later re-conceptualised by Freud as underlying all 
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ego formation: “[T]he character of the ego is a precipitate of the abandoned object-
cathexes and it contains the history of those object choices’”(Freud, 1923: 29). Judith 
Butler (1990, 1997) utilizes the idea of melancholic identification to illustrate how the 
assumption of a gendered position entails a loss – the loss of the other sex as a love 
object or the “foreclosure of certain forms of love” (Butler, 1997:23). An identification as 
homosexual hereby functions not as a potentially destabilizing force to the order of 
gendered positions, but instead frequently serves to strengthen them in its perceived 
quality as an identification in opposition to the hegemonic order. 
 
In summary, identification is both ambivalent and inherently precarious. It involves 
feelings of love as well as aggression, attempts at emulation as well as rivalry. 
Identification is an experience that is predicated on failure. We can never fully be like the 
other, and neither can we fully have or incorporate the other into ourselves, even though 
identification may represent an attempt to achieve just that. It oscillates between a desire 
to have and a wish to be like the other. Later, Lacan was to group these aspects under 
the notion of imaginary identification.  
       
However, Freud’s account of subject formation has not been met with unanimous 
agreement. The individual’s integration into, and identification with, the group as Freud 
saw it has received its fair share of resistance and critique, even within the broader 
psychoanalytic community.  Victor Wolfenstein (1990) objects to Freud’s ideas about 
group formation on the grounds that it is based on what he perceives to be an erroneous 
conceptualisation of an individual that pre-dates group formation: “’the individual’ is an 
element in a group phantasy” (Wolfenstein, 1990:174). To him, this notion of the 
individual is in fact an effect of group membership: negative emotions that accompany 
this membership are projected onto the group, leading to the perceived dichotomy 
between individual and the collective. The real focus of Wolfenstein’s critique, however, 
is that by starting with an individual, rather than the group, an application of Freud’s 
theorization of identification is at times less than helpful when one tries to utilize it to 
explain specific historico-political moments:  
 
Freud’s psychological individualism and mystification of history restrict the 
political theoretical utility of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 
(1921) and preclude the recognition that psychoanalysis is, eo ipso, a social 
psychology. (Wolfenstein, 1990:178) 
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Does this imply that we must dismiss identification as a concept without explanatory 
value beyond the initial familial dyad and triad? Looking at post-Freudian contributions, 
which re-conceptualise the individual as a product of familial structures as well as 
discursive and ideological formations, it appears that in order to make the concept more 
relevant, one may have to locate every instance of identification more specifically in a 
given set of socio-historic circumstances.  Thereby one ends up somewhat complicating 
the initial Freudian account, without, however, losing his ideas regarding the libidinal ties 
that underlie the formation of groups. 
 
Ideal ego & ego ideal 
 
The Ego is an other. (Jacques Lacan, 1954:9) 
 
Perhaps the most compelling illustration of the fundamentally intersubjective nature of 
identity is that the subject need others in order to form its own ego:  "It is by means of a 
series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified" (Laplanche, 
Pontalis, & Nicholson-Smith, 1973:205). In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud details how 
the ego is established through ”successive identifications, resulting in the production of a 
love object for another agency (i.e., the Super-Ego)”(Vanheule & Verhaeghe, 2009:393). 
The child’s primary identification, as detailed above, is so similar to object-cathexis or 
love, as to be indistinguishable from it. Beyond this initial identification, the ego develops 
through subsequent identifications, which keep occurring throughout adolescence and 
adulthood. Freud does not exclude the possibility that these can come into conflict with 
each other, with potentially troubling consequences:  
 
[… ] we cannot avoid giving our attention for a moment longer to the ego’s 
object-identifications. If they obtain the upper hand and become too 
numerous, unduly powerful and incompatible with one another, a pathological 
outcome will not be far off. […] Even when things do not go so far as this, 
there remains the question of conflicts between the various identifications into 
which the ego comes apart, conflicts which cannot after all be described as 
entirely pathological. (Freud, 1923:31) 
 
Identifications never lose their relation with the initial object, with whom one may have 
identified in part due to the impossibility of establishing another type of relationship.  
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this: firstly, the true origin of the Ego lies 
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in the other. Secondly, “Freud understands the development of the Ego as a never-ending 
attempt to return to the state of primary narcissism, albeit via the ideal criteria as put 
forward by other(s)” (Vanheule & Verhaeghe, 2009:395), meaning that the subject wants 
to return to a state of perceived oneness and self-sufficiency via the path and criteria set 
out by one’s parents, although these criteria may become modified with further 
identifications in later life. However, the awareness that identity construction is mediated 
through others, that there is an otherness at the heart of the subject, is only the starting 
point for a further investigation into processes of identity formation. In order to gain a 
better understanding of this, we need to turn to the distinction, made by Freud and 
developed further by Lacan, between ego ideal and ideal-ego. 
            
Freud first refers to an ideal ego (Ideal-Ich) in his essay On Narcissism in 1914. In fact, he 
never makes a concrete distinction between the ideal ego and the ego ideal (Ich-Ideal), 
but later authors such as Daniel Lagache relate the ideal ego to primary processes of 
identification with powerful parental figures and see it as an essentially narcissistic 
formation, connected to early feelings of omnipotence and self-sufficiency of the ego. 
Lagache also regards it as the foundation for later heroic identifications, that is, 
identifications with charismatic historical or contemporary figures (this instance of 
identification will become important in a discussion of the role of ‘fantastic’ Vladimir 
Putin).  
 
The notion of the ego ideal assumes greater importance in Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego, as the "principle on which the constitution of human groups is 
based"(Laplanche, et al., 1973:144). Freud sees it as clearly differentiated from the ego, in 
fact as a result of the ego having become "divided, fallen apart into two pieces" (Freud, 
1921:109). The ego ideal shares some of the functions of the superego (to be fully 
conceptualised in 1923 with the publication of The Ego and the Id), in that it operates as an 
observer and moral conscience: “It is easy to show that the ego ideal answers to 
everything that is expected of the higher nature of man“(Freud, 1923:37). At the same 
time it originates, like the ideal ego, in earlier, infantile identifications. Cases of "amorous 
fascination, for subordination to the hypnotists and for submission to leaders" 
(Laplanche, et al., 1973:144) are to be explained as the subject substituting the ego ideal 
for another person. 
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From these brief definitions, it may become clear that the distinctions between ego ideal, 
ideal ego and superego are in fact rather subtle: all involve identifications with powerful 
others, thus having an impact on the subject's self-regard. Lacan develops these concepts 
into three distinct entities or registers (Imaginary, Symbolic and Real), all three of which 
can provide clues about the subject's integration into the social. 
 
Identification in Lacan 
Lacan’s initial theorisation of identification can be located in his writing on the ‘mirror 
stage’ in infant development, which he wrote in 1949. According to Lacan, prior to this 
stage the child experiences its bodily self as disjointed, its existence as helpless and 
chaotic. The experience of seeing its image reflected in the mirror then becomes a key 
episode. According to Lacan, the reflection may at first conjure up feelings of rivalry and 
aggression as it embodies an ideal image of wholeness. The child overcomes these 
feelings by identifying with the image, which enables it to see itself as a harmonious whole. 
In fact, the prerequisite to – as well as in this case, the partial resolution of – feelings of 
jealous rivalry is the ability to imagine oneself in the place of the other (Parker, 2007). 
        
Here, the ego thus arises in reaction to an image of (illusory) wholeness – an Ideal Ego - 
and represents the child’s entry into the realm of the imaginary. Importantly, it involves an 
element of misrecognition, in that the subject comes to associate with an image whose very 
level of integration – both physically and psychically – it will continue to strive for and 
assume possible. Psychologists such as Michael Billig (2006) have criticized this rather 
unorthodox account of ego development. However, rather than attacking it purely on the 
grounds of a lack of scientific credibility – a popular strategy for undermining 
psychoanalysis - Billig takes offence at Lacan’s privileging of the visual in psychic life:   
 
Indeed, one might argue that the popularity of the mirror trope in 
contemporary cultural analysis is yet another example of the over-evaluation of 
the visual modality in much western philosophy and psychology.(Billig, 
2006:16) 
 
Later on Lacan himself becomes increasingly dissatisfied with his first account of 
identification and, while he retains the emphasis on misrecognition and alienation, in his 
later modifications, “the stress falls less on its ‘historical value’, and ever more on its 
structural value” (Evans, 1996:118). By 1956 Lacan states that “ The mirror stage is far 
form a mere phenomenon which occurs in the development of the child. It illustrates the 
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conflictual nature of the dual relationship” (Lacan, 1956 in Evans, 1996:118) It is helpful, 
however, to remember how he, like Freud, foregrounds the strongly narcissistic 
components of ego development. If identification is perhaps less about actual specular 
images than initially thought, it is nevertheless beneficial to retain the importance of the 
dimension of looking, and being seen. Additionally, with the contemporary pervasiveness 
of images and the theorization of post-modernity as ‘hyperreality” (e.g. Baudrillard, 
1988), Lacan’s initial account of imaginary identification has once more gained currency. 
         
Lacan’s subsequent interpretation of the importance of the Ego Ideal in symbolic 
identification takes into account the mystery of what it is that the other expects or wants of 
the subject. The subject’s Ego Ideals are treated as potential answers to the question of 
what it is the other desires:  
 
Lacan starts from the axiom that the other’s desire is essentially enigmatic to a 
subject. It comes across as a threatening riddle. He assumes that in their 
contact with others, human subjects invariably, but not necessarily consciously, 
ask themselves the question: “What does she/he want from me?” (Vanheule & 
Verhaeghe, 2009:397) 
 
In order to make itself likeable or desirable to the other, the subjects assumes or 
identifies with elements or ‘traits’ (signifiers) that appear to have attracted the other’s (for 
example its mother’s) desire. By insisting that the other’s desire is at the subject’s core, 
Lacan exceeds intersubjectivity and arrives at alienation as the central principle of 
identification. Each element which the subject may experience as most integral to its 
being is therefore originally an answer to the mystery of the other’s desire.  
         
Underneath these identificatory layers is something that resists symbolization – referred 
to by Lacan as the real of the drive – but which nevertheless exerts a disturbing effect on 
the subject and thwarts any attempts at constructing an integrated identity, in the 
meaning given to it by ego psychology. However, this antagonism is not only due to the 
basic split between the symbolic and imaginary orders on the one hand and the real on 
the other – there is also a split on the level of the symbolic between the different 
signifiers that provide the basic material for any articulation of a subject’s identity. These 
elements can enter into conflict with each other, as previously discussed in Freud’s 
account of identification, leading to the Ego “coming apart”, splitting, as in his 
topographical model. The subject never feels fully represented by a signifier - a signifier 
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which predates him or her - and being conflated with this signifier can be anxiety –
provoking, as it entails questions of who the subject is in the eyes of little others and the 
Big Other. 
        
Both Freud’s and Lacan’s accounts of identification do not treat the process as one of 
increasing removal from an authentic core. In the clinical encounter, it is less the content 
of representations or signifiers underlying specific identifications that is of interest, but 
rather their function, and what these have failed to subsume or integrate. If to identify 
requires the ability to represent, then this representation only ever succeeds to a certain 
degree. It is the failure to represent and subsequently assume a signifier in its entirety that 
may provide one of the important motivations behind further identifications in 
adulthood.  
 
In summary, for Lacan, the ideal ego represents the subject's idealised self-image, and 
the term imaginary identification applies to the mechanism by which we identify with the 
“image in which we appear likeable to ourselves” (Žižek, 1989:105). Ego ideal and 
symbolic identification, on the other hand, refer to a positioning of oneself in a place “from 
where we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable” (author's italics). It is 
the location from which this image takes on value in the gaze of the big Other - the big 
Other being "the virtual symbolic order, the network that structures reality for us"(Žižek, 
2003). Finally, the superego is " this same agency in its revengeful, sadistic, punishing, 
aspect" (Žižek, 2006:132). The ideal, 'imaginary' ego is what Lacan refers to as the 'little 
other'; the ego ideal is the reference point of the subject's symbolic identifications, and 
the superego with its impossible, relentless demands on the subject, is an instantiation of 
the Real. 
 
Identification, Introjection, Incorporation 
In order to avoid further confusion of a number of psychoanalytic terms which all 
ostensibly refer to psychic (and actual) processes of 'taking in', this may be a suitable 
point at which to provide brief definitions of their respective meanings. The umbrella 
term that is thought to encompass introjection, incorporation and identification is 
internalisation. Freud himself never fully distinguished between these terms and at 
times uses them interchangeably. All of them are seen as integral to ego development, as 
they involve both a taking in of external prohibitions, and the establishment of a 
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boundary between self and object. The most important distinction in the way it has been 
applied both in and outside the clinic is that between introjection and identification.       
In its role in the developmental trajectory, identification is closely related to both 
incorporation, seen as a manifestation of the oral impulse, and introjection, which can be 
regarded as its mental counterpart. It is both a normal developmental process and a 
defence mechanism, as in projective identification, whereby an affect which has become 
intolerable to the psyche is split off and externalised, i.e. projected outward onto another 
person. Whether more fleeting or integral in ego development - identifications occur 
throughout a person’s life and form the basis of any form of engagement with the 
outside world.   
Introjection is often used to refer to all form of internalisation whereby the ego forms a 
relationship with an object, including, confusingly, the incorporation of the object into 
the ego in melancholia, as it was utilised by Freud who simultaneously referred to it as 
(melancholic) identification.  According to Sandler, the subject constantly engages in a 
"perceptual taking in" of the external world (Sandler, 1989: 10), which leads to both the 
construction of fantasy objects in the child, and superego introjection. However, the fate 
of objects internalised differs sharply in both processes: "From a representational point 
of view it is valuable to make a sharp distinction between identification as a modification 
of the self-representation on the one hand, and introjection as the setting up of 
unconscious, internal "phantom" companions, felt to be a part of one's inner world, yet 
external to one's self-representation, on the other" (ibid: 11). 
 
Identification and the Social 
 
I therefore shall adopt an overall, comprehensive approach to the problem, 
 taking the position that the identification process, 
 in its each time singular specificity for each historically instituted society,  
and identification itself are moments of the totality of society  
and that these moments make no sense, either positively or negatively,  
when detached from this social totality. (Castoriadis, 1989:208) 
 
A type of parallel can be drawn between the Lacanian concept of the big Other and 
Georg Herbert Mead's account of the child’s encounter with the 'Generalised Other'. It 
is defined by Mead as “an organized and generalized attitude” (Mead, Morris, & Morris, 
1934), an amalgamation of individual attitudes into a symbolic unity, that informs the 
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way individuals regulate and judge their own conduct. It is through introjection of the 
generalised other that the subject is integrated into the social world. Mead's notion of the 
self is thus in part a result of identification with an imaginary collectivity. This is perhaps 
where the two concepts diverge: while the generalised other shares some of the 
regulating and structuring functions of the big Other, its origin is to be located within the 
imaginary. The big Other, contrastingly: 
 
[…] transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be 
assimilated through identification. Lacan equates this radical alterity with 
language and the law, and hence the big Other is inscribed in the order of the 
symbolic. Indeed, the big Other is the symbolic insofar as it is particularized for 
each subject. The Other is thus both another subject, in his radical alterity and 
unassimilable uniqueness, and also the symbolic order which mediates the 
relationship with that other subject. (Evans, 1996: 136) 
 
 It is equally important to note that in Mead’s conceptualisation, much of the ambivalence 
and instability accompanying identity formation, which is so essential to psychoanalysis, is 
lost. While he allows for social conflict, self-formation is essentially seen as a process of 
assimilation and adaptation. Psychoanalysts, and Lacanian thinkers in particular, on the 
other hand, stress the alienating effects of identification, as well as the fragility of any 
identity at which we might arrive, as: 
 
 […] human construction is never able to institute itself as a closed and self-
contained order. There is always something which frustrates all efforts to 
reach an exhaustive representation of the world – whether natural or social. 
(Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:132) 
 
Symbolic order 
For this study, and its focus on experiences of structural dislocation, the idea of a 
symbolic order is of particular significance. The concept was introduced by Levi-Strauss, 
who claimed that '’any culture may be looked upon as an ensemble of symbolic systems, 
in the front rank of which are to be found language, marriage laws, economic relations, 
art, science and religion” (Lévi-Strauss, 1987:15). Its nearest sociological or social 
psychological extension can once more be found in the work of the symbolic 
interactionists, and their insistence that symbols are the means through which we 
structure our reality (Blumer, 1986). 
 
The symbolic thus denotes the effective operation of collective customs and 
institutions which work not by reference to the intrinsic meaning of symbols, but 
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on the basis of how they locate subjects, by generating the symbolic co-ordinates 
that enable such subjects to take up positions in social reality (Hook, 2011a:190). 
   
In terms of processes of identification, it is important to remember that symbolic 
identification is seen by Lacan to precede imaginary identification, as it is the symbolic 
realm from which we retrieve and judge the imaginary forms after which we model 
ourselves. The symbolic precedes the individual, and by being located in a social order, 
he or she is endowed with a number of roles, a symbolic mandate, with which to identify, 
which in turn informs the imaginary aspect of identification.      
           
However, the relationship between the two types or levels of identification is by no 
means entirely circular and smooth-running.  There is a gap between the roles, which the 
individual is offered or assigned in a given structure, and the imaginary work it requires 
in order to fully assume an identity. Any interpretation of and identification with the 
symbolic order is an attempt to overcome this tension, to temporarily fix meaning for the 
subject. There is “no meta-guarantee of the validity of the symbolic order within which 
the subject dwells” (Žižek, 1996:136) – when taking up a symbolic mandate, such as that 
of ‘teacher’ or ‘wife’, effort is involved in establishing its meaning for the subject; 
meaning which is thus established retroactively.  At the same time,  “identity can never 
be fully totalised by the symbolic, for what it fails to order will emerge within the 
imaginary as a disorder, a site where identity is contested.” (Butler, 1997:97).  
 
 
Broader discursive formations 
If the social and cultural co-ordinates underlying these roles or mandates change, a gap 
opens up between the meaning that the individual previously derived from them, and the 
new order. Ernesto Laclau describes this as a space between the subject and the 
dominant, hegemonic discourse and endows structural dislocations with powers that are 
both traumatic in that ‘they threaten identities’, and productive in that they can serve as 
‘the foundation on which new identities are constituted” (Laclau, 1990:45). This gap 
between the new order and anachronistic discourse can be temporarily sutured through 
the creation of myths,  “spaces of representation” (Laclau, 1990), which in some cases 
lead to the creation of new social imaginaries – a process which he sees as occurring 
more and more frequently in contemporary, de-traditionalised societies.  
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In a manner reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, Laclau mentions how 
subjects are created partially through the structure into which they are born (Laclau, 
1990). In line with other post-structuralist thinkers, he gives preference to the term 
‘subject position’ over that of ‘identity’. Rather than seeing the self as a fixed entity, 
‘subject position’ indicates a particular configuration of subjectivity. An individual can 
identify or be identified with more than one subject position, such as that of ‘Russian’ or 
‘husband’ or ‘teacher’. Which mode of subjectivity gets activated under what 
circumstances is centred on the debate over how much agency the subject has in forming 
these positions. Therefore, before moving on to a discussion of psychoanalytic, and 
specifically Lacanian approaches to discourse analysis in the next chapter, it is 
worthwhile reiterating that, despite the structuring and perhaps deceptively a-
psychological status of the symbolic order, it requires affective investment in order to 
operate at the individual level: 
 
The important point is to realise that without this cathectic (affective) investment 
in an object […] there will not be a symbolic order either. So the affective, the 
cathectic investment, is not the other of the symbolic but its very precondition. 
(Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2010:236) 
 
For the current research project, which aims to locate moments of national identification 
in discourse, it is assumed that there are moments when and where the subject feels he 
or she coincides with the signifier. A discourse analysis therefore needs to delineate what 
marks these moments of seeming authenticity, and, conversely, determine when and why 
the gap between oneself and the signifier is felt most acutely. If recurring patterns 
emerge, this could point to the fact that conducting this type of analysis can be a way of 
examining the role of fantasmatic identification. 
 
National Identification 
 
Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound by ties of 
identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego ideal upon the most various 
models. Each individual therefore has a share in numerous group minds - those of his race, 
of his class, of his creed, of his nationality, etc. - and he can also raise himself above them to 
the extent of having a scrap of independence and originality. (Freud, 1921:129) 
 
Judith Butler points out that identification is never fully accomplished – in order to 
approximate any sense of an identity, the subject needs to constantly reiterate and 
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reproduce this identification: “Identifications are never fully and finally made; they are 
incessantly reconstituted and, as such, are subject to the volatile logic of iterability” 
(Butler, 1993:105). She opens our mind to such questions as what the subject is trying to 
attain by identifying, or refusing to identify with an existing position, postulating that, for 
example, “a radical refusal to identify with a given position suggests that on some level 
an identification has already taken place, an identification that is made and disavowed” 
(ibid: 113).      
          
Butler treats sexed positions as being marked out in the symbolic order – “there are 
sexed positions that persist within a symbolic domain which pre-exist their appropriation 
by individuals” (Butler, 1993:97). In order to heed to this “symbolic demand to assume a 
sexed position” (Butler, 1993:96), subjects need to appropriate these positions, which in 
practise means an appropriation in the sense of engaging in the fantasy of 
“approximating that symbolic site” (ibid.). At first it appears that this ‘symbolic demand’ 
does not find its equivalent within a national framework. This is possibly due the 
secondary nature of the nation or wider community in an individual’s development, i.e. 
the fact that nation and national identity play little or no role in the initial dyad and triad 
with one’s caregivers. Additionally, one needs to question the status of the nation in the 
symbolic order. If the symbolic order is something that pre-dates specific cultural 
formations or their approbation by individuals, and is itself a way of structuring such 
formations, does it contain a mandate which demands one take up a place, or position 
within a national body?  
         
At the same time, notions of what constitutes a specific national identity as it is situated 
in a societal context infiltrate a multitude of interactions and public debates, and by the 
time a child enters school it encounters a discourse of the nation, which constructs the 
child as its subject and citizen. There are, therefore, recurring moments throughout an 
individual’s life when it is asked to assume a configuration of national identity. The type 
of subject position assumed is thus directly linked to processes of identification, and 
specifically, which signifiers captivate the subject, and in what way. On top of this it 
frequently appears that in order to sustain themselves, national ideologies attempt to 
engulf other categories within the symbolic, such as gender or kinship relations, so that a 
threat to national identities can become a threat to the stability of these positions as well. 
Similarly, a national ideology potentially needs to take into account symbolic roles (one 
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example is the integral role of an image of the ‘good German mother’ in National 
Socialist ideology) in order to become successful. 
           
If we therefore pursue Butler’s line of thinking and try to apply it to a form of national 
identity, the challenge for the individual then becomes one of approximating a site that is 
not fixed in the symbolic. On top of this, if one keeps in mind Anderson’s work on the 
imaginary – here in the sense of mythical - nature of national communities - in times 
following societal or political upheaval, this site then becomes difficult if not impossible 
to locate. Oushakine (2000) describes post-soviet Russian subjectivities in terms of their 
inability to assume such a position, which he relates to fundamental disturbances in the 
discursive field. To him, contemporary Russia does not offer the individual any subject 
positions that would adequately represent ‘post-soviet man/woman’, and Russians are 
thus forced to rely on past signifiers, which remain ever-present if not in content – a 
content which has become historically redundant - then in form. One, somewhat 
anecdotal example provided by him is the use of the Russian national anthem: a new 
anthem was introduced in 1990 to replace the old Soviet hymn, but proved so unpopular 
that then-President Putin re-instated the old anthem with new words, albeit written by 
the same author who had composed the lyrics for the Soviet anthem. 
          
However, the crisis of identification that is perhaps specific to post-soviet Russia in its 
‘state of permanent transition’ is merged with, and possibly enhanced by, the crisis of 
meaning that has beset Western (post-)modernity -  a crisis which Russia is fated to 
repeat at an accelerated pace as it rejoins the trajectory of modernity (as argued in 
Habermas, 1990). According to Castoriadis (1989), all modern Western societies are 
undergoing a crisis that affects the identification process - a process, which then in turn 
serves to perpetuate this predicament.  His comments on the state of society are certainly 
reminiscent of what has been termed the ‘crisis of investiture’ (Santner, 1996) of 
modernity. However, here the consequences for the subject appear to be somewhat 
more traumatic. The status of community in the symbolic has become eroded, and a 
community’s “existence as a meaning-giving, symbolic whole can no longer—and 
perhaps never again—be experienced as fully trustworthy or of ultimate value”(ibid: 
145). Its origin is seen to lie in the central paradox of post-Enlightenment: that “the 
subject is solicited by a will to autonomy in the name of the very community that is 
thereby undermined, whose very substance thereby passes over into the subject” (ibid). 
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Returning specifically to national identification, Žižek insists that “the element which 
holds together a given community cannot be reduced to the point of symbolic 
identification: the bond linking together its members always implies a shared relationship 
towards a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated” (Žižek, 1993:111).  He sees this 
enjoyment as the key to understanding a community’s coherence in opposition to other 
communities – each society attempts to cover over its inherent antagonism by 
‘outsourcing’ it. There is, of course, no pre-existing, positive content to signifiers such as 
Russianness. In order to bring into being a society or nation, this very nation first needs to 
stage a threat or loss, so that this quality under threat can become an essential part of the 
nation’s identity. An example frequently employed by him to illustrate this is National 
Socialism’s use of an alleged Jewish-Bolshevik plot threatening an essentially German 
culture and way of life, when Germany as a sovereign nation had in fact only been in 
existence since 1871. This type of discourse continues to be employed in contemporary 
anti-immigration campaigns. In Žižekian terms, this occurs whenever a society attempts 
to cover over its inherent antagonism or split, the fact that in reality it does not exist, by 
‘outsourcing’ this conflict. This is perhaps best illustrated by the eruption of nationalist 
conflicts after the breakup of the former Eastern bloc. Socialism, according to Žižek, 
functioned as a kind of positive ‘guarantor’ for the social pact. While allowing Eastern 
Europeans to keep a type of ‘cynical distance’ from its ideology, it nevertheless 
functioned as a ‘social glue’ holding society together. Citizens of former socialist 
countries experienced the disappearance of this ‘big Other’ and subsequent upheaval as a 
traumatic encounter with the Real (Žižek, 1993:129). Aggressive displays of nationalism 
towards ethnic minorities and neighbouring countries can thus be seen as desperate 
attempts to prevent a total disintegration of society. 
          
However, this is not to say that in order to identify with one’s country, one needs to 
engage in xenophobic speech or practices. Returning to the notion of enjoyment, Žižek 
claims that: “A nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be 
materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national myths.” (Ibid: 
112). This is a statement which is strongly reminiscent of Santner’s verdict on judge 
Schreber’s “cultivation of an ensemble of “perverse” practices, identifications, and 
fantasies” (Santner, 1996:145) allowing him to find his way back into a context of “basic 
human solidarity” (ibid.).  The main difference here is Žižek’s emphasis on the social 
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nature of these practices, where Santner stresses the importance of finding a personal set 
of rituals which would help one engage with one’s nation or community. For any 
discourse analysis, this would entail looking for the myths and fantasies structuring the 
interviewees’ representations of Russianness, while keeping in mind that their decision to 
leave the country, albeit temporarily, may signify a gesture of refusal of identification, or 
indeed that this gesture of refusal may enable the individual to create a series of private 
practises which allow it to create its ‘Own Private Russia’. 
 
 
Love and identification 
 
We are aware that what we have been able to contribute towards the explanation of the libidinal 
structure of groups leads back to the distinction between the ego and the ego ideal and to the double 
kind of tie which this makes possible - identification, and putting the object in the place of the ego 
ideal. (Freud, 1921:96) 
 
When one speaks of identification, must one not also speak of love? For Freud, the 
development of a ‘true object-cathexis’ appears around the same time as identification in 
a child’s developmental trajectory, and both are ways of establishing a relationship with 
the object. According to Mladen Dolar’s recapitulation of the two processes, the main 
difference lies in whether the object has been introjected into the ego, as in identification, 
or has been put in place of the ego ideal, as in love.  In fact, identification often takes 
place when a loving bond has become impossible, be it through the foreclosure of desire 
as detailed by Butler, or the loss of the object through death or the end of a relationship. 
In line with these similarities, the bond underlying group formation can be one of love or 
identification. In fact, if we recall Freud’s statement regarding the mechanism behind the 
third mode of identification as it operates in groups – the recognition of a shared 
emotional quality such as love for the leader, or an ideal – it can be both. 
           
However, before the formation of groups must come the formation of subjects. 
Previously we discussed how the ego consists of the ‘sediment’ of previous 
identifications – attachments that served as “the resolution of desire” (Butler, 1997:102), 
so that that the ego becomes “the residue of desire, the effect of incorporations which, 
Freud argues in The Ego and the Id, trace a lineage of attachment and loss” (ibid.). Lacan, 
and Butler after him, share the notion that the subject comes about through a forced 
choice. For Butler, this means, “no subject emerges without a ‘passionate attachment’ to 
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those on whom he or she is fundamentally dependent (even if that passion is ‘negative’ in 
the psychoanalytic sense)’’ (1997:7). In order to materialise as a subject, the individual 
cannot become fully aware of the conditions that created it and its respective ‘passionate 
attachments’ – that the love it feels for its primary caregivers is necessary to ensure its 
survival and is thus created out of a situation of utter dependency, in which by definition 
no true ‘free decision’ of whom to love or not to love can be made. Becoming a subject 
thus involves a process of ‘subjectivation’ (from the French ‘asujetissement’, which Butler 
adopts from Foucault), which in Butler’s definition becomes an attachment to the very 
agency that subordinates the subject. 
          
Dolar, like Butler, concludes that it takes love to become a subject. He takes the 
Althusserian notion of interpellation and demonstrates how it does not suffice as an 
explanatory mechanism of how ideology turns individuals into subjects. He, too, takes 
his cue from Lacan and his ‘impossible choice’ – becoming a subject by entering the 
symbolic entails a loss and brings with it alienation. The individual must remain unaware 
of the obligatory nature of the choice (which was never truly a choice in the first place, as 
to exist outwith the symbolic is itself an impossibility) and must carry on as if it was 
made freely. In ideology, love “can serve as a link between the most private and a social 
bond” as it masks the external origin of subjectivity and endows it with a veneer of 
authenticity in order to facilitate the marriage of external, contingent materiality and 
interiority of the subject. The type of attachment which originates in a forced choice - in 
other words, when there is no choice as to its object - can be said to apply to one’s 
country or nation as well: “The contingent circumstances of one's birth are transformed 
into an object of love; what is unavoidable becomes ethically sanctioned” (Dolar, 
1993:82).         
            
In Sara Ahmed’s words “identification is a form of love; it is an active kind of loving, 
which moves or pulls the subject towards another” (Ahmed, 2004:126). In a Butlerian 
vein, she also shows how identifying with someone, and hence with that person’s desire, 
requires a dis-identification with the object of desire – in order to want to have it, I cannot 
simultaneously want to be it. When we love, the object placed in the position of the ego 
ideal allows the subject to see itself as lovable – thus by loving I am given a chance to 
idealise myself. Ahmed insists that this logic is also in operation in the establishment of a 
group identity. She emphasizes how non-reciprocated love can intensify the affect, 
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similarly to when the loss of the object leads to it becoming firmly lodged in on the ego 
as in melancholia: “Love may be especially crucial in the event of the failure of the nation 
to deliver its promise for the good life” (Ahmed, 2004:131). The nation cannot return 
one’s love. In Ahmed’s argumentation, this failure in effect serves to “increase the 
investment in the nation” and, consequently, one’s attachment to it, rather than 
decreasing it after being forced to justify this love despite all the nation’s shortcomings, 
in which case the cost would perhaps appear to be all too great. Antidotes to such a 
possible ‘depression’, or rather, palliatives that seemingly solve the problem of how to 
overcome a sense of disappointment in the nation are listed by her as both a 
postponement of potential national greatness to future generations, or nostalgia for a 
past that never was. Another common strategy is the use and naming of an other as that 
which prevents the nation from achieving unity (see Žižek, 1989). Narratives of love for 
the nation therefore frequently become narratives of loss, as national lore appears to be 
in need of an ‘obstacle’ which keeps it from achieving union with the desired object. 
             
For Ahmed, the content of a national ideal is unimportant – it takes shape in the act of 
loving, “the ideal is the effect of the process of idealization” (Ahmed, 2004:131). At the 
same time, the nation is not without form – it is an image that each of its members tries to 
approximate, but which remains unattainable to some (she cites Kristeva’s example of 
the veiled woman in modern-day France). A special case is the ideal of multiculturalism, 
whereby the act of loving each other in one’s differences becomes the ideal, and, 
subsequently, an imperative. The supposed love for difference thus contains its own 
failure, or blind spot, as being different only ever means being equally loyal to all cultures 
– giving preference to one in any area is regarded as a betrayal. 
          
A fundamental problem, however, remains - a problem that has been in existence 
perhaps since the initial Freudian account: love for an ideal such as the nation, and a 
person such as a leader are conflated. But can they really be treated as one and the same 
in terms of underlying psychic processes, including identification and loss? In a Lacanian 
vein one would treat an ideal as a ‘master signifier’ – variable in content, significant only 
in its ability to tie other, contingent elements together. A loving relationship, on the other 
hand, may be based on ‘misrecognition’, but never does the other come to us as an 
empty vessel waiting to be filled with psychic or ideological content – a relationship 
between individuals, be it based on love, identification, or a sequence of both, does not 
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leave either party unchanged. If we assume that the relationship with an idea, or a ‘master 
signifier’, should be distinguished from that with another subject, then what is it exactly 
that separates the two? Presumably, it is its very emptiness that distinguishes the master 
signifier, whereby notions such as ‘nation’ can obtain an almost accidental set of 
meanings, which, albeit to varying degrees, manage to capture the imagination of large 
groups of individuals: 
 
[..] in the ideological space float signifiers like ‘freedom’, ‘state’, ‘justice’, 
‘peace’….and then the chain is supplemented with some master-signifier 
(‘Communism’) which retroactively determines their (Communist) meaning. 
(Žižek, 1989:113) 
 
If the content of any national ideal, however, is to such a strong degree dependent on 
individual fantasy which enables the subject to assume this ideal as its own, that is, to 
identify with it, then how can we even endeavor to study these ideals and their assumption 
by subjects on a collective scale? It serves the researcher well to remember here that 
these fantasies – social fantasy – nevertheless remain anchored in the conditions specific 
to a society: “[…] the fact such an economy remains tied to the Other (of prevailing 
societal-historical norms, ideological values, etc.) means that a regularity of sorts is 
nonetheless obtained in such fantasies ” (Hook, 2011b: 130). 
 
 
Pathological identifications 
 
 
In Freud’ view, we become what we cannot have,  
and we desire (and punish) what we are compelled to disown. 
 But why these choices – why can’t we do both and something else as well?  
 - and why are they the choices? (Butler, 1997:157) 
 
 
Freud detailed how the ego itself is formed through the internalisation of lost objects; 
that in melancholia, for the ego it can become a way of establishing a relationship with an 
object, which would not be possible otherwise (Rauch, 1998). Klein described how it 
could be an almost violent act, how in projective identification the individual colonises the 
other’s psyche in a desperate attempt to ward off threats to the ego. Butler claims that 
the subject may at times identify with another’s position exactly so as to disidentify with its 
existing identity position: 
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Or it may be that certain identifications and affiliations are made certain 
sympathetic connections amplified, precisely in order to institute a 
disidentification with a position that seems too saturated with injury or 
aggression, one that might, as a consequence, be occupiable only through 
imagining the loss of viable identity altogether. Hence, the peculiar logic in the 
sympathetic gesture by which one objects to an injury done to another to 
deflect attention from an injury done to oneself, a gesture that then becomes 
the vehicle of displacement by which one feels for oneself through and as the 
other.” (Butler, 1993:100) 
 
This may apply in particular to a certain mode of national identification, where subjects 
openly reject the possibility of a straightforward identification with a nation or national 
ideal, and feel the need to maintain and voice a minimal, “cynical” distance between 
themselves and a particular identity constellation. In order to avoid too much ‘injury to 
oneself’, the subject can then only take offense as if on behalf of another subject. 
        
The abovementioned forms of (dis)identification all serve as solutions to problems – a 
given position, such as the potential loss of the object, becomes intolerable for the 
subject and a certain mode of identification serves to prolong the object’s existence, or to 
avoid an exposure to what seems too great an injury to the psyche.  However, this still 
leaves one with the question of when or under what conditions an identification 
becomes problematic, or even pathological. There are, of course, examples of 
pathological identifications in the clinical sense, such as that of Judge Schreber, whose every 
act of identification presupposes an act of splitting and dividing up the other. Where 
Freud identified the origin of these paranoid identifications as lying in disavowed 
homosexual desire, Santner (1996) suggests that the case of Judge Schreber is indicative 
of the fact that: 
 
[…] we cross the threshold of that era where and when those symbolic 
resources no longer address the subject where he or she most profoundly 
“lives,” which is, beginning at least with the European Enlightenment, the 
negative space hollowed out by the will to autonomy and self-reflexivity. 
(Santner, 1996:145) 
 
This ‘crisis of investiture’ carries as its consequence “the inability of subjects to assume 
symbolic mandates: what prevents them from fulfilling the act of symbolic 
identification” (Žižek, 1997:13)31. Therefore, even if Schreber’s illness is enabled by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See also Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen’s essay on the “The Oedipus Problem in Freud and Lacan” (Critical 
Inquiry 20 [Winter 1994]: 267–82): “Our societies, on the other hand, are defined by a general crisis of 
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certain facets of his biography, chiefly among them his upbringing by an hyper-
disciplinary and repressive father, Santner also sees it as representative of, or conditioned 
by: 
 
…the central paradox of modernity: that the subject is solicited by a will to 
autonomy in the name of the very community that is thereby undermined, 
whose very substance thereby passes over into the subject. (Santner, 1996, 
ibid.) 
 
He treats Schreber’s “cultivation of an ensemble of “perverse” practices, 
identifications”(ibid., my italics) as one answer to the problem of modern communities’ 
inability to interpellate the subject in its name. It can become a way of relating to and 
assuming a position in society without resorting to, or submitting oneself to totalitarian 
projects which promise to heal this rift by a double-movement of disavowal of its 
existence, and the simultaneous staging of a threat by external forces (see Žižek, 1997). 
 
The problem confronting us is thus one of dynamics in society where making an 
identification can be injurious to the psyche. If it is assumed that we keep making 
identifications throughout our lives, yet have little or no autonomy over where and when 
we undertake these acts of identification, then this seems almost inevitable. Another 
potential issue that needs to be flagged up is the use of the language of pathology itself. 
Using psychoanalytic terminology applied to the social realm may carry with it its own 
problems, but these are enhanced when we use the language of pathology, whereby a 
social diagnosis can easily serve to disenfranchise those whose plight it means to 
highlight. Psychological portrayals of nations in states of occupation or colonisation have 
been especially exposed to this terminology, perhaps not surprisingly, considering their 
inherent injustice and well-documented social and political consequences. However, 
considering the widespread use of psychoanalysis outside clinical settings, the question of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
symbolic identifications—’deficiency’ of the paternal function, ‘foreclosure of the name-of-the-father,’ 
perpetual questioning of the symbolic Law and pact, confusion of lineage and general competition of 
generations, battle of the sexes, and loss of family landmarks. . . . Let us not be fooled by Lacan’s 
invocation of the symbolic Law: What he described as an a priori law of human desire is nothing but a 
convenient hypothesis of the ‘elementary structures of kinship’ in Lévi-Strauss’s sense, and it cannot be 
applied to modern societies, where it simply does not apply as a law. . . . How is it possible to separate good 
from bad oedipal identification if the law that guarantees that difference is slowly being eroded in our 
societies?” (282). 
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whether one is justified in using its tools to examine the social world has perhaps become 
redundant.  
          
Instead, one may do well to follow Stephen Frosh’s advice to use the analytical tools of 
psychoanalysis reflexively. Not only should one avoid treating it as a kind of oracle, 
which could provide insights other approaches might fail to give.  One should also 
remain aware that many of its theories are products of a specific time (and individual), 
and should be treated with a certain awareness of this context. Frosh calls for 
psychoanalysis “[…]to step back form its own normativeness, its own conformist 
tendencies, and ask how it can be constantly renewed” (Frosh, 2010:224). This does not 
imply that the clinical concept of melancholia for example cannot be used in a societal 
context – indeed it has been applied very fruitfully to the study of post-transitional and 
post-colonial regimes, as detailed below – but that beyond certain structural similarities 
with the initial concept, it can acquire a different set of meanings and consequences 
outside the clinic; meanings that might call for a different type of ‘intervention’. 
           
Melancholia - as a pathological form of identification - has a been diagnosed in societies 
that have struggled to acknowledge or work through the loss of a national ideal, 
beginning with the Mitscherlichs’ famous study of Germans’ Inability to Mourn (1975), 
which detailed how the apolitical stance and focus on economic success of most post-
war Western Germans was actually symptomatic of an underlying melancholic 
identification with, and refusal to mourn, the loss of the ideal image of Germany and 
Germans propagated under National Socialism. Paul Gilroy (2005) detected similar 
workings in the British psyche: the British continual celebration of moments of ‘glory’ 
such as its role during WWII in facts indicates a harmful obsession, or rather, regressive 
identification with its former omnipotence as colonial masters over large parts of the 
world. 
       
Homi Bhabha, like many others, turns to the writings of Frantz Fanon, in order to 
examine the dynamics of identification in the colonial subject. He concludes that, 
because to exist in relation to others (which is the only way to exist) means to identify, 
colonial identification is always  “caught in the tension of demand and desire, is a place of 
splitting” (Bhabha, 2004:63) – the fantasy of assuming the place of the colonial master 
co-occurs with one of retaining one’s place and one’s anger. At the same time, the image 
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of the colonial subject has become distorted by the coloniser’s gaze, so that identification 
becomes “the return of an image of identity that bears the mark of splitting in the Other 
place from which it comes.”(ibid:64). The colonial subject finds itself doubly alienated, in 
search of deliverance from identifications that are injurious to both the oppressed and 
the oppressor. These identifications, that are at best ambivalent, at their worst 
“compulsive” (p.86) or even “paranoiac” (p.88), become symbols of a dislocation, which 
is both social and psychic. Identification in a colonial context is thus seen as a 
“pathological condition produced by the colonial relation” (Fuss, 1994:29).  
 
One of the questions that follow from a reading of Fanon is then how subjects can 
liberate themselves from these problematic identifications, if one sees, as he does, 
identification as the incorporation of an image that originates in the fantasy of the 
colonial oppressor and that serves to enslave its subjects. One strategy which Fanon 
himself refers to is a refusal to identify. In order to illustrate this, Diane Fuss cites the 
example given by Fanon of an Algerian woman walking around unveiled, thus ‘imitating’ 
the style of the French occupiers. Fanon is at pains to stress that this instance of 
imitation is not simultaneously also one of identification. Imitation here is purely 
instrumental, as it allows the women to carry weapons undetected. However, it remains 
difficult to determine how one can be sure whether an identification has not in fact taken 
place regardless, especially in light of Butler’s comments on disidentification as an 
alternative form of identification. 
      
Nevertheless, the emancipatory and political potential of disidentificatory practises is also 
hailed by Muñoz, who claims that it “permits the subject of ideology to contest the 
interpellations of the dominant ideology” (Muñoz, 1999:168) – in the cases mentioned by 
him through carving out an alternative space for queer, “anti-identitarian” (ibid: 177) 
identities.  At the same time he aims to rehabilitate the role of melancholia in 
marginalised communities (note the difference between this type of community and the 
national melancholia referred to by Mitscherlich and later Gilroy), for whom it can 
become a productive ‘structure of feeling’ reminding them of what was and could once 
more be. 
 
 
 
	   58	  
Table 1: Types of identification 
Theoretician Types of 
Identification 
Characteristics Applications / 
Elaborations 
Freud First “object-cathexis and 
identification are no doubt 
indistinguishable from each 
other” :  wanting to have & to 
be. 
 
Second (Regressive) “in a regressive way it becomes a 
substitute for a libidinal object-
tie”: 
wanting to be so as to have; 
Melancholia; 
Identification with leader 
Ahmed: Identification 
as a form of love 
Butler: “Melancholy 
Gender”, 
Gilroy: “Postcolonial 
Melancholia” 
Third (Hysterical) “one ego has perceived a 
significant analogy with another 
upon one point” 
Identification between group 
members 
 
Lacan Imaginary (Primary) Identification with image, 
establishing ego, leads to 
formation of ideal ego, involves 
feelings of rivalry & alienation 
Žižek: ‘identification 
with image in which we 
appear to ourselves’ 
Symbolic (Secondary) Identification with 
signifier/traits, with the Name-
of-the-Father; represents 
accession into symbolic order, 
leads to formation of ego ideal 
Identification with look of the 
Other 
Žižek: ‘identification 
with place from where we 
are being observed’; 
Ideological 
identification; 
subject requires fantasy 
in order to fully assume 
mandate. 
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Conclusion 
 
In Psychoanalysis Outside the Clinic (2010), Stephen Frosh summarises the main aspects of 
identification - the emphasis being on its processual nature – and concludes that: 
i) identity is not an achievement, but an act which, in order to come into being,  
ii) requires constant re-enactment and performative elaboration, as well as  
iii) recognition by others and an Other, and, importantly,  
iv) the subject’s affective investment. 
 
The ego is formed through identification, meaning the internalisation of lost objects, and 
their incorporation into the subject’s fantasy. Identity formation thus becomes 
“something founded on the fantasised relationship with real objects in the interpersonal 
or intersubjective world” (Frosh, 2010:109). One way of treating identifications which 
take place in adulthood is to regard them as answers to the question of what makes one’s 
life liveable.  In order to do so, these identifications need to retain a link to one’s ideal 
ego and ego ideals. At the same time, they enable one to hold on psychically to what may 
already be lost in material reality, or what one has never been able to possess due to the 
foreclosure of certain desires. If we assume that adult identifications include those with 
political and national ideals, then the nature of these identifications reflects not only a 
subject’s personal history of prior identifications made in childhood, they also reveal 
something of history itself. 
           
In a social context which is undergoing dramatic transformations, or which is 
characterised by skewed power relations, a prevalent identificatory pattern can potentially 
help one gain a better understanding of the context itself. A strongly melancholic tinge to 
national identification can therefore mean that ideals, which have perhaps been publicly 
disavowed, continue a ‘subterranean’ existence allowing them to keep exerting their 
influence. Alternatively, an excessively cynical attitude to one’s nation and national 
signifiers may point to a type of disidentification (which, if we recall, is also a type of 
identification), as a straightforward identification would prove to injurious to the psyche. 
At the same time, one should not neglect the emancipatory potential of these forms of 
identification, as they may eventually result in new practises, or lead to the demand for 
new structures. 
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One strategy enabling one to utilise theories of identification – while heeding the warning 
not to apply psychoanalytic ideas opportunistically – is to start with a form of social 
‘diagnosis’:  what are a nation’s societal structures and forms of sociality, what are its 
manifest problems, and who suffers (or, despite apparent injustices, claims not to suffer)? 
Only then can one turn to psychoanalytic ideas and rephrase the above questions in 
terms of symptoms, using clinical notions to understand what these could represent. If 
ideas from the clinical domain can give one clues about what could be going on, then 
one should be able to return to one’s initial analysis with a better comprehension of the 
underlying motivations of – or affective investment in – certain social movements and 
practices. 
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Chapter III: Reading formations of national identification: a 
psychosocial approach 
 
Against the view of someone who might argue that identification with a form of discourse is labile, 
tenuous and weak, I would urge that it is in fact immensely strong since it is cognate with those primordial 
movements, constitutive for the species, in which the subject strives to win a place for itself within language 
and so become a speaking subject. (Easthope, 1999:18) 
 
One of the thesis’ central challenges is the location of psychic operations, such as that of 
identification with the nation, in discourse.  This entails a movement from what is 
observable in language to a conjecture of what these recurrent linguistic patterns might 
indicate in terms of psychic operations in the subject. The analytical move from 
discourse to psyche is also one of the central methodological preoccupations of 
psychosocial studies, so that the current chapter represents an attempt to present an 
overview not only of the methodological procedure of this particular study, but also a 
survey of relevant of strategies to examine human subjectivity as it is  “produced and 
reproduced in the text, as embodied and ‘invested’ discourse” (Savile Young & Frosh, 
2010: 518). The chapter follows a dual structure: after describing how to distinguish a 
psychosocial approach from other forms of textual analysis, the second part features an 
exposition of the thesis’ empirical process, and which methodological steps this entails. 
Anthony Easthope’s quote serves as a good transition from the previous chapter, with its 
focus on the theoretical underpinnings of the study, to the current one, which seeks to 
lay out the rationale for the analytical strategy and methods of data collection. This then 
paves the way for the subsequent empirical chapters. In comparison with other forms of 
qualitative analysis, there has been relatively little empirical work that seeks to identify 
moments of identification in discourse using a psychosocial methodology. This thesis 
seeks to fill this lacuna by applying this type of analysis across different forms of textual 
discourse, such as interviews, surveys and media representations.  
The thesis’ introductory chapter provided information on the discursive conditions that 
form the background to the subsequent empirical chapters.  Without awareness of, and 
sensitivity to the sociohistoric developments of which subjects have been a part, social 
research methodology becomes ineffectual, if not meaningless.  Ideally, such knowledge 
enables social researchers to gain a more holistic understanding of their participants. In 
the case of post-Soviet Russia, and as indicated in the introduction, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that this context is marked by profound uncertainty and sense of 
dislocation that transcends the characteristic facets of (post)modernity. A psychosocial 
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analysis such as it is proposed here entails paying attention to such societal shifts and 
disjunctures, and to examine how they are reflected in discursive patterns and 
formations. One approach allowing the social researcher to trace such changes is to look 
at discourse in the form of spontaneous utterances, as well as those of a more formal, 
institutionalised nature. In fact, it could be argued that as an examination of subjects’ 
discourse(s) provides insight into prevalent discourses and relations of power in a given 
society, they can also convey a realistic picture of how transitions from one order to 
another affect the individual: 
 
At times, changes in discursive fields and changes of ‘verbally constituted 
consciousness’ might be more telling, so to speak, than political changes 
themselves. In other words, socio-political changes can be approached 
through the transformation of ‘differentiated subject-positions and subject-
functions’ that a ‘discoursing subject’ assumes within the discursive field 
under construction. (Oushakine, 2000: 997) 
 
Most forms of critical discourse analysis offer ways of examining the effect of power 
relations and their transformation on  “modes of representation”(Taylor, Yates, & Open 
University., 2001: 360), so as to (in its more Critical form) “highlight the way that 
speakers both exploit and are exploited by existing discursive formations” (Edley, 
2001:223). The task of the scholar employing the tools of discourse analysis is thus to 
focus on a) the historic conditions of possibility that led to emergence of a specific 
discourse or set of discourses, and/or b) the meanings imparted to the objects through 
these ‘orders of discourse’.          
        
However, whereas a purely discursive reading might seek to identify subject positions 
assumed in an instance of discourse, what the taking up of these positions enables the 
subject to do, and how they might reflect wider societal discourses, a psychoanalytic 
reading would attempt to ask why it is that the subject displays such an attachment (or 
aversion) to these positions, and to identify the modes and vicissitudes of such 
attachments. One of the project’s outcomes is therefore the compilation of modes of 
identification encountered across different types of discourse.  
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Methodological strategy and injunctions 
 
Discourse analyses 
Detecting the workings of discourse in contemporary social and political formations 
presents a challenge when we remind ourselves that one can only speak of discourse from 
within discourse. Different schools of thought within the tradition disagree over whether 
anything can be located outside the realm of the discursively constructed (e.g. Billig, 1997, 
2006; Potter et al, 1990). However, whenever we take recourse to words in order to talk or 
write about things which themselves may have an existence independent of language, we 
re-enter discourse, as pointed out in the following much-cited words by Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe:  
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing 
to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event 
that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of 
my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 
‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001:108). 
 
The conflict between the more extreme strands of discourse theory and those in favour of 
a stance of ‘critical realism’ (Bhaskar, 1989) has  led to different research trajectories,  but 
this divergence of opinions is of less consequence for those interested in investigating how 
certain objects and practices which appear as self-evident and natural are in fact the 
products of specific discourses, and how these discourses can serve to support or resist 
relations of power.  According to the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis as set out by 
Norman Fairclough (1992), rather than immediately approaching research with a series of 
pre-defined research questions, the discourse analysis should be commenced by identifying 
a social problem which has a semiotic aspect. The discursive aspect and the power relations 
it re-produces can find their expression in both symbolic and social practices and networks, 
and are often easier to locate in societies, or parts of society, undergoing social change.  
          
One example of a CDA-inspired analysis of the discursive construction of national identities is 
Ruth Wodak et al’s study of a variety of instances of discourse by and about Austrians in 
the late 1990s (Wodak et al, 1999).  Like the present study, it views nations as ‘imagined 
political communities’ (Anderson, 2006:15) that require constant re-production and re-
affirmation in order to produce identities. The ‘raw material’ of nation building is a shared 
or sharable repertoire of cultural and historical objects and artefacts which can be re-
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counted, re-assembled and re-interpreted at will. The very constructedness of national 
identities, and the transformations they undergo, make them almost ideal objects of study 
for discourse theory: “national identity is the form, par excellence, of identification that is 
characterised by the drawing of rigid, if complex, boundaries to distinguish the collective 
self and its the other” (Howarth, Norval, & Stavrakakis, 2000: 226). 
          
However, one major point of divergence between Wodak et al’s approach to discourse 
and a more psychoanalytically inflected method is in the way subjects are perceived to 
assume discourses of the nation. The account given by the former aligns with the majority 
of national identity research, which treats it as “as internalized structuring impetus which 
more or less strongly influences social practices” (Wodak et al, 1999: 156). This de-
problematises the process of (national) identification to a certain extent by removing the 
necessity to look closer into what is required in order to internalise a discourse, and which 
elements are privileged or neglected in the process. In different, but related terms:  
 
The problem with discourse analysis is that it fails to consider the crucial 
non-discursive element upon whose disavowal every discursive/ideological 
practice relies.(Vighi & Feldner, 2010:39) 
 
 
The present study shares with CDA a concern with the social world, a sensitivity to 
historical processes and an interest in investigating the signifiers and narratives that 
structure viable subject positions. Crucially, however, my analysis seeks to go beyond the 
mere ordering or categorization of discourse, and towards an elaboration of discursive 
strategies employed, that is, the logic operating in each of the discourses.  
Discourse and the subject 
At first glance, discourse analysis, with its insistence on the agency of discourse and the 
way it provides and shapes subject positions, seems to leave out the question of subjectivity 
altogether32. When using the tools and techniques of discourse analysis to study 
individual utterances, the role of the individual therefore at times seems to be reduced to 
that of a sounding board for available subject positions in discourse, that is, the notion that 
the subject is spoken by discourse. However, since the 1980s there has been a renewed 
interest in the subject. Social psychologists such as Wendy Hollway (Hollway, 1989) have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Bar a few exceptions such as Henriques et al. (1984). 
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used discourse analysis to investigate the production of subjectivity in gender and family 
relations, and have found that: 
 
[…] the positions which are available in discourses do not determine people's 
subjectivity in any unitary way. Whilst gender-differentiated positions do 
overdetermine the meanings and practices and values which construct an 
individual's identity, they do not account for the complex, multiple and 
contradictory meanings which affect and are affected by people's practices. 
(Hollway, 1989: 282) 
 
She demonstrates that the conversations with her research participants are more than just a 
"mechanical circulation of discourses" (ibid.), and that the forms of subjectivity assumed in 
the interviews represent an attempt to protect themselves "from the vulnerability of desire 
for the other" (p.283). This in fact links to a more psychoanalytic approach to discourse, 
which offers "a framework for considering how we may be invested in a particular 
discourse" (Branney, 2008:576).  
                
In his 1999 book on Freudian Repression, Michael Billig argues that the two forms of 
repression – in, or because of language, cannot be separated. Billig treats repression as an 
activity accomplished in language, rather than an unconscious mechanism over which the 
subject has no control and is not even aware of. In his account, the act of repression is 
consciously performed by the person, not by the ego or any other mental structure: as soon 
as we speak, we repress – not all things can be said to everyone at all times, for different 
reasons. Methodologically, this for instance means paying attention to how things are said, 
but also when they are not addressed, avoided, or when participants abruptly change the 
subject. When analysing interviews, it is helpful to treat them as ‘situated interactions’ along 
the lines of what he describes in his analysis of the repressed elements present in any social 
interaction. This means factoring in the interviewer’s presence, as well as coming to 
recognise the interview event as artificial, that is, as a conversation, usually between quasi-
strangers, that would not have taken place without the researcher’s instigation.  
            
Billig equates his concern with mental functioning to that of cognitive scientists. Together 
with other scholars in discursive psychology such as Potter and Margaret Wetherell, and 
inspired by predecessors such as John Austin and Mikhail Bakhtin, he is concerned with 
talk as a social action, thus at least partially rejecting the notion that thinking is an internal 
process, making it unobservable by others. In fact, following this line of thinking, one 
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should not only be more optimistic about the use of language as a viable route to arrive at 
the subject – here, the subject is language. Billig is keen to point that emotions are not 
unconscious, wordless inner states of arousal which require translation into words – he 
presents a view in which emotions are a form of activity that takes place in language and 
conversation. 
            
At the same time, this type of analysis' focus on language, and the insistence that we are 
confined to its parameters, at times limits it theoretical reach, especially in situations where 
there might be a strong affective component at play, as criticised by Stephen Frosh in his 
discussion of Michael Billig’s work:   
 
I think that the over-strong discursive move participates in a rationalist 
fallacy that itself ‘flattens out’ situations of great emotional complexity, of 
intense feeling.(Frosh, 2002:189) 
 
This means that the psychic operations that make up the focus of this study – as they are 
not merely the product of social and linguistic conventions, which serve to enable the 
smooth running of everyday interactions - require different analytical tools, like those of a 
more psychosocial approach. 
Psychosocial methodologies: deadlocks and impasses. 
It may be unusual to begin a section advocating a methodological approach with a 
detailed explication of the deadlocks and impossibilities with which the psychosocial 
researcher is confronted. However, one of the distinguishing features of the relatively 
new area of psychosocial studies is its acknowledgement of the challenges present when 
examining the forces that have an impact on subjectivity. Rather than utilising language 
as data, confident in its ability to contain all the information one needs about subjects, 
“[…] psychoanalysis shows very clearly that there is a point where discourse fails, where 
language is characterised by its insufficiency rather than its expressive capacity, where 
what is known in and by a person lies quite simply outside of symbolisation” (Frosh, 
2002: 172). Stephen Frosh further qualifies the area’s relationship with language:  
 
The reason that some things cannot be said is not that they are mystical and 
the language in which to express them is absent, but rather that language 
itself produces gaps and difference, that as we speak and therefore inhabit 
the Symbolic, we engage in a process of exclusion (Frosh 2007: 641).   
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However, the conclusion to be drawn here is not resignation, or mistrust in all that is 
produced in and via language. In fact, Laclau is adamant that affect resides within 
discourse: “Freud already knew it: the social link is a libidinal link” (2004: 326). In 
Mladen Dolar’s interpretation, there is “nothing that would call for casting away language 
as insufficient” (Dolar, 1993: 95). Language both provides the means with which to 
locate ourselves, and to be heard from that very location, and it creates a loss, as with 
one’s entry into language one also becomes confined within its limits. In (even) more 
Lacanian terms: “What is beyond language is the result of language itself. Only in and 
through language is there an unspeakable – that remainder produced as the fallout of the 
Symbolic order and the Real.” (ibid.)  
          
If one must assume that it is impossible to truly speak of one’s identification with the 
nation, thus reaching an inevitable encounter with the frustrations of reaching an adequate 
representation, an answer is perhaps to be found in the linguistic gaps and lacunae, that is, 
the rhetorical and discursive strategies employed to overcome these impossibilities.  From a 
methodological angle, this raises the question of whether this is to do with gaps in language 
as implied in the quote above, or whether there is something that escapes representability.  
If this is true, then those interested in discourses of identification must look for strategies 
of evasion or compensation that emerge because of it. Indeed, one of the major challenges 
facing the researcher interested in investigating processes of identification is the question 
of how to access these if the mechanisms at work are unconscious. Additionally, many of 
the facets underlying a current subject position may in fact be unpalatable to the 
subject. Identification with, for example, a certain moment in a nation's history may be an 
instance of melancholic identification with the country's 'lost' status (see Paul Gilroy's 2005 
Postcolonial Melancholia). 
         
Here the argumentation seems to have reached a theoretical impasse: discourse analysis and 
similarly, discursive psychology in the tradition of Wetherell and Potter, claim that 
psychological states can and should be observed in language and practices. Psychoanalysts, 
on the other hand, emphasise the importance of what is unspoken by, and possibly 
inaccessible to subjects themselves, making these two approaches seemingly irreconcilable. 
While Karen Malone (2000) concludes that the fundamental optimism in psychoanalysis’ 
ability to at least potentially bridge the gap between ‘the formation of subjectivity’ and the 
‘social dimension’ had not as yet been realised, she recommends that this should not 
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discourage the researcher. She adds, perhaps rather hesitatingly, that its ideas have distinct 
value, as “it adds another dimension, a layering, that specifies the efficacy of the social 
without reducing subjectivity” (Malone, 2000: 81). 
               
Georgina Born (1998) is yet more optimistic. As an anthropologist employing Kleinian 
concepts, she is confident of the value of transferring these from the study of group 
dynamics to an investigation of “defence mechanisms characteristic of the discourse or 
cultural system under study” (Born, 1998:  374). She further states that Kleinian ideas are in 
fact more appropriate for the analysis of sociocultural systems than those of Freud or 
Lacan, as “in contrast to the normative developmental narratives of Freudian and Lacanian 
perspectives, Klein offers the concept of “positions.”” (ibid.) However, not only is she 
relying on somewhat obsolete representations of these psychoanalytic schools of thought, 
it is surely also the case that the tendency to see processes “such as projection and 
introjection, splitting and fragmentation” (Born, 1998: 373) as occurring routinely within 
institutions can be similarly reductive.  
Lacanian discourse analysis 
A Lacanian approach to discourse analysis is in fact gaining currency in social research, as it 
seeks to incorporate the analytical insights of discourse analysis with the “sophistication of 
its [i.e. psychoanalysis, MB] ideas about emotional investment and fantasy” (Frosh & 
Baraitser, 2008: 351). In fact, a Lacanian perspective is perhaps singularly well positioned 
for such an undertaking, as for Lacan the unconscious is to be located not within the 
individual, but as a feature of language, “that part of concrete discourse qua transindividual, 
which is not at the subject’s disposal in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious 
discourse” (Lacan, 2002, quoted in Parker, 2005). 
             
This perspective aims to show that, while there may be a limited choice in the positions 
that subjects can assume within discourse (and, in more Lacanian terms: as the symbolic 
order predates the individual), how and why they invest in certain subject positions can also 
be fruitfully explored using psychoanalytic concepts: 
 
Our route through this mire is to argue that in the accounts individuals 
give of their lived experiences, one can see at work both the powerful 
effects of social discourses and the agentic struggles of particular 
subjects as they locate themselves in relation to these discourses -and 
that the unconscious is both generated by this struggle, and generative 
of its consequences (Frosh et al, 2003: 7). 
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A first step when looking at texts, be they public and/or institutionalised, or in the form of 
private narratives, is to read for existing discourses, and the position(s) the text or narrative 
takes in relation to them. Parker (2005, 2010) provides a guide for ‘negotiating a Text with 
Lacan’ (2010), by advising the analyst to examine the formal qualities of the text, the anchoring of 
representation, to look at the different registers of communication and instances of agency and 
determination, the role of knowledge, positions in language, deadlocks of perspective and, importantly, to 
be wary of one’s own interpretation of textual material.   
              
The three registers of the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real permeate discourse and the way 
the subject is positioned within it: “whenever we deal with discourse we are necessarily 
dealing with the intertwining of imaginary, symbolic and real elements” (Neill, 2013:6).  In 
discourse, the Imaginary can be described as the dimension of ego-substantiating 
interactions between subjects (e.g. the interviewer and the interviewee, or the author and 
the public) and in this capacity it relies on the narcissistic aspects of identification, as well 
as its aggressive and rivalrous tendencies, as explained in greater detail in chapter II. The 
researcher needs to acknowledge that in any interpretation of what is communicated, 
meaning is established retroactively, and is likely to contain imaginary elements.  
        
The symbolic is referred to by Parker as the “unconscious of the text” (2010, author’s italics) 
– it is what is not thematised, does not appear to require thematisation, yet functions to 
structure the text and our understanding of it. It is in this dimension that one needs to pay 
close attention to any ‘holes’ or ‘gaps’ in speech as an indication of something that cannot 
be said, that is repressed. The real in the text is the underlying ‘centre of gravity’, the thing 
that drives the exchange or that serves to “provide cohesion to make sense of the discourse 
in play” (Neill, 2013:8), while at the same resisting adequate representation or verbalisation 
by the subject(s). 
       
In order to benefit from the insights of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the discourse analyst 
should not conclude his or her labours at the stage of having identified the three registers 
in operation within the text. Used in this way, Lacan-inflected discourse analysis becomes 
little more than a method for ordering data, or at most “a tool to open up a text” (Parker, 
2010). According to Žižek, it is the categories of fantasy and jouissance that make up the 
crucial component which has been left out of existing discourse analyses: the aspect of 
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enjoyment, of the subject's attachment to certain signifiers, despite their outwardly 
‘irrational’ nature (Žižek, 1989). These concepts may be offering clues to what constitutes 
subjects’ attachment to certain discourses, in order words, what makes up the ‘drive behind 
identification acts’ (Stravrakakis, 2007: 166). But while work dedicated to detecting the 
workings of fantasy in ideology, and of ideology in fantasy, may have become more 
prevalent since the publication of Žižek’s Sublime Object of Ideology (e.g. Glynos, 2001, 2008; 
Stavrakakis, 1999, 2007), accessing the workings of fantasy and desire in private discourse 
represents perhaps the most challenging task for the researcher. Significant methodological 
challenges thus remain when one tries to implement the above recommendations to 
empirical data.  
          
Finally, the privileging of language in Lacanian Discourse Analysis is coupled with what at 
times reads like a celebration of incomprehension. Lacan’s clinical recommendation not to 
assume the place of the ‘subject that is supposed to know’ (le sujet-supposé-savoir)33, while 
ethically sound as a way of refraining from colonising the text with the researcher’s 
investments, makes viable forms of investigation of subjects’ accounts even more elusive. 
After all, how can one make this ‘refusal of understanding’ actionable, that is, how can one 
transform an impossibility into a methodological injunction? 
Return to Freud 
Along with interest in the Lacanian approach (2008a, 2008b, 2008c), Derek Hook has in 
recent years increasingly called for a reconsideration of Freud’s work for the purpose of 
investigating processes of group identification, as “Freudian group psychology pin-points 
those trajectories of affect – discourses and affects of identification here being intractably 
interwoven – that prove indispensible in constituting a group” (2014). However, he is 
similarly wary of researchers confining themselves solely to the textual, to that which is 
legible, as a way of gaining a closer understanding of these “trajectories of affect” and 
warns explicitly against simply mapping psychic formations onto discourse, that is, against 
“the utilization of models of psychical functioning as ‘reading tools’ that supply motifs to 
be identified within the contents of a given discourse” (ibid.) In order to examine how 
“lines of identification and desire” intersect in discourse, Hook suggests approaching the 
analysis of discourse with a number of questions which operate as structuring principles for 
the text and enable the researcher to extract facets which might form the building blocks of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  “I would go as far as to say that it is on the basis of a kind of refusal of understanding that we push open 
the door to analytic understanding” (Lacan, 1953-54: 73).	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a careful psychosocial reading. These questions include enquiries into what it is the 
community most values or yearns for, as a way of locating narcissistic points of 
identification and given ideal-ego values, as well as the community’s ‘lost objects’. Others 
focus on the preferred mode of enjoyment of group, and, crucially, seek to identify its key 
symbols and points of historical identification. In other words, it attempts to pinpoint its 
ego-ideal values and prevailing master-signifiers. 
          
Claudia Lapping advocates a similarly non-dogmatic approach to textual analysis. In her 
book on the pitfalls and possibilities of using Psychoanalysis in Social Research (2011) she 
suggests that openness is essential to psychosocial forms of analysis: 
 
I am arguing against the reification of psychoanalytic concepts.  
Psychoanalytic concepts are not unitary objects that exist outside a particular 
analysis. They are constituted in the process of analysis, in the discontinuous 
elements of discourse; they are signifying elements that are only temporarily 
ordered or fixed within a particular social and historical context (Lapping, 
2011:6). 
 
Lapping engages with the question of whether one can read discourses in the manner 
reserved for the interpretation of dreams, as this would in principle represent the most 
fundamentally psychoanalytic of all forms of textual analysis. Indeed, some of the ‘tools’ 
provided by Freud, such as the distinction between manifest and latent content, notions 
of condensation and displacement, and the idea of overdetermination have become 
popularised to a degree that they have entered mainstream discourse (Parker, 1997). The 
concept of overdetermination has also re-emerged in discourse analysis, for example in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s employment of the idea of ‘nodal points’ tying the field of 
discursivity together (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).  
However, while she is attuned to the needs of scholars engaging in empirical social 
research, Lapping is simultaneously wary of the spectre of misinterpretation by those 
who have come to treat psychoanalysis as something of a Weltanschauung, thereby 
ignoring the problems of integrating psychoanalytic ideas outside the clinic (Frosh, 2011). 
Potential temptations for the social researcher are those of overprivileging one’s own 
research agenda so as to become blind to the actual discourses at hand, or to apply 
psychoanalytic ideas haphazardly in order to give an illusion of psychological depth.  
Finally, Lapping gives room to the divergent opinions surrounding the debate of whether 
	   72	  
one can ever get to the truth of another subject, and if so, by how much, for instance by 
asking whether affect can be transmitted without distortion, “since the condensation of 
meanings through symbolic associations has a simultaneous effect of displacing or 
covering over affect?” (Lapping, 2011: 62).  
         
This is of special relevance to social researchers who may find themselves trying to 
minimise the degree of ‘static’ in research encounters, while inadvertently becoming its 
source. It is important to remember that subjects do not represent puzzles to be solved 
by the ‘right’ analyst. Engaging in psychosocial forms of methodology means giving up 
on the fantasy of mastery.  Indeed, not all instances of say, repetition, may even benefit 
from the introduction of psychoanalytic concepts, as the may not always point to strong 
underlying attachments.  
 
Methodological lessons 
Moving on to the consideration of methodological injunctions for the analysis of discourse, 
Frosh and Lapping both suggest a multi-stage approach to the text. In one of the studies 
commended by Lapping, the first analytical stage operates on the level of discourse, 
focusing on “the discursive texture of reiterated categories” (Lapping, 2011: 92). At this 
stage, there is not yet any accounting for why there is attachment to certain positions 
within discourse, as this quasi-Foucaultian stance does not offer the explanatory tools 
which would reveal “why it is that certain individuals occupy some subject positions rather 
than others” (Hall, 1996: 10). Following this first ordering move, the second stage opens 
itself up to the careful introduction of psychosocial ideas, and is thus potentially more 
equipped to “capture the complexity of desire, transference and the compulsion to repeat 
(Lapping, 2011:93). However, while certain inferences may be made and patterns be given 
some hesitant interpretation, even a multi-stage process does not allow for analytical 
certainty. Through a psychosocial reading, the fact of affective investment can be 
established, but its meaning or definite origin most likely remain opaque.  In other words, 
“we can trace the discursive instantiations of reiterated desire, but we cannot, perhaps, gain 
access to desire itself” (Lapping, 2011: 95). 
        
Frosh similarly posits that psychoanalysis is useful for “outlining patterns of desire in 
which subjects become stuck” (Frosh, 2010: 186) and can thus perhaps explain 
attachment to certain subject positions. The analytical procedure of ‘concentric 
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reflexivity’ he discusses at length in his 2010 article with Lisa Savile Young is similarly 
consistent of two stages or ‘circles’. The first circle: 
 
 [… ]is concerned with discursive positions resisted and taken up in talk.[…] 
In Lacanian terms, master signifiers are identified in the text – recurring 
metaphors or discourses that define and limit what can and cannot be said, 
making certain subject positions possible while denying others (Savile Young 
& Frosh, 2010: 518). 
 
In procedural terms, this stage analyses the text’s structure, paying attention both to the 
text’s internal logic, and the way it reflects or “ventriloquates” (Frosh, 2007) broader 
cultural discourses. The second stage represents the “realm of the psychosocial” proper, 
as it “understands subjectivity, produced and reproduced in the text, as embodied and 
‘invested’ discourse and it is here that psychoanalysis is drawn upon as part of the 
attempt to construct the text in a certain way” (ibid.). However, subjectivity itself is not a 
stable entity in the text. Rather it is located at the intersection of the two concentric 
circles, and its manifestation is a product both of “the subjectivity of the researched as 
well as the subjectivity of the researcher” (Savile Young & Frosh, 2010: 519). A 
psychosocial reading is thus able to discern specific textual dynamics, and to connect 
such observations to the presence of affect, or the existence of certain nodal points or 
master signifiers which structure discourse. Specific instantiations of discourse may even 
share similarities with certain psychic operations, such as splitting and disavowal. While 
such readings are never final – psychosocial meaning can rarely be fixed in this manner – 
they may shed some insight both into the logic inherent in discourse, and the subject’s 
investment in it.  
 
Multi-method research 
In order to investigate different registers of identification and discourse formation, texts 
for this project were gathered from four different discursive sites. One of the research 
outcomes is the identification of modes and vicissitudes of attachments to the nation 
encountered in discourse.  In order to achieve this, the thesis examined two dimensions of 
discourse: its private, spontaneous instantiation in interviews and open-ended surveys, and 
its more deliberate, public form. This meant that these two types of discourse were also 
analysed with somewhat different focal points in mind, as will become apparent in the 
following sections.  	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Part I: Interviews and surveys 
The first semi-structured interviews for this project were conducted in November and 
December 2010. After 3 pilot interviews (with one Russian, one Polish and one Turkish 
participant), interviewees were recruited from several departments at the LSE and 
University College London through emails sent to departmental mailing lists, specifically 
addressing individuals born and raised in Russia. The 2 male and 6 female respondents 
were aged between 20 and 35 and mostly from the 2 Russian metropolises of Moscow and 
St Petersburg. Interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and were conducted in 
English. Participants had been given the opportunity to speak Russian, but had declined – 
several specifically to ‘practise their English’. However, on several occasions, and because 
my fluent knowledge of Russian had been established, interviewees would revert back to 
Russian for specific terms or phrases which they considered ‘untranslatable’ or for whose 
translation they sought my advice. All interviews were recorded and transcribed by myself.  
          
Questions concerned the interviewees’ representations of Russia past and present, their 
ideas regarding the country’s problems and opportunities, as well as personal experiences 
that led to these views. Many of the interview questions tried to tap into a more imaginary 
realm (not in a strictly Lacanian sense yet), as a way of freeing the interview participants 
from the constraints of having to adhere to actuality, or a strict adherence to life, that is, 
 
            Stages of data collection 
 
1. 8 semi-structured interviews with Russians in London 
       (Completed in December 2010, between 30 – 60 mins)  
 
2. Collection of 34 online surveys using textual and image prompts 
(Commenced in March 2012.  Completed in June 2012) 
 
3. Case study I: Public responses to Pussy Riot’s performance & subsequent arrest 
(Based on sources collected mainly between autumn 2012 and spring 2013) 
 
4. Case study II: Public discourses of Putinism 
(Based on sources collected mainly between autumn 2012 and early 2014) 
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external events. In other words: introspection was strongly encouraged. A full topic guide 
can be found in the appendix, but a number of questions are listed here for purposes of 
illustration:  
 
• How would you describe to someone who's never been to Russia, what it's like to 
live in it? 
 
• What were your dreams or ambitions when you finished school? 
 
• What is different between now and the time before 1992? What has actually 
changed? 
 
• What does being Russian mean for you? Does it have a meaning? 
 
• Any specific thoughts or feelings associated with the notion, say when you 
introduce yourself as Russian? 
 
• Are these things you find yourself thinking about or discussing with others? 	  
The transcribed interviews were subject to a preliminary analysis that aimed to draw out a 
number of initial discursive operations, which formed the basis for questions for the 
open-ended survey - the project’s next stage.  
Surveys 
If we assume that how and with whom or what we identify is largely an unconscious process, 
then in order to gain access to mechanisms of identification, an ideal source of ‘private’ 
instantiations of discourse is one that interferes as little as possible with respondents’ 
narratives. With most interview techniques, this is only partially realisable – the 
interviewer’s presence, be it verbally or merely physically, is felt and can have a 
significant impact on the direction the interview takes. An alternative, and increasingly 
prevalent way of collecting qualitative data is through the Internet (Mann, 2000; Frueh, 
2000). In fact, ever-increasing familiarity with the Internet’s tools and platforms means 
that it has become a convenient way of data gathering, especially in order to reach 
respondents that are geographically remote, thus also managing the challenge of enabling 
a sense of being embedded in the  participants’ life world (Lebenswelt), without being 
embedded (at the time of research) in their life conditions (Lebenslage). 
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In March 2012, a brief online survey in Russian was placed online.  Due to its links with 
the higher education sector, experience hosting social research projects, and general user-
friendliness, I selected Bristol Online Surveys34 to host the questionnaire. Respondents were 
recruited using snowball sampling via emails sent to a number of Russian friends, 
acquaintances and colleagues. The only condition for participation was that recipients had 
been born and raised in parts of the Soviet Union now forming Russia. In my email, I 
briefly described that my research was an investigation of Russians’ relationship to, and 
interpretation of, the meanings of Russianness (see appendix for full text). The survey was 
closed on 30 June 2012, after 34 responses had been collected. Importantly, while the 
interviews were conducted in English and took place in various university settings in 
central London, the surveys were Russian-language and completed from different locations 
in Russia and, for a small number of cases, the European Union, the US and Canada. The 
potential implications of this are discussed in chapters IV and V.  
         
In order to elicit more free-flowing narratives of national identification, after requesting 
standard sociodemographic information35, the survey contained 5 open-ended questions: 
 
• What does it take to become Russian?  
Please answer in as much detail as possible 
 
• Try to think of a moment or incident that made you feel especially Russian. 
Please describe it in as much detail as possible. 
 
• Can you list a number of items (objects, sensations) that are truly Russian? 
Could you please explain why you have chosen them? 
 
• Has the meaning of Russianness/of being Russian changed over time? If so, how 
and why? 
 
• Please describe or provide the link to an image or picture which would convey a 
sense of Russia or Russianness. Please explain why you have chosen this image.  
 
Additionally, following the work of Jacqueline Palmade on identification and work 
(2003), the survey made use of images on which respondents were asked to comment 
(see appendix). The survey’s focus on images and visceral sensations aimed to 
discourage an adherence to everyday occurrences and overly ‘realistic’ thinking, in other 
words, it aimed to provide greater space for affect and imaginative play with speech and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk 
35 See appendix for tables containing sociodemographic information for interviews and surveys.  
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image. Together with the questions, this sought to elicit responses that closer resemble 
a kind of free association.  
 
Respondent selection: discourse-rich yet opinion-poor? 
As will be explored in greater detail in the following chapters, the majority of respondents 
completed higher or even postgraduate education, with most hailing from one of the two 
cultural Russian capitals, St Petersburg and Moscow, or from other, nevertheless fairly 
cosmopolitan cities such as Kaliningrad36. The chief reason behind this conspicuous 
pattern is the recruitment strategy, namely contacting respondents via London university 
departments and snowball sampling via friends and colleagues. The existing pool of 
respondents therefore consists almost exclusively of members of the intelligentsia or, in a 
more recent designation, the ‘creative class’, that is, member of a highly educated class who 
frequently subscribe to a cosmopolitan outlook, or even live a transnational existence. 
What could perhaps be seen as a limitation of my sample has in fact given the thesis a 
productive and necessary additional focus. Not only is Russia too vast and multifaceted a 
country to make its entire population a realistic subject within the confines of a single 
doctoral thesis, the intelligentsia also has a historic, and, perhaps more importantly, 
symbolic significance in Russia that is not easily matched by similar groups in other 
countries. This group was one of the driving forces behind the anti-government protests of 
2011/2012, and has recently been under fire in its supposed role as ‘fifth column’, because 
of its critical stance during preceding the annexation of Crimea. Chapter I has pointed to 
the complex, even contradictory social and political position that this class has found itself 
in since the 1990s. The following chapters seek to investigate how this position is perhaps 
mirrored in an ambivalent relationship with Russianness.  
 
Due to their methodological implications, two, superficially contradictory facets of the 
respondent selection are worthy of comment. The first characteristic of the demographic 
featured here, and which was hinted at above, is that they are highly cultured and self-
reflexive (Etkind, 2011), often using literature both as a discursive reference point and as a 
means of abstraction from current national sensibilities to more metaphysical concerns. 
This mostly urban class takes an active interest in both internal and foreign public 
discourses about Russia, and participates in them actively – more so now that the Internet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The city and surrounding region, in its state as an exclave geographically situated between Poland and 
Lithuania, present themselves more ‘European’ than other Russian cities 
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provides ever-never platforms through which to disseminate one’s ideas and opinions. In 
the words of Ruth Halliday (2004), they are ‘discourse rich’. A passage in which she 
introduces this concept is worth quoting at length here:  
        
What is clear from this conceptualisation is that the potential self - and 
the potential for that self to be reflective - is limited by one’s access to 
discursive formations. Thus while some academic selves might have 
access to theoretical, political, legal, journalistic, therapeutic, televisual 
and situated discourses, other selves may only be able to access the latter 
of these (and even then the televisual and situated discourses available to 
some are severely restricted). What emerges from this are selves that 
exist on a continuum. At one end are the 'discourse rich' - those with a 
high level of cultural and social capital, highly educated, with access to 
libraries, intellectual discussions with colleagues and friends, 'intelligent' 
television programmes, art and literary criticism and counselling and 
therapy (all discourses that are highly valued). At the other are the 
'discourse poor' - the practically and vocationally educated (with access 
only to discourses that have little attributed value). (Halliday, 2004: 56)    
 
Halliday applies this idea of varying levels of discursive availability depending on one 
social’s location to refer to research participants in the UK, a country arguably more 
marked by class distinctions (though not inequality) than post-Soviet Russia. It reminds the 
social researcher that those with less social capital – already underrepresented – have fewer 
discursive means at their disposal, which serves to perpetuate and justify the initial 
underrepresentation. However, for those conducting research with members of the 
highest-educated class in Russia, this statement bodes well for the research, promising as it 
does rich, multi-layered responses from the participants. Yet upon further inspection the 
equation of cultural with social capital does not necessarily hold true: while “evidently, in 
post-Soviet society, “middle” (or any) class is often interpreted as a moral category and 
mark of character” (Chehonadskih, 2014: 206), the Russian intelligentsia has overall not 
been able to translate their intellectual credentials into financial stability or prestige at the 
level of the middle class. As a group, this has left them unmoored and, in part due to their 
inability to position themselves in the political matrix (Chehonadskih, 2014), politically 
inarticulate.  
        
This resonates with observations made almost 20 years earlier by political scientist Ellen 
Carnaghan, who in 1996 analysed 4 large scale opinion surveys conducted in the Soviet 
and early post-Soviet period. The remarkable prevalence of ‘I don’t know’s’ in all of 
these surveys made her question whether Russians suffer from ‘Alienation, Apathy, or 
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Ambivalence?’. While one may treat this type of answer as a refusal to comment or to 
engage with political opinion polls, in a more pessimistic reading: 
 
[…]the spectre of large numbers of opinionless citizens  -or, maybe worse, 
citizens, who have opinions but do not say what they are – haunts prospects 
for the establishments of a stable democracy in Russia (Carnaghan, 1996: 
326). 
 
Disregarding the accuracy of this prediction (indeed the consensus appears to be that 
stability has been achieved at the cost of democracy), for the researcher seeking to 
encourage an exploration and articulation of attachments to Russian society this implies 
that, discursively, many Russians – discourse ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ – lack the means to make 
sense of their role and location in contemporary Russia. The current study therefore aims 
to both a) investigate the signifiers they utilise in lieu of political attitudes and affiliations, 
and b) examine to what degree these attachments take on the quality of ‘alienation, apathy, 
or ambivalence’. 
Part II: Case studies of public discourses 
As referred to above, the Internet has in recent years gained currency as a valid research 
tool. As an alternative to the large-scale opinion survey, online publications and the 
discussion forums linked to them can prove a valuable resource for those interested in 
“judgments, systems of value, and rhetorical devices “ employed by Russians (Trubina, 
2008: 1). Thanks to the influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis on the study of ideology 
(frequently inspired by Ernesto Laclau’s turn to Lacan), there is a number of works from 
which this study takes inspiration in its analysis of public discourses (Daly, 1999; Glynos, 
2001; Stavrakakis, 1999). In order to analytically dissect a text’s discourse, 
recommendations include the suggestion to identify the ‘nodal point’ or Master Signifier 
– the notion around which the entirety of the text is organised, although this signifier 
itself remains unmentioned, as if requiring no further elaboration. As identifications are 
characterised by elements of contradiction and discontinuity, an insistence on their unity 
often leads to the identification of actors or movements threatening their stability,  
“those who are responsible for loss and immanent blockage as a way of supporting its 
fantasy of ultimate unity” (Daly, 1999:225). While this framing of identity in terms of 
antagonistic struggles might not be expressed openly in more liberal publications, cultural 
artifacts at the margins of officials discourse, such as tabloid newspapers, can provide 
rich examples of such ‘blame games’. The Lacanian concept of enjoyment is equally vital 
to the analysis of media discourse. For example, it has been successfully applied to 
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analyses of work practices (Glynos, 2008), racism (Hook, 2008b), the discourse of ’New 
Labour’ (Daly, 1999) and nationalism (Žižek, 1993). Finally, as the production or 
authoring of a discourse implies a recipient or consumer, close attention needs to be paid 
to how the researcher’s reading of the text always entails imaginary identifications.         
          
The second approach vital to the thesis is the analysis of cultural representations and 
representational mechanisms in the tradition of cultural studies. Of special relevance here 
is Stuart Hall’s contention that in order to approach questions of identity, one needs the 
concept of identification, as any identity configuration “[…] is grounded in fantasy, in 
projection and idealization”(Hall, 1996: 14). The language he uses is distinctly 
psychoanalytic, and Hall in fact seems to call for the recruitment of psychosocial ideas 
when he later states that what is missing is:  
[…]a theory of what the mechanisms are by which individuals as subjects 
identify (or do not identify) with the ‘positions' to which they are summoned; 
as well as how they fashion, stylize, produce and 'perform these positions, 
and why they never do so completely, for once and all time, and some never 
do, or are in a constant, agonistic process of struggling with, resisting, 
negotiating, and accommodating the normative or regulative rules with 
which they confront and regulate themselves. (ibid. ) 
 
The positions Hall refers to for instance become visible in situations of a public indignation 
and outward rejection of a position, such as in the responses to Pussy Riot’s ‘punk prayer’ 
and subsequent arrest.  Another example can be certain ‘overdetermined’ signifiers such as 
national leaders, as they can provide a way of getting to ego-ideals which form such a 
fundamental element of symbolic identification, that is “the collection of the cherished and 
respected societal ideals which mean more than the ego itself. This is the ‘to live and die 
for’ element underlying the affective substance of the mass which is, importantly, as much 
a question of values and ideas as of powerful affective investment” (Hook, 2014:7). With 
this in mind, Vladimir Putin offers himself as a particularly pertinent example. 
 
For part 2 of its analysis, the thesis takes a two-pronged approach, resulting in two 
chapters. One element is the examination of discourses  o f  re j e c t ion and 
(dis) ident i f i cat ion  as featured in the public responses to Pussy Riot in Russia (Chapter 
VI). In their policing of Russianness and the demarcation of features deemed undesirable 
as embodied by the women of Pussy Riot, these delineate, implicitly or explicitly, the 
ideal form (and perhaps even content) of a national vision. The strongly negative 
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reactions to the punk prayer in Russia, and the subsequent calls for punishment were one 
of the most remarkable public ‘outcries’ of the Putin period, and its public criticism 
quickly evolved beyond that of ‘mere’ hurt religious feelings. The majority of sources 
cited here are based on a Russian Google (google.ru) news alert with the keyword ‘Pussy 
Riot’, which was active between August 2012 and December 2012. Additionally, a 
number of sources that offered a sustained engagement with the group or the case up to 
March 2013 were considered. Online platforms and sources that appeared several times 
were: snob.ru, mk.ru (Moskovskyi Komsomolets), kp.ru (Komsomolskaya Pravda) and 
echo.msk.ru (Ekho Moskvy).  
 
The second element of this analysis of public discourses of Russianness is one that 
examines discourses  that seek to e l i c i t  ident i f i cat ion , and by extension, love  in the 
populace. The question motivating this part of the analysis was how an ostensibly strong 
figure (both in terms of access to power, and mechanisms of self-representation) such as 
Vladimir Putin attempts to elicit leader love (Chapter VII).  The changing tactics utilised to 
achieve this goal enable an analysis of their interpretation of ‘what the Russian people 
want’. The majority of sources cited in Chapter VII are based on a Russian Google news 
alert with the keyword ‘Putin’ active between October 2012 and December 2013, plus a 
number of media artefacts (pictures and video clips) as well as other sources (English and 
Russian) that offered a sustained engagement with the Russian president’s persona or role 
from as early as 2004 to as late as January 2014. 
 
Ethics 
In the case of empirical research involving personal encounters, attention needs to be 
paid to the relational dynamics between research participant(s) and researcher, not only 
because a properly psychosocial form of analysis would not be complete without such 
considerations, but more importantly to remain sensitive to how research participation 
affects participants. Additionally, if questions require the disclosure of personal 
information such as is the case in most survey research, the correct handling of this data 
and protection of anonymity become paramount. In terms of such potential ethical 
concerns, no major issues were anticipated, and those that could have emerged were 
indeed restricted to the interviews and surveys. Interview participants signed a consent 
form (Appendix I). Survey participants had to signal their consent before submitting 
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their responses (Appendix J). Interviewees were offered the chance to use a pseudonym, 
and a number of them made use of this possibility by selecting an appropriate alias.  
            
For additional protection, only first names were used in the analysis. Because the 
interview questions were only preoccupied with life events insofar as they formed the 
backdrop to the participants’ responses, and instead mainly focused on questions 
pertaining to Russia and Russianness, no emotional distress was predicted or 
encountered. One respondent, while initially very enthusiastic about the research, rather 
unexpectedly expressed concerns about her anonymity being compromised, so upon her 
request I changed not only her name but also the details of her postgraduate degree here 
in the UK. The fact that I saw no grounds for concern in the responses she provided – 
in fact I only saw them as mildly critical of contemporary Russia and its politics in 
comparison with other contributions – may indicate how my researcher’s perspective and 
interest in the extreme forms that an attachment to, or rejection of the nation can 
assume, can become blind to the lived reality and consequences of these positions. The 
surveys were completely anonymised and participants are cited here as, e.g. ‘S2’, ‘S23’. 
Additional sociodemographic information about the participants can be found in the 
appendix (Appendices D and H). 
             
In the case of the second part of the thesis’ empirical element, that is, the analysis of 
public discourses, no ethical concerns were foreseen. All texts are available in the public 
domain via the Internet or print publications (see References), so issues of data 
protection were not applicable.  However, the possibility of a later dissemination of 
research conducted for the thesis in the form of published papers and presentations was 
a further consideration, particularly inasmuch as it would represent the ‘public’ 
representation of respondents’ views. In the present example, this entailed refraining 
from conducting a form of ‘wild analysis’ or remote diagnosis, which would lead to the 
identification of participants in the public debates as supposedly suffering from 
psychological disorders. In the analysis of texts, a reading needs to necessarily remain on 
the level of discourse, not that of individual psyches. This represents one example of the 
confluence of ethical and methodological considerations in psychosocial research. 
Reflexivity and resistance 
Reflecting on the process of collection and analysis of texts, one eventually encounters 
multiple layers of translation.  These are difficulties which are inherent to any project 
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seeking to describe what is not easily represented in language, as “there exists a large variety 
of different psychological experiences of considerable emotional force which lie outside 
narrative – even outside of what can be spoken” (Frosh, 2010: 527). Here Frosh addresses 
the fact that certain affective experiences may not correspond to specific word-
representations. Another act of translation takes place when researchers transfer texts and 
responses conveyed to them by participants and through other sources into the language of 
academia, which inevitably, and not only through the act of interpretation, entails a degree 
of transformation. Additionally, the texts utilised by the researcher have often undergone 
both transcription and translation from one language to another. However, rather than 
become resigned regarding the possibilities of social research to ever get to the ‘truth of the 
subject’, one should remain aware of the fact that asking subjects to put things into words, 
and then to further work with those words along certain research trajectories creates new, 
perhaps unexpected meanings. 
       
An additional factor in the present project is the shift from English to Russian and vice 
versa, which is mirrored in the different locations in which the research took place, that is, 
in London in case of the interviews, and mostly in Russia for the survey element. It opens 
up the question of what happens when we use a language that we do not quite inhabit, 
which is especially true of those Russians interviewed who had only spent a relatively short 
time in the UK. It is possible that in such circumstances we become reliant on expressions 
that are not our own, that perhaps reflect a different kind of experience. Indeed, a certain 
‘grasping for words’ is rather characteristic of interviews. In the current example, it at times 
led to a process of common negotiation over the correct or adequate expression, 
sometimes resulting in delight when we appeared to have arrived at the correct ‘version’. 
The interviewer needs to be aware that in so fragile and temporary an encounter as that of 
an interview, gaining an understanding of the fantasmatic content and logic underpinning 
certain expressions may not always be viable, at times for chiefly linguistic reasons. 
         
Another element of the transitory interview situation is that respondents may resist 
revealing too much of themselves, both consciously and unconsciously. However, when 
discussing the analysis of texts, it may also be worthwhile to speak of the researcher’s 
resistance. In these specific circumstances, it means acknowledging that as a non-Russian I 
am writing about, and to some extent, speaking for Russia and Russians. This appears to 
increase the stakes: there is a real sense of responsibility, and linked to this, a fear of failure 
	   84	  
to ‘get it wrong’, or to misrepresent participants’ responses. At the same time, the 
awareness of there being no ‘ultimate truth’ when speaking of the social world means that 
this sense of responsibility could at times lead to a repeated backtracking and triple-
checking of arguments. It became increasingly difficult to disentangle whether this 
hesitation was part of a natural awareness that one never quite knows enough, and that the 
(social) research process goes through a series of ‘endings’, or whether it was rather a fear 
of not knowing enough because of writing about Russia.  Compared to experiences of 
writing about research conducted in East Germany, where a familiarity, even intimacy with 
its places led to a much greater confidence in the process of analysis and writing, this 
therefore proved to be a much more uncomfortable process.  
Finally, and as alluded to in the introduction, one major motivation to write about Russia 
was to counter many of the existing, Russophobic or simply uninformed narratives of the 
nation which circulate in the West. These increasingly hark back to Cold War-era discourse, 
as relations with Russia appear to be deteriorating. Paradoxically, this desire to write a 
counter-narrative stems from a sense of greater understanding of contemporary Russia, 
and a wish for this to transpire in the current analysis.  
Conclusion 
This thesis takes a two-pronged approach to national identification by looking at public 
and private instantiations of discourse in a context which is marked by instability. The 
group of highly educated, urban Russians traditionally referred to as the intelligentsia forms 
the focus of the much of the thesis, especially in its first part consisting of interviews and 
open-ended surveys. This group is ‘discourse rich’ but devoid of discursive means that 
would anchor them in Russian actuality by allowing them to make sense of it discursively. 
In its second part, the thesis consists of two case studies. The first investigates public 
discourses of rejection and (dis)identification in the responses to the arrest and trial against 
members of Pussy Riot, while the second analyses discourses seeking to elicit identification 
and (leader) love as manifest in the public persona of Vladimir Putin.  
         
This chapter discussed how psychosocial studies are distinguished by a heightened 
awareness of the challenges of qualitative analysis. These increase in urgency when 
introducing concepts from psychoanalysis, whereby the researchers moves beyond a 
naming and categorisation of discourse and, in its critical form, a focus on power relations. 
The psychosocial researcher seeks to locate the unconscious forces driving certain 
discourses into circulation, and to examine subjects’ investment in them. This includes a 
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highlighting of the role of affect, an employment of concepts such as ‘nodal points’ or 
master signifiers, and a focus on processes such as splitting and disavowal. In order to 
resist the temptation of seeing the unconscious ubiquitously, it has been suggested that it is 
often advantageous to proceed in several analytical stages, progressing carefully from the 
discursive to the psychosocial realm. Psychosocial forms of analysis, even in their allegiance 
to different schools of psychoanalysis, are particularly aware of how they are implicated in 
the meanings created in academic research. Hence the ‘impasses’ referred to here should be 
seen as productive, rather than limiting, as they point to the possibilities as much as to the 
limits of what can reliably be detected in discourse.  
           
Finally, this approach serves to remind the scholar that while qualitative research usually 
relies on the narratibility of experience, much of what has an impact on subjects’ lives may 
lie outside of this: “To say, as some do, that the self must be narrated, that only the narrated 
self can be intelligible and survive, is to say that we cannot survive with an unconscious” 
(Butler, 2005: 65). In fact, explanations that seem too linear or ordered and thus leave no 
room for alternative meanings should leave the reader suspicious. Instead, accounts that do 
justice to subjectivity need to relinquish fantasies of integration, and to instead see the self 
as multiple and over-determined: “There is always 'too much' or 'too little' - an over-
determination or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality” (Hall, 1996: 3). 	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Chapter IV: Natasha’s Dance and the Drunkard in the Rain37: 
a psychosocial approach to texts on Russianness. 
 
The, and Tolstoy discusses, this girl, she was brought according to maybe French principles, she 
had British gouvernante and something like that, yeah, and the lifestyle of, em, nobility, of high 
society was absolutely European, Western European, but she danced, because it was something 
native. Actually, I will also dance, because it feels so, so, native, so dear, actually, to me (Katia).  
 
 
The preceding chapters outlined the theoretical and methodological foundations of 
investigating identification with the nation in general, and with Russianness in particular, 
while the introductory chapter pointed to some of the obstacles and impasses to this 
process. The current chapter, along with the consecutive chapter featuring an analysis of 
mixed-media surveys, seeks to detect instances of identification with Russianness in 
discourse. The tentative nature of this aim is based both on the precarious and at times 
fleeting nature of identification, as well as the fragility of any identity at which one might 
arrive.  
            
The interviews in this chapter were conducted with full awareness of the problems of 
self-representation, and of how the image we have of ourselves can never be adequately 
translated into language. Indeed, in some ways the research project originates in this 
blockage – it acknowledges both the conceptual and methodological impossibility of 
attaining a representative account of what underlies Russianness, but it nonetheless 
maintains a belief in the significance of results that will be attained en route to this 
elusive destination. For the current research project, which aims to locate moments of 
national identification in discourse, it is assumed that there are moments when and 
where the subject feels he or she coincides with the signifier: “Identities are thus points 
of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct 
for us (Hall, 1996: 7)”.  These ‘temporary attachments’ can be fleeting experiences, but 
they are of a recurrent nature.  A discourse analysis therefore needs to delineate what 
marks these moments of seeming authenticity, and, conversely, determine when and why 
the gap between oneself and the signifier is at times felt most acutely. When recurring 
patterns emerge, this could suggest conducting this type of analysis can be a way of 
examining the role of fantasmatic identification. As already indicated in the chapter on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Natasha’s Dance is the title of Orlando Figes’ 2002 ‘cultural history of Russia’, as well as a prominent  
reference made by one of the interviewees. The subheading is inspired by Stephen Frosh and Lisa Savile 
Young’s 2010 article.  
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methodology, while closer to a critical psychoanalytic reading (see Frosh, 2003, 2007, 
2010), this chapter takes discourse analysis as its starting point. The discourses referred 
to here are discourses of the nation, which, while multifaceted, tend to rely on key 
markers or master signifiers to tie them together. What the present analysis shares with 
discourse analysis is an interest in pattern, rather than merely individual instantiations of 
Russianness. However, the mere fact that certain discourses feature in a subject’s 
repertoire is not deemed sufficient, though it does provide insight into the pool of 
knowledge and sense-making that is available. In order to account for ‘passionate 
attachments’ or attempts to break free of them, a more psychoanalytic perspective has 
been adopted. In order to prevent the formation of a kind of totalizing discourse which 
would insist on accounting for textual patterns in terms of ‘symptoms’, rather than 
accepting its fragmented nature, this perspective is applied to provide depth and 
additional nuance. The aim is emphatically not to colonise the text with wild forms of 
analysis. In line with postmodern readings of a less stable symbolic framework, it is 
conceded that when patterns become apparent in the shapes and forms that 
‘Russianness’ assumes, the mechanisms of taking up these positions may turn out to be 
highly individual.  
 
Eric Santner provides an alternative reading of the case history of 19th – century Judge 
Schreber which posits that it is not merely to be understood as the study of a paranoid 
schizophrenic, but rather that the personal crisis which affected Daniel Schreber is to be 
seen as part of a greater crisis of modernity. As a consequence, community’s “existence 
as a meaning-giving, symbolic whole can no longer—and perhaps never again—be 
experienced as fully trustworthy or of ultimate value”(ibid., p.145). However, a 
“cultivation of an ensemble of “perverse” practices, identifications, and fantasies” 
(Santner, 1996: 145) can allow subjects to find their way back into a context of “basic 
human solidarity” (ibid.).  For this study, a ‘private Russia’ can for instance entail an 
idealised version of the country as a kind of imaginary retreat or ‘sanctuary of meaning’ 
(Wilson, 2005) as one way of sustaining nostalgic practices. As explained in more detail 
in the introductory chapter, Oushakine (2000) describes post-soviet Russian 
subjectivities in terms of their inability to properly assume such identificatory positions 
in the present, which he relates to fundamental disturbances in the discursive field. To 
him, contemporary Russia does not offer the individual any subject positions that would 
adequately represent ‘post-soviet man/woman’, and Russians are thus forced to rely on 
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past signifiers, which remain ever-present if not in content – a content which has 
become historically redundant - then in form. In the work of both such theorists then, a 
psychosocial approach is adopted whereby psychoanalytic notions provide a way of 
reading the social through the insignia of subjective psychic life. 
Aims of the chapter 
The analysis presented here represents an attempt to implement some of the ideas 
explicated in Chapter II. The discursive operations identified in the analysis as ways that 
subjects have found to position themselves vis-à-vis Russia take their cue from the 
psychoanalytically informed accounts of identification by Butler (1997), Ahmed (2004) 
and Stavrakakis (2007), among others. Unlike their more theory-focused work, however, 
the present analysis attempts to apply their contributions to my own empirical data, thus 
simultaneously examining how to translate these into methodological prescriptions. One 
of the chapter’s overarching concerns is reflected in Avitar Brah’s question:  
 
How do the 'symbolic order' and the social order articulate in the formation 
of the subject? In other words, how is the link between social and psychic 
reality to be theorized? (Brah, 1992:142) 
 
 
More specifically, it seeks to investigate how this link between ‘social and psychic reality’ 
finds its articulation in discourse. Is it possible to detect  ‘passionate attachments’ to the 
nation in discourse? Are there multiple fantasmatic Russias, and how much intersection 
is there between them? And do they, at least in part, occupy the same fantasmatic space 
in various forms of in the national imagination, so that some mutual intelligibility is 
retained? 
            
A psychoanalytic approach seeks to locate the fantasmatic logic that is at play whenever 
one identifies with something.  If we treat narrative in itself as a possible psychic defence 
mechanism, a semblance of stability where there is none, this means paying close 
attention to what the narrative structure could be trying to achieve, as well as its gaps. 
However, it also requires not giving in to the ‘lure of narrative’ entirely:  
 
Limits to making sense, to making connections, have to be set. The point 
here is that it may be consoling, therapeutic even, to have sense made of 
one’s mystifying miseries, one’s uncertainties and partial understandings 
(Frosh, 2007: 638). 
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 When certain positions in the interview situation appear to require reiteration or 
repetition, this could point to the fragility and instability of the position assumed, and the 
gap between available subject positions and the subject. Finally, it means looking for the 
‘enjoyment’ that is the result of taking up a specific subject position, as “the problem is 
that, without taking into account enjoyment, the whole Lacanian framework loses most 
of its explanatory force” (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003: 135). However, as Frosh points 
out, this analytic “move ‘beyond’ has to be made respectfully and cautiously, to be sure: 
there is no certainty of interpretation” (Frosh et al, 2003:52), as it is here that the 
interviewer’s interpretations could lead to the greatest distortions. At the same time, it 
can be argued that researchers using psychoanalytic concepts come to the research 
process with greater reflexivity. They are aware of the impact the analyst’s interpretations 
have on analysis, as well as crucial roles of transference and countertransference – 
notions that may be transposed both to the interview setting and the context of textual 
analysis. 
** 
With these considerations in mind, the following discursive operations were identified 
within the data on the basis of a preliminary analysis of the 8 interviews: 
• Disavowal 
• Disidentification (with available Russian subject positions) 
• Mythologisation or romanticisation (of Russian character, history) 
• Reference to fantasmatic origin of Russianness (pre-Revolution, pre-Peter the 
Great, pre-Ivan the Terrible) 
• Loving Russia(n culture) 
• Splitting (into good & bad Russia) 
 
Linguistically, particular attention was paid to interruptions, ellipses and repetitions, to 
the addressees of particular statements (and to those who were being excluded), as well 
as to the use of metaphors. Discursive strategies were translated into more 
psychoanalytic terms when the above-mentioned patterns in language use were seen to 
warrant it and fit the data well.  
Disidentification 
The type of disidentification encountered in the interviews is one that repudiates any 
overt emotional or affective ties to the nation. This mode of discourse is located in a 
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register which is ostensibly devoid of affect, instead it is characterised by rationality. In 
answering the question of whether being Russian has a meaning for him, Yura38, a 30-
year old PhD student in anthropology from Moscow dismisses the notion of any 
palpable attachment to Russianness:  
 
Yura: Well, to me being Russian means you were born in Russia, you grew up in Russia, 
so you have to call yourself something, ok, then let’s say you are Russian, you speak 
Russian language as the mother tongue, for instance, yeah? On the other hand, of course 
you could try to, em, to compare different cultures and say that Russian culture has a 
particular flavour and everybody who grew in that culture will have internalized it to some 
extent and therefore will be Russian in term of the cultural identity. Uh, yeah…and now 
that particular meaning of identity doesn’t really appeal to me that much, because I 
am…I have, I have trouble, really, like accepting that people internalize their cultural 
identity to such an extent that it will be noticeable 20, 30 years later or something like 
that. 
 
 
He presents those that confess to retaining these ties (or rather, displaying them) as 
having chosen to keep up this attachment. His statement that he has “trouble accepting”- 
indicates resistance, or an attempt to distinguish oneself from those that do identify. 
Unfortunately, there is little indication of what they might represent for Yura. 
Throughout the interview, there is a palpable sense of discomfort and a clear 
unwillingness to use more emotive language. This may not be related to the interview 
topic, but to the fleeting, frequently one-off nature of interviews in general. However, it 
does mean that whenever possible Yura will operationalize the subject position of a 
social scientist (anthropologist), enabling him to apply a theoretical rather than personal 
perspective on the world. This type of language acts as a barrier, and while a short 
interview does not provide enough material to draw reasonable inferences about his 
underlying reasons, it does demonstrate that it is difficult to justifiably speak of 
identification without affective investment, or without any discursive move that would 
indicate affect. Does an assumption of Russianness performed by the subject therefore 
also need to indicate a sense of fantasmatic enjoyment?  And should we assume that the 
interviewee’s reticence is symptomatic of his relationship with Russia and Russianness, or 
‘merely’ symptomatic of his everyday conduct? His assertion that “I don’t know how well 
I would fit” once again represents an act of withdrawal of the self from the notion of 
Russianness, as well as a signal to the interviewer, indicating or reinforcing that 
Russianness does not exist in a vacuum. Yura rejects the notion of identity as fate, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 All names are pseudonyms chosen by the interviewees.  
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instead posits the existence of agency over how much Russianness is assumed by the 
individual. At the same time there is a clear desire to differentiate himself from others 
who left Russia: 
Yura: Em, but, em, yeah, I don’t know how strongly I would personally fit, how, how 
well I would fit stereotypical expectations of Russianness that you might have. Maybe, to 
some extent… 
 
While it can be safely assumed that no one wishes to coincide completely with a 
stereotype, or indeed believes themselves to resemble it, Yura makes it clear that he 
views the distance between himself and what he believes to be potential expectations of 
Russianness as especially large.  In part this is perhaps out of a resistance to the fact that 
the interview topic was ostensibly that of national identity, so that the fear of being 
reduced to the category of national belonging may have been present. However, there is 
nevertheless a clear intention to distance oneself  ‘personally’ from associations with 
Russianness which goes beyond the need to establish a distinct subject position within 
the realm of the interview.  
 
In describing these tendencies in Yura’s account, the question may arise whether these 
simply represent a quirk of the individual in question. In fact, while as much discursive 
context as possible is provided for each of the interviewees cited in this chapter, each 
discursive strategy commented upon is also understood to be operating in the broader 
population. Their individual manifestations serve to sensitise the researcher to discursive 
operations more broadly deployed in the sample of interview and survey respondents. 
Thus the distancing so prevalent throughout the interview with Yura is both an individual 
trait in terms of the type of language operationalised (analytic, depersonalised), and part 
of a discursive pattern of highlighting one’s ability to overcome any overt attachment to 
the nation (see chapter V). 
 
Disavowal 
If the first excerpt speaks of a desire to be more, or anything but a representative of 
Russianness, despite the effort this may requite, the next conversation yielded a different 
example of relating to the nation: that of remaining attached to certain fantasmatic 
aspects of its past, despite full awareness of the contrary.   This instance of disavowal is 
to be found in the following excerpt from a conversation with Katia, a 22-year-old MSc 
student from Moscow, who had been asked to give a description of how she imagined 
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life in the Soviet Union in order to get a feel for the past is spoken of in relation to the 
present: 
 
Maria: So you don’t remember any of that, but you certainly have an idea of what life in 
the Soviet Union looked like…could you give me a little description of how you imagine 
life in the Soviet Union? Say, for your parents… 
 
Katia: Yeah. And,er, actually I have a very positive view of what was in the Soviet 
Union. Of course, yes, my image is quite positive, even if I know what, for example, my 
family says, what limitations were of the USSR, but, despite all that, and, in spite of 
that, I believe it was good (laughs). It was not bad, and, er, actually, there were lots of..my 
present image of life in this, er, Soviet Union, was shaped by different films, and they were, 
some of them I like very, very much, and actually… 
[…] I don’t have any, actually bad, er, thoughts about life in the USSR, even if I know 
that, er, it wasn’t that easy. (Laughs) 
 
Her words of “Of course my image is…even though…” and “I don’t have any 
bad…even though I know” are strongly reminiscent of Mannoni’s evocation of “Je sais 
bien, mais quand meme" (Mannoni, 1969).  Certain phantasmatic images clearly resist 
rationalization or supersession by more historically representative narratives. These are 
the images, as well as certain practices, that a nation has to rely on in order to affect 
processes of national identification. They are both highly individual, and highly 
conventional, clichéd. Katia herself makes explicit reference to such images of the past 
which serve as a ‘repository of affect’, of positive, warm emotions. The source often 
appears to be cinematic, as it is images that seem especially conducive to activating these 
processes. The traditional film operates on the premise that the audience identifies with 
its characters, or with its setting. According to Judith Butler’s  (1990) reading of 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1967), the type of identification which takes place the moment 
that one is affected by filmic images is phantasmatic in nature.  It allows several points of 
entry into the (cinematic) scene, so that the viewer can potentially assume the role of 
each of the characters and each detail of the scene’s staging, which leads to a kind of 
desubjectivisation of the individual who is identifying. This implies that there is never a 
straightforward charting of the interaction between onscreen activity and the viewer.  
However, it does beg the question of whether one’s fantasy can be transformed through 
the act of identifying. That is, are there psychic traces after a repeated exposure to a 
certain type of cinematic image? In this case, if a certain, seductive representation of 
what the Soviet Union felt like is projected through film, could it have replaced other, 
official representations?  
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In her characterization of life in the Soviet Union, Katia speaks tautologically:  
 
Katia: […]even according to my family’s stories I know that, er, it was like with 
Germans nowadays, er, Soviet people united, abroad for example. They went together to 
different places and, er, it was normal, it was, er, yeah, it was just a right of things. And, 
but…there was unity in society. The society was united, and it was good (laughs). 
 
“There was unity in society. The society was united, and it was good”: according to 
Pavon Cuellar, subjects can engage in repetition as a way of making discourse true, of 
making it exist: “To be empty, a discourse should be contradictory, but repetitive. To a 
certain extent, the discursive emptiness can be assured by the recurrence of a signifier in 
a ‘tautological’ discourse..” (Pavon Cuellar, 2010: 238).  The above excerpts also open up 
the question of how the past is accessed by subjects, particularly a past that was not 
experienced personally. Katia gives the impression of having to make a choice between 
images, especially moving images, and the narratives of others.  
             
Her attachment to imaginary aspects of the past also enable, or are sought out in order to 
perform a far more overtly emotive relationship with Russianness and Russia than that of 
Yura. When asked what she associates with being Russian, she replies:  
 
Katia: Do you remember the moment when Natasha Rostova, she went to the countryside, 
to her uncle’s if you remember, and she heard, em, native folk songs… 
 
Maria: She dances… 
 
Katia: Yeah, she danced. The, and Tolstoy discusses, this girl, she was brought according 
to maybe French principles, she had British gouvernante and something like that, yeah, 
and the lifestyle of, em, nobility, of high society was absolutely European, Western 
European, but she danced, because it was something native. Actually, I will also dance, 
because it feels so, so, native, so dear, actually, to me. Yeah, when I hear some Russian 
folk songs, it, hm, I actually feel myself Russian, so…(Laughs). 
 
 
She constructs Russianness as something to be felt (see the repeated use of the word 
‘feel’, ‘’dear’, ‘happy’), and there are explicit references to the practices that create the 
kind of enjoyment which is meant to sustain nations, such as celebrations, festivals, as well 
as supporting one’s team in international sports event and competitions (Stavrakakis, 
2007). It is worth quoting Stavrakakis at length here:  
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In his Identification seminar, for example, Lacan will argue that the subject can 
momentarily experience something akin to an attainment of his or her 
identification: ‘at this unique instant demand and desire coincide, and it is 
this which gives to the ego this blossoming of identificatory joy from which 
jouissance springs’ (seminar of 2 May 1962). A national war victory or the 
successes of the national football team are examples of such experiences of 
enjoyment at the national level” (Stavrakakis, 2007: 197).  
 
The 2014 Olympic Winter Games in Sochi are representative of politicians’ and 
governments’ desire to recreate this ‘unique instant’. Take for instance, journalist Oleg 
Kashin’s description of the Games as an ‘ideological event’39, that is, a PR-exercise to 
improve the President’s image at a time of popular discontent.  Thus the opening 
ceremony specifically referenced ‘glorious’ episodes from Russia’s past so as to create a 
natural, affective link with its present, culminating in the (hoped for) national fervour of 
the Olympic Games. Katia’s response similarly echoes this sentiment of national 
belonging through sport: 
[…]. Yeah, I’m very proud, for example, when Russians for example win something in 
the Olympics (laughs), and if they do I proud of being Russian (both laugh), so…and all 
those things make me feel Russian, actually…. 
 
 As Katia professes these strong emotional ties to certain aspects of Russian culture, it may 
appear paradoxical that the most strongly felt moment of self-ascribed identification is 
lifted straight from the pages of a classical Russian novel. It also sheds a different light 
on Masha’s later comment about the cultural ‘poverty’ of the 1990s (“…but probably 
what gets me more is how poor culturally the country was in the 90s”) and begs the 
question of whether this particular contingent of interviewees requires a degree of 
poeticisation or romanticisation in order to be able to identify with a version of the nation, 
and whether this is perhaps a necessary condition for identification to take place. When 
she says:  
 […] some people say that they actually don’t feel there is nationality. I think if you think 
a bit more you will understand what’s your nationa…what is your identity…National 
identity. 
 
This could be read as a direct response to Yura’s expressed lack of conviction in the 
coherence or continued existence of national identity. The two clearly operate on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 http://kashin.guru/2014/05/21/polska/ 
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different registers of discourse, Yura’s being that of a social scientist, Katia’s being 
affective and relying on imagined and real visceral sensations. Here, the nation is 
performed via key cultural signifiers.  
Mythologisation 
Describing Russianness can also entail an element of ‘making strange’. 
What gets presented in terms of a critique is at the same time an instance of mythologisation 
of the Russian character - a character that appears to have been left unchanged by 
modernity and the belated introduction of capitalism, and that evokes a mixture of 
exasperation and admiration: 
 
Andrey: I mean that, er, people have different way of doing things they have different way 
of living. Traditions, maybe. They are not totally in the modern world. Er, it’s 
very…maybe example? Ok, so, er, they don’t appreciate a job, don’t appreciate earning 
money, for instance, don’t appreciate personal efforts to work. Don’t appreciate 
achievements, sometimes, Of course, it’s, it depends, but it’s more in the country than in 
the cities. 
 
 
The use of the third person pronoun indicates the emphasis of distance between Andrey, 
a 34-year-old MSc student from St Petersburg, and most Russians – where Andrey has 
moved on, most Russians have stayed behind.  One needs of course to be aware that any 
interview question asking the respondent to define a group necessarily entails a reifying 
of this group or category. However, as an alternative, Andrey could have used a first 
person pronoun here, but he (un)consciously decided not to, in strong contrast to what 
Wodak et al (1999) define as one of the fundamental macro-strategies employed by 
individuals to construct national identity discursively. These constructive strategies include 
linguistic acts such as using the pronoun ‘we’ which would “invite identification and 
solidarity” (Wodak et al, 1999: 160). Another remarkable absence which deserves 
mentioning here is the relative lack of perpetuation strategies, which would serve to 
“maintain, support and reproduce national identities” (ibid.) by relying on metaphors 
which emphasise the need to ‘stick together’ as a nation. In the present context, it 
certainly serves to reinforce the above-mentioned discourse of lazy Russian villagers who 
are themselves to blame for any lack of progress or wealth (“They don’t appreciate…”). 
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Later in the interview, there is a change from third- to first-person pronoun, in a 
comment that is highly reminiscent of Sergey Sokolov’s assessment of the structure of 
Russian society40:  
 
Andrey: This weekend I just was in the British country, I was a guest of some elder 
person for a couple of days, so I saw this life…in the UK, I can see that main difference is 
the lack of self-organisation of Russian people on the lower level, so the thing you name 
community…actually we don’t have community in Russia. Of course we have this level of 
government, we have it, yeah? But according to the entire meaning of this word, we don’t  
have these relationships, where people together, trying to solve problems, we don’t have it. 
People are very individual, even in the cities. 
 
 
There appear to be two distinct purposes to this: one is to continue the critique of the 
contemporary Russian way of life, which he characterises as highly individualistic and 
socially dispersed, thereby elevating the level of criticism away from the primitivism he 
describes earlier. Further into the discussion, he includes himself once more in his 
description, this time to foreground the aspects of Russian identity that, though 
conditioned by the many negative features he mentions earlier, in fact provide an 
advantage: 
 
Andrey: […]We know nothing about next decade, we can hardly imagine. On one side, 
it’s not so good, because we can’t build plans, private plans as well. We, er, are moving, 
moving. But it is an advantage that it is an opportunity. We are more open to new things, 
to…So I think, that to be Russian is to have a wider horizon for opportunities.  
 
 
It is here that the use of the pronoun is more obviously motivated by a desire to align 
oneself with those Russians who prevail despite the odds, and even manage to benefit 
from them. 
                
In fact, the mythologisation of Russian national character together with emphasis placed 
on the dichotomy between town and country is a dominant discursive strategy 
throughout the interviews, as well as in media accounts of contemporary and historic 
Russia. Russians are constructed as a people of extremes, capable of great feats, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Russian society does not exist. It is a sort of atomised substance, whose elements live lives that are completely disconnected 
from each other.(Interview with BBC Russia, 11.11.2010) 
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always teetering on the brink of self-destruction. According to Natasha, a 26-year-old 
student from Krasnodar in Southern Russia:  
 
Natasha: Sorry, I just want to add, I would say that Russians, they don’t have any 
brakes. 
 
Maria: OK, brakes (laughs). What do you mean by that? 
 
Natasha: So we’re very….if they start doing something, they can’t, they can’t, er, you 
know, find…they can’t stop themselves. They don’t have any limits. So if they start 
drinking they can drink too much, if they start spending money, they can spend too much, 
if they start, I don’t know… so, they don’t have any limits.  
 
 
Like any stereotype or dominant discourse, it serves to order and structure certain 
behaviours and subsequently converts them into truths. At times one may be led to 
conclude that the very fatalism of this discourse acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
According to Pavon Cuellar, the frequent repetition of a term or statement serves to 
resolve contradiction, which is inherent in discourse: “Actually, for all I know, repetition 
is the only effective intra-discursive remedy for the contradiction that divides the 
subject” (Pavon Cuellar, 2010: 238).  
          
One might agree that every representation of Russia or Russians is merely a creation that 
misses some aspects while reifying, if not always romanticising or mythologising others. 
However, some characterisations are produced in a more self-conscious, postmodern 
spirit, that is, in full awareness of their constructedness:  
 
Maria: And you’ve given me a few glimpses. How would describe that, if I just asked you 
about that?41  
 
Irina: Yeah. I guess that’s also a myth at this point, em, or, like a mental space that I 
have created for myself. I don’t know. Em, because, I mean there’s, maybe it’s not, bleak 
was, like, a, not a very good word choice I suppose, maybe gaudy would be a better word 
now? Just with a, em, just a popculture, you know, and, em, the materialism that is just 
overwhelming among the young people. But then there are the babushkas, that’s sort of 
bleak. Em, em, just I guess the poverty and the lack of hope and, you know, just the 
socioeconomic situation that is kind of causing despair. So, yeah it’s definitely a country of 
contrasts to me. My country, you know, my Russia, my very limited experience of Russia. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Reference is made to “post-soviet, provincial reality” mentioned by Irina.  
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Like many of the respondents, Irina, a 22-year-old student from Yoshkar-Ola42 seems 
unwilling to commit to one definitive representation of Russia – she insists on the 
subjective quality of her answer once more through the repeated use of the personal 
pronoun (“my country, my Russia”). The following statements also confirm that one of 
the underlying reasons for this may be an inability to unite the conflicting elements that 
make up this ‘post-soviet provincial reality’. In her description she initially uses both 
‘gaudy’ and ‘bleak’, located as they are at opposing ends of the colour spectrum.  
        
At the same time, her insistence on its subjective quality allows for a rather unorthodox 
approach to the question, which enables her to answer it in terms of aesthetics, as she 
describes the country as resisting rationalisation (another prevalent cliché).Whether 
reproduced automatically, or presented more self-consciously, the recurrent drive 
towards of mythologisation of national character does prompt the reflection of what it 
means to employ a myth. What does it enable subjects to make sense of? And, 
additionally, what does it mean to employ this strategy consciously, even self-
consciously? One answer points back to processes of identification: only by inhabiting a 
shared imaginary can subjects be linked in collective identification: 
 
 
The bond of affection and collective identification with the nation is 
established not only through common ways of life but also through cultural 
myths that constitute the phantasmatic space of the national imagination. 
(Boym, 1995: 134, my emphasis). 
 
 
However, it appears that following the crisis of investiture which affects institutions as 
well as also ideological and cultural edifices, one way of reinvigorating these cultural 
myths is to first imbue with personal relevance, thus turning them into ‘own private 
Russias’ (Santner, 1997). A subject position Irina thus willingly assumes later in the 
interview is that of a Russian woman grappling with outsiders’ representations of Russia. 
It appears to allow her to speak of herself as actively engaging with Russia as a Russian 
(albeit from abroad), to regain a sense of agency:  
 
[…]I'm fighting against the perception of Russia as backward, wild, oppressive; of 
Russian women as promiscuous, greedy mail order brides or blonde communist spies. 
Paradoxically, I am trying to present a Russia that's still backward, wild, and oppressive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Capital of the Mari El republic in Russia. 
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- but illuminated with a mysterious, ancient light from within, unknown to itself, fantastic 
and poetic, and soulful. I am trying to project an image of an intelligent, free, magical 
woman, a forest witch that's only civilized on the surface.  
 
Why do I do this? Because I think that the West needs a Russia of this kind.  
 
Now what if I am NOT in the West? If I am not in the West or in the Western 
mindset, I am inevitably dancing in the woods, swimming in lakes, singing folk songs in 
the fields, cooking with my grandmother, going to the cemetery with my mother. This is my 
Russia: elemental, ancient, wholesome, pagan43.  
 
 
The repeated use of the present continuous presents her as engaging in the “struggle’ for 
an alternative view on Russia, without, however, indicating how she aims to achieve this. 
By focusing on ‘projecting’ a certain image of Russia, she is essentially turning an act of 
self-stylisation into a political act, showing a desire to be seen as Russian and for this 
‘Russianness’ to acquire meaning. The meaning she does want to project reflects that 
same wish to idealise Russianness via the Russian soul, which she has endowed with 
features (“elemental, ancient, wholesome, pagan”) and which appear to have been drawn 
from a repository of fairy-tale images.  In the introduction it was reiterated that, 
according to Serguei Oushakine writing in 2001, the post-soviet discursive field fails to 
provide its subjects with “a clearly located position from which to address others and to 
be addressed” (Oushakine, 2001: 300). In 2010, this still appeared to be true – Irina 
forges a subject position that enables her to identify with Russianness, but which has 
little in common with everyday elements of Russian life. Indeed, the emphatically 
capitalised ‘NOT’ seems to speak not merely of identification via differentiation, but 
identification through negation. 
 
Prelapsarian states 
This absence of viable subject positions in post-soviet Russia implies that there was a 
time when these were more readily available.  In some retellings, the history of Russia 
becomes the history of the loss of such positions, and of a ‘brighter future’ that would do 
justice to the country’s imagined potential. In Andrey’s words:  “And actually, the great part 
of Russian history is just a loss of these opportunities”.  While this is true of any ‘history’ 
depending on how one chooses to tell it, the notion of a ‘failed potentiality’ appears to be 
a particularly persistent strand of discourse. There is a series of losses which keep being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Irina had offered to provide further reflections via email. This is an excerpt of her response to the 
question “what does being Russian mean to you? “.  
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referred to: first the October Revolution, which is seen to have brought an end to a kind 
of cultural and even social apogee, and is at times represented as having plunged 
Russians back into a darker, less civilized time. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
an entity which is paradoxically described as a great destroyer of tradition and values in 
the same breath. Nevertheless, its breakdown is seen to have lead to a further 
unmooring, made all the more painful by the chaos of the 1990s: “after Soviet Union 
collapsed, er, it is a gap…in this place of universe” (Andrey). 
               
When Masha, a 26-year old literature student from St Petersburg, is asked to recollect the 
1990s, her speech becomes elliptical, almost disintegrates, giving further evidence of the 
traumatic nature of the 1990s in the consciousness of most Russians:  
 
Masha: Ah...suddenly there was this...I don't know...there was a lot of Mafia things, and 
I don't know, it just ticked in my mind, a lot of these kinds of guys in leather jackets 
hanging around, a lot of these stupid films, like, really rubbish film (interviewer laughs), 
horrible, horrible films. Em, yeah, just a lot of...and I mean, money then became...even not 
money, but getting stuff. Stuff became really important. Clothes and, em, suddenly. And 
just changes, a lot of changes. Changes in prices, and like, all the time, and I remember  
'98, and it was horrible, I mean, overnight everything just changed, unbelievable. I don't 
know, it was really stressful being at school. Looking back at it now, and just 
remembering how stressed our teachers were, I mean, it's ridiculous. A lot of, kind of, 
screaming. Teachers, especially women, they were quite aggressive. Looking back at it now 
you might think that they had obviously been affected as well. (long pause) Yeah, just not 
really knowing what's going on, what's happening, that was a bit scary. (long pause). 
Hm. Just kind of, just going to the markets, because there weren't many shops, and I just 
remember it being very, just messy and...getting something or doing something bureaucratic 
was always, yeah, I just remember these queues and all these offices. I mean, things didn't 
change very much, but it was really, really worse then. (long pause) But probably what gets 
me more is how poor culturally the country was in the 90s. 
 
While it may be an impossible task to characterise a time in one’s life or a historical 
period, the way these are narrativised is still indicative of their impact, the traces they left 
in the individual and social psyche. In the operation of this text, it involves ellipses, 
repetitions (see her repeated use of the word “change”), long pauses and a general sense 
of chaos and disturbance. The interruptions to the flow of narrative convey the idea of a 
disruption to the flow of life, while the reiteration of  ”looking back at it now” points to 
a retroactive attempt to make sense of seemingly unconnected episodes and images, and 
an inability to accomplish this. The 1990s remain a lacuna, thus thwarting an attempts to 
seamlessly integrate them into a temporal and personal trajectory – there appears to be 
only the ‘before’ of the Soviet Union and the ‘after’ that coincides with Putinism (See 
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Chapter VII). As mentioned in the introductory chapter, an attempt to forge a national 
project out of a rejection or disavowal of almost an entire decade inevitably leads to 
blockages, as well as recurrent usage of past signifiers.  
             
In fact, in some interpretations, the watershed moment after which Russia ceased to be 
moving towards what it could have been, is located even earlier, in 1917:  
 
Masha: But I often think about what it is to be Russian. I often think about how 
differently things would have been, what it would be to be Russian, if there wouldn't be 
1917, there wouldn't be revolution, there wouldn't be communism...things would just go 
on after 1917 as they were. I think that's quite interesting. What it would be like...what 
it would be like then. Would we be more Russian? Or is the Communist Party part of 
being truly Russian, or is just a group of some kind of mad guys? Yeah, these kinds of 
things I think about. I don't know what I should be associating myself with. Should I be 
associating myself with communism as well, or should I just, you know, associate myself, 
kind of choose and pick what to be Russian, or is it a whole kind of box? Do I have to 
take it...[…] ..is it something where you would sort of think 'yeah, that's part of my 
history', or is it something you just want to erase, and just not consider....I mean, is it 
worth really being part of your history? 
 
This leads to the contradictory operation where an idea of a Russia that was somehow 
more Russian before a certain event is constructed, while simultaneously associating 
Russianness with distinct elements of Soviet culture and society (“Everything that was 
written and done before…before 1917, before the Revolution” […] “If there wouldn’t be 1917, if there 
wouldn’t be communism”…). The latter is perhaps self-evident, considering that all of the 
interviewees were born in the Soviet Union. However, for many the origin of ‘true 
Russianness’ is located elsewhere, in a pre-Soviet past (or, in one case, prior to Ivan the 
Terrible). This falls in line with the idea referred to by Žižek that, in order to conceal its 
non-existence, a society or nation needs to create the myth of a ‘Golden Age’ before it 
was deprived (usually, although not in this case, by an outside force) of its essential 
qualities: 
 
The paradox to be fully accepted is that when a certain historical moment is 
(mis)perceived at the moment of loss of some quality, upon closer 
inspection it becomes clearer that the lost quality emerged only at this very 
moment of its alleged loss (Žižek, 1997: 14).  
 
This recurrent referencing of a time when Russia was free from many of the social 
problems it currently experiences often leads to an evocation of greater spirituality and 
	   102	  
(hence) greater cultural output. Notably, in the online ‘Test for Russianness’44, the 
majority of questions require an in-depth knowledge of Russian poetry, music and films, 
giving the impression that the preferred connotations of Russianness are of a cultural 
rather than a political nature. What is positive about Russia(ns) becomes retroactively 
associated with art and literature. 
        
This interview excerpt is also indicative of the limits of the types of discourse an 
interview encounter can produce. There is both an orientation towards the interviewer, 
an adjustment of what is verbalised in accordance with circumstances  - both the setting 
of the LSE, and the fact that the interviewees are outside of Russia at the time of the 
interview - and a certain level of self-censorship based on what the respondent expects 
the interviewer wants to hear or find palatable (“It might sound a bit sort of, I don’t know”…). 
It would be going too far to refer to this as transference, but something is played out that 
speaks of previous relationships, and over which the interviewer has little control and 
lacks knowledge as to whether this is related by the interview questions, or the 
respondent’s personal history. The tone throughout this long answer is contemplative 
and equivocal, but ends in a somewhat defiant way. It appears that throughout the 
answer Masha has surveyed the subject positions seemingly made available to her 
through Russian history, and decides to reject them.  This could be cited as an instance 
of disidentification – something she has already done in a physical sense by leaving the 
country, most likely for good. By asking whether something is ‘worthy’ of being part of 
one’s national history she also reveals that she holds on to an idealised concept of what 
the nation can represent, along with the possibilities of history. There is thus still, if no 
actual love for the nation in the sense of a strong attachment to an ideal, then a desire to 
achieve this level of attachment, and a sense of disappointment that the nation failed to 
live up to this potential. What unites many of the respondents is not an apparent love for 
the nation but a mourning of the absence of love.  
       
While most interviewees referred to two breaks or gaps in Russian history, which 
heralded a series of traumatic changes, i.e. the end of the Soviet Union and the October 
Revolution, Natasha identifies the locus of true Russianness in an even remoter time, 
namely before Ivan the Terrible’s ascent to power. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 http://www.kommersant.ru/k-vlast/vlast-test.asp 
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Natasha:[…] what we have now, er, how we can explain, you know, our behavior, or our 
corruption and everything. It happens during Tsar, during, er, Ivan, you know, Ivan The 
Horrible times and oprichnina45… 
 
Maria: OK. 
 
Natasha:…where he introduced, so, I mean, that we lived according to, you know, 
Christian laws and we were very, you know, we had, er, just I need to remember, you 
know, like, his idea… 
 
Maria: Sure. 
 
Natasha:..I mean that, before his period of governing Russia, em, we had like, we had, we 
know that we are allowed to do this, we are not allowed to do this. But when he was Tsar 
you know he did so many horrible things, so, I mean that, sometimes, you know 
sometimes he did some things which contradicted with Christian laws and he introduced 
oprichnina and it changed people’s mind because they realized, especially about oprichnina, 
because, you know, people during his time they, you know, they could be killed at any 
time. 
 
 
True Russianness is thereby inextricably linked with “Christian laws”, which were followed 
until Tsar Ivan the Terrible and his henchmen “changed people’s mind”. Contrary to the 
usual version of such accounts, which supposedly rely on an antagonistic outside force to 
explain the loss of a nation’s or people’s essential quality, the change is to have come from 
within. This in itself could indicate that the usual model tends to rely on an oversimplified 
notion of internal versus external forces46. At the same time, it is also characteristic of the 
aforementioned way in which Russians themselves discursively construct Russianness in 
terms of extremes, both good and bad (‘generous but frivolous’, ‘heroic but reckless’), so 
that the most virtuous behaviour is paired with the most immoral tendencies. 
          
Another discursive tendency present throughout the interviews, that is, a referencing of 
works of literature or cinema, is also present in Natasha’s account. According to her, the 
film Tsar (Pavel Lungin, 2009), to which she refers in her attempt to “explains Russian 
mentality nowadays”. Beyond being sceptical of such a statement, it is perhaps more 
worthwhile to inquire into the underlying reasons for this consistent practice of citation. 
Why are films better equipped to respond or provide an answer to questions about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Period of Russian history between 1565 and 1572 during which Tsar Ivan the Terrible instituted a 
domestic policy of secret police, mass repressions and confiscation of land from Russian aristocracy. 
46 For example, the pariah in much of contemporary German discourse – the ‘benefit scrounger’ - is ‘truly 
and essentially’ German according to most criteria, both ethnic and cultural. 
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nature of Russianness? Recall that one of Masha’s first recollections of the 1990s is of 
films ([…]”a lot of these stupid films, like, really rubbish film….horrible, horrible films”).  This, 
together with the fact that they also occur in the interviews with Katia and later Natasha, 
open up the question of whether cinematic images are a kind of imaginary supplement to 
an otherwise fractured representation of the past. If we concede that identity formations 
can be based on an internalisation of phantasmatic objects, as well as remembering the 
notion that any kind of affective investment needs to be routed via fantasy, this may 
indeed be the case. De Lauretis appears to have just this in mind when she states that 
“today cinema’s unique effectiveness in the production of a social imaginary (public 
fantasies) is understood to work through the phantasmatic production it elicits and 
shapes in individual spectators (private fantasies)” (Lauretis, 2008: 16).  
               
When giving an account, there is always the need to produce a coherent story, so one 
may ask why it is not preferable to refer to a pre-existing story rather than invest in the 
work of creating one afresh. After all ”the feeling remains that whenever we try to say 
something completely, the saying of it misses the point. […] There are, simply, too many 
ways of speaking about things, and to do them justice one would have to use all these 
different ways, all at once” (Frosh, 2007: 641). The very conviction with which 
respondents evoke these images and scenes from works of art suggests that they are seen 
to represent the essence of Russianness more coherently and more convincingly than the 
interviewees’ personal impressions.  Returning to the Žižekian account of the fantasmatic 
nature of ideology, or rather, the ideological nature of fantasy, one can see how 
successful47 narratives becomes integrated into both discourse and fantasy, giving 
another indication of where they might overlap. In fact, one of the methodological 
findings of this chapter is that the visual, that is, imaginary form, as salient in the 
respondents’ accounts which feature cinematic scenes, intrudes upon and does a 
different kind of substantiating work to that identified by a more strictly linguistic or 
discursive frame.  
Nostalgic fantasies 
Interestingly, as indicated in responses by Katia and Irina, at times it appears more 
straightforward, or less troubling to relate to Soviet Russia than it is to establish a stable 
relationship with present-day Russia. This attachment, as illustrated in the following 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In terms of its ability to tell a story that allows for processes of identification by the viewer or reader, not 
necessarily in terms of artistic merit. 
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excerpt, is not always predicated on an altogether positive or rose-tinted vision of the 
past. When I asked for more detail in response to a reference she had made to a time 
when she had ‘actively sought out the Soviet experience’, Irina responded:  
Irina: Ye…yeah. Just, I mean, I read a lot of history and, like, stayed up ‘til two in the 
morning crying over, you know, horrible things that happened during thirties, and, em, 
went to the museums, looked for old buildings, and tried to learn the history, just local 
history, em, wore a lot of Soviet dresses, my mum’s dresses, my grandmother’s dresses, so, 
yeah, it was, just, I guess the main thing that I still love about it and am still drawn to is 
how, I guess, how at the same time I think of the Soviet life as very catchy, and obviously 
just, I mean, the propaganda and the formulaic speech of people and objects and just, 
everything loud and not, like there aren’t many, er, nuances, I guess, but at the same  time 
there is this delicacy, that, em, comes from poverty and lack of resources, intellectual 
resources and, em, just any input, and so this, I guess, idea of people making do with the 
small space that they have, you know, the small space in the kommunalka48 , and, you 
know, the little money, and this one book, I don’t know , the, like, printed copy of 
something, does it make sense? 
 
She stresses its ‘catchiness’ and ‘formulaic speech’, vestiges of which can still be 
encountered in present-day Russia, perhaps even more so in smaller towns such as her 
hometown Yoshkar-Ola. In her quest to see and describe the world in aesthetic terms, 
the ‘retro-feel’ of all things Soviet is presented as attractive, even fascinating. Here Irina 
engages in a wilful and self-conscious aesthetisation of the past, perhaps succumbing to 
the same seductive qualities of the image referred to earlier. Like her self-styling as “a 
forest witch that's only civilized on the surface”, there is an agentic quality to this yielding 
to the past’s seductive powers.  Both Katia and Irina are aware of the traumatic aspects 
of Soviet history (even though few born after the 1950s have direct experience of them), 
but this does not diminish the appeal of Soviet aesthetics. If our experience of reality is 
strongly reliant on fantasy, then images that lend themselves more easily to being 
incorporated in this fantasy are perhaps those that have been reworked through 
narrativisations in popular culture and family lore.  
           
This is strongly reminiscent of the type of attachment usually characterised as nostalgia. 
The immersive experiences that Irina describes as having sought out resemble the  
“‘magical thinking’ that is such an important element of nostalgic reverie, that is, the 
temporary suspension of the reality principle” (Nikelly, 2004: 184). The fact that this 
reverie enables ”the ego to “regress into memories and fantasies of long ago” (ibid.) links 
it to the situation of ‘narcissistic withdrawal’ which was seen as a consequence of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Communal flat.  
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‘discursive arrest’ of the 1990s (Oushakine, 2000: 1011). In his psychoanalytic reading of 
nostalgia, Nikelly further points out that the initial investment in the object, be it a 
parental figure or one’s country of birth, was most likely of an ambivalent nature, and 
that nostalgic feelings are frequently borne out of an attempt to retain the positive 
attachment, and resist the resolution of this tension that mourning would require. 
Crucially, it appears here that this ambivalence has been transposed onto a different era. 
The reference Irina makes to ‘crying’, to her seeking out of negative affect, may indeed 
be a performative re-enactment of a type of mourning.  Pertaining as it does to a past of 
which she has virtually no recollection, this is a psychically ‘safe’ endeavour out of which 
she can exit and re-enter at will.  
 
Splitting the nation 
When Natasha is asked what being Russian means to her, she locates it in the realm of 
culture and aesthetics, like Katia and Irina before her:  
 
Maria: […] I’ll just ask you how you feel, but er, what er, what does it mean, does it 
mean anything to you? I mean, Russian, having a Russian nationality? 
 
Natasha: Em, good question. My personality, you know, what people could expect form 
my behaviour, I think. My culture. I would this is the most important thing, my culture, 
because I love my culture. For me it’s like…you know, I, I would say that I divide 
Russia into two things, politics and culture, and you know, I devoted, I’m, you know, I’m 
very loyal to Russian culture, but I am not about Russian politics, I mean, I mean, it’s a 
big, it’s a contradiction. I mean, why…so why people sometimes, they don’t want to live in 
Russia. Not just because they don’t like their country. They just don’t feel themselves safe 
there, they just don’t like the politics, the, you know, that, you know, politics, political 
system, or, you know, but they are Russians inside because of their culture, it’s, you know, 
I think, I think you should understand what you mean, I mean but by, I mean my…I’m 
Russian, it means my culture, first of all, so what I got from my parents, my 
grandparents, and what I have in my genes. 
 
Hence, because she loves culture, or rather, the cultural output of Russia, she finds 
herself ‘loving’ Russia’ with an affection that is reminiscent of the love for the 
‘contingent circumstance of one’s birth’. Loving one’s country of birth becomes an 
example of a ‘forced choice’ – lacking control of where one is born and raised, one is 
better off loving it, so that “the contingent circumstances of one’s birth are transformed 
into an object of love; what is unavoidable becomes ethically sanctioned” (Dolar, 
1993:82). This ‘forced choice’ results in the expectation that the nation (as a construct or 
an ideal) can be loved, and that a lack of love for it impoverishes one’s life, or at least 
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adds complication. It is perhaps this ‘readiness to love ’ that makes one vulnerable to 
glorified images of the nation (together with the narcissistic gains to be had from)  - be 
they purely phantasmatic, or merely phantasmatic representations in art and literature – 
which satisfy this need to feel attached.  
                  
For Masha the difficult question of ‘what Russia is about’ similarly leads to a referral to 
literature, and the values gleamed in the works of classical 19th century Russian literature: 
 
Masha: Em, I really think that Russian kind of inheritance in terms of literature and 
culture, everything that was written and done before...I don't know...before 1917, before the 
Revolution, basically, I think that still has a lot of effect on people. And hopefully this is 
what one day what, I don't know, people will kind of go back to. They'll realise that that's 
what's really really precious. And that's what Russia is about. About charity, about 
patriotism, about people giving up their lives for their country. Em....about people being 
reckless, but in a kind of amazing, heroic way. Yeah, these kinds of things. That I can 
only...well, not only, but you read about it in Russian literature. They are very dear to me. I 
am really proud of that, really proud of this. Especially as I studied Russian literature, it 
made me so happy to be Russian. It's not that I chose to study Russian literature because I'm 
Russian, because it's that I really loved....em...but actually being Russian, that always made 
me think: I am so proud to be a part of it.  
 
 
These cardinal features include the kindness and spirituality which is repeatedly cited by 
both interview and later survey participants, and which is contrasted with the ‘real 
existing’, manifest demeanour of Russians in contemporary Russia. Literature has always 
enjoyed a particularly elevated status in Russia, where its dissemination and reception are 
closely intertwined with the self-perception of its intelligentsia49. Indeed, one prevalent 
Soviet dissident practice in Moscow in the 1960s was to organise public readings of 
poetry as a form of subversive, anti-government action. 
 
What transpires here is that one of the ways to enable a relationship with Russia that is 
characterised by positive affect is to engage in a form of splitting, reminiscent of the ways 
in which Melanie Klein utilises the notion. Natasha admits herself that she “splits” Russia 
into good and bad components. The cultural output of Russia (though certainly not all of 
it) inspires feelings of “devotion” and “loyalty”, tying it to the types of affect that 
characterise group formation and coherence in the Freudian account. Politics seem to 
inspire a wholly negative reaction, which is not fully verbalised, but which is positioned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See the important role of samizdat and tamizdat in the Soviet Union. See also the common reference to 
“Manuscripts don’t burn” from Mikhail Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita (1967).	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in strong contrast or “contradiction” to all that is lovable about Russia, represented by 
culture. Culture can be internalised because of its positive, possibly phantasmatic 
connotations. Hence: “they are Russians inside because of their culture”.  
                 
The social world is frequently encountered as chaotic and threatening.  One way of 
managing the resultant anxiety is the splitting off and projecting outwards of its negative 
aspects. While the notion of splitting – as typical of the paranoid position  - was formulated 
in response to certain processes Melanie Klein observed in young infants, it shares with 
its later application to the wider social world a concern with phantasmatic processes. The 
good/bad objects are constituted as a result of symbolisation, or a failure to do so.  
Oushakine observed a similar process when asking students in Russia about their 
representations of “New Russia” in the late 1990s: “The ‘good’ Motherland is taken 
“inside, hummed as a song, while the ‘bad’ Motherland is projected out- and downward” 
(Oushakine, 2001: 309). This ‘rhetorical splitting’, which is similar to Natasha’s 
presentation of Russia in starkly binary terms of ‘good’ culture and ‘bad’ politics then 
results in an idealisation of the good object, and an abjection of the bad. By de facto 
constituting Russia in these terms, perhaps to ward off some of the anxiety that its every-
changing political and social landscape has produced since the early 1990s, one is 
simultaneously making it impossible to engage with what one has expelled from one’s 
psyche at so much personal cost. From here, it could be assumed that one of the 
underlying reasons a large majority of Russians refuses or fails to engage with Russian 
politics is that the cost would simply be too high. At the same time, it is important from 
a theoretical perspective to ask whether it might be worthwhile to retain, or re-introduce 
the distinction between identification and introjection, whereby the former “involves an 
alteration in the subject’s self-representation” (Lapping, 2012: 148), whereas in the latter 
“the internalized object is kept apart from the sense of self” (ibid.). 
 
Conclusion 
These interviewees lament the absence of a sense of community or solidarity, while 
simultaneously emphasising that they see no possibility of identifying with contemporary 
instantiations of Russianness. However, there is a distinct desire to love the nation, which 
finds its expression either in a sense of disappointment, resulting in a list of grievances 
against a Russia which has failed to make itself loveable, or a splitting into a good and a 
bad nation, so that what is perceived as worthy of love can be retained and internalised, 
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while the worthless Russia can be expelled. A similar dichotomy can be encountered in 
the way Russian national character is constructed and mythologised. The aspects of 
Russianness that are capable of inspiring affective investment can be found in the realm 
of aesthetics and culture. Characters and scenes from Russian novels and films are 
identified with fantasmatically, being first deemed worthy of identification, and then 
retroactively established as distinctly Russian. Some interviewees also allow for the 
possibility that a true (meaning: lovable) Russianness existed in the past, but lost these 
qualities through a usually sudden historical change or ‘fall’. The last vestiges of a spirit of 
community are seen to be located in the Soviet Union. Once more the interviewees are 
disavowing the problematic side of Soviet history, despite being fully aware of it on the 
level of knowledge, in order to be able to hold on to, and fetishize, a certain version that 
can be integrated more easily into fantasy.  This is again enabled by the peculiar qualities 
of images and symbols and the way they can circumvent certain discursive impasses..  
           
Incidentally, the same focus on, and fetishisation of, aesthetics is what anti-government 
protesters operating in Russia’s capital had been accused of during the most recent wave 
of anti-government protests in 2012 and 2013. While their sit-ins and flash mob-like 
events may represent a practice capable of creating the type of enjoyment necessary in 
order to evoke processes of national identification (Žižek, 1993), it was essentially an 
insular movement relying on a number of Master Signifiers such as ‘democracy’ and ‘fair 
elections’ which had failed to draw much support from the regions, potentially because 
their relevance to the majority of Russians was disputable.  
** 
As mentioned previously, the ambivalent attachments to the nation encountered here 
may also originate in the absence of freedom over one’s place of birth – in other words, 
the type of ‘forced choice’ that stands at the beginning of the formation of subjectivity.  
One needs to distinguish between the kind of psychic imprint left by primary caregivers, 
and that of the nation, however, images of the nation are pervasive (Billig, 1995). In fact,  
the notion of ‘home’ is one that has managed to occupy the symbolic and affective 
terrain between national and familial attachments. 
        
Subjects thus have to position themselves vis-à-vis the nation, though they are rarely 
called to do so explicitly. The empirical examples of the current and subsequent chapter 
provide insight into the problems subjects encounter when asked to recruit the discursive 
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means available to delineate this relationship, and the strategies they employ to 
circumvent these blockages. What emerges is that subjects have retained an implicit 
expectation of retaining a positive attachment to on the nation, which is coupled with an 
inability to maintain it. Discursively, the subject positions taken up the respondents 
clearly reflect their disciplinary or habitual vocabulary, so that some employed a more 
literary repertoire, whereas others were more firmly rooted in the linguistic habitus of 
social science. By looking at textual material collected online from a similar, but 
numerically larger contingent, the next chapter will therefore further assist in determining 
how much the discursive patterns established here are representative of different types of 
attachment, whether they merely originate in distinct discursive realms, and how much 
the two are possibly associated. 
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Chapter V: The Drunkard in the Rain: a psychosocial analysis of 
surveys on Russianness 
 
I often recall that scene from ‘Andrey Rublev’ with the drunkard, in the rain, with a club in his hands which he is 
unable to control, and with which he attempts to reach ever-elusive ghosts. It's funny, and sad, and frightening. One 
even feels a little sympathetic: after all,  
when he's sober, he's a completely different person!50 
 
A Tale of Two Russias 
The previous chapter addressed the idea of an internal splitting of Russia into good and 
bad objects as one way of managing the threat posed by an uncertain and ever-changing 
political and social terrain in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the 
beginning of the interview, Natasha attempts to convey the experience of Russianness as 
one that is deeply infused with a lack of security:  
 
I would say, like, main characteristics that it’s, er, unpredictable, er, sometimes, I would say 
that for the majority of people you don’t have the feeling of safety, that you are not secure, but 
just because of our experience, because of nineties, because of, er, you know, we don’t have this 
feeling. And we still don’t trust, don’t trust, you know, the government, what might happen, 
we don’t know. 
 
 
In this particular case, the splitting of her ‘private Russia’ into that which is threatening 
and needs to be expelled, and that which is retained and idealised has taken the form of a 
denigration of politics, and a simultaneous romanticisation of traditional Russian culture.  
            
As previously referred to in the Introductory chapter, one of the wider societal 
phenomena of Russian society mirrors this observation: in public debates on the subject 
of the country’s history and future, Russia is subjected to a similar treatment of 
discursive splitting. The nation itself is divided into two groups: the uneducated and 
uncouth masses, and the cultivated, liberal elite which, in the footsteps of the 
intelligentsia, tends to be in charge of these discussions. This discursive splitting has 
manifest consequences, once more highlighting the interconnectivity of the two registers: 
The theory of the two Russias constructs a veritable ontology of Russian 
politics, naturalizing differences in ways of life, behaviors, and tastes that 
otherwise could be critically explained by social and economic conditions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50Answer in response to request to provide or describe image which would convey a sense of  
Russianness (S33). In Russian original: Мне часто вспоминается сцена из "Андрея Рублева" с 
пьяным, под дождем, с дубиной в непослушных руках, которой он пытается достать все 
ускользающих призраков. И смешно, и грустно, и страшно, и немного сочуствуешь: ведь как 
трезвый - совсем другой человек! 
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of various social and strata and their genealogies into “primordial”, eternal 
qualities, forcing their bearers into an ahistorical and unresolvable 
confrontation (Matveev, 2014: 188). 
The educated elite with its monopoly on cultural, if not monetary capital, is similarly 
invested in the concept of Russia as a cultural and not political entity, and therefore 
wholeheartedly subscribes to the ‘theory of the two Russias’. According to Ilya Matveev, 
Russian intellectuals  “comment on politics through the language of culture, thus 
culturalizing politics” (Matveev, 2014: 191). This absence of a language with which one 
could meaningfully speak of the body politic is exemplified by empirical examples of 
representatives of this class being unable to locate, or make sense of themselves in the 
societal matrix (Chehonadskih, 2014). He goes on to conclude that, problematically, this 
means that no change can emerge out of a group that continues to see the divide in the 
country in exclusively cultural terms. This group is thoroughly distrustful of politics and, 
relatedly, lacks the discursive means to conceptualise how the status quo could be 
transcended. It often appears unwilling to endow the ‘other Russia’ with a meaningful 
perspective of its own: “The permanent culture war of the two Russias leaves the 
majority of the Russian population voiceless and powerless” (Matveev, 2014: 194).          
Returning to this and the previous chapter’s aims, that is, an investigation of the 
interrelation, or intersection between discursive and psychic realms, one might say that 
the discursive splitting observed in these instances has the structure of a psychic 
operation, set in motion to manage tensions that threaten to overwhelm subjects, or 
simply to manage the ambivalence inherent in attachments to the nation. The previous 
chapter, along with the work of scholars such as Matveev (2014), Chehonadskih (2014) 
and Oushakine (2001) provide evidence that supports this claim. This observation also 
links it to the internalisation of, and identification with, images of the nation. If they had 
no power over subjects, they could not represent a threat that needed to be contained, 
or, alternatively, would not have the potential to bolster subjects’ egos in the ways that 
historical and current (see Chapter VII) leader figures have tended to rely on.     
For some members of this particular educated and cosmopolitan cohort, the aspiration 
or real experience of emigration51 throws up additional poignant questions of how these 
attachments are affected by the experience of moving to another country, and how they 
shape existing images of one’s nation of birth. As mentioned in the Introduction and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 9 out of the 34 respondents were living outside of Russia at the time of participation.   
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further emerging in the previous chapter, for members of the traditionally more 
Westward-looking Russian intelligentsia, the imagined perspective of the West on Russia 
is always factored in. As a consequence, not only does Russia always need to live up to 
the comparison with an imaginary Western Europe and, to some extent, North America, 
many of the participants’ contributions are also framed as conversations with, or 
statements in response to this imaginary Western audience. 
 
Chapter structure and aims 
This chapter will continue the exploration of ‘passionate attachments’ and 
(dis)identifications which was commenced in Chapter IV. It is to be treated in 
conjunction with the analysis of interviews, not only because in many ways the current 
texts and their analysis represent an attempt to flesh out some of the themes and 
discursive structures that emerged in the previous chapter. In terms of the voices 
gathered here, this serves to create a more diverse pool of textual material, due to the 
greater number and heterogeneity of respondents, leading to an enrichment of already 
established observations and conclusions. The chapter will therefore return to some of 
the discursive operations established in Chapter IV. Through the integration of further 
textual material, it will arrive at greater explanatory force in order to establish further 
connections between what is observable in discursive practices, what can meaningfully be 
said about psychic operations, and what remains unknowable.  
Along with the previously mentioned splitting into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Russias, other 
discursive modes of relating to Russia and Russianness noted in the previous chapter 
include those of a disavowal of knowledge so as to justify one’s idealisation, and 
mythologisation of aspects of the Russian ‘national’ character. This brings it in line with 
the Lacanian understanding of the preconditions for activating national identification. 
One such condition is a promise of ‘imaginary’ fullness’ (entirely fantasmatic) so as to 
‘animate national desire’ (Stavrakakis, 2007: 199). Once in place, a nation’s failure to 
uphold the ‘promise for the good life’ and thus the inevitable disappointment this entails 
make love, as a psychic operation closely related to identification (detailed in Chapter II), 
particularly crucial (Ahmed, 2004)52. From the responses, there was a disappointment in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Note that this trajectory from identification to love is not to be treated in terms of actual temporality, 
but rather in terms of psychic time, so that this is a movement which can be repeated, revised and 
reversed.  
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the nation, as it failed to make itself loveable. A less ambivalent attachment was located 
in, and projected into the past, with nostalgia providing a safe passage in and out of 
mourning 
           
This is linked to the second condition, namely the upholding of a narrative of the 
‘Golden Age’. In the interviewees’ case, this meant locating this time of untarnished glory 
further and further in the past: from before the Revolution, to prior to the enthronement 
of Peter the Great, to, in Natasha’s case, a time before Ivan the Terrible. The 
fundamental contradiction or tension here is that each of these conditions of possibility 
of national identification is in principle fulfilled, or referred to, in the interviews, while 
there are simultaneously indications of a strong desire to disidentify with the nation. A 
partial explanation provided by respondents is that the impossibility of leading a good 
life in Russia is conditioned by the Russian national character, so that at the heart of 
Russianness lies both the potential for a more spiritual, liberated form of existence, as 
well as the impossibility of its realisation. This links it to the trope of the ‘Russian soul’, 
which has haunted Russian cultural and philosophical discourse for centuries (see also 
Introduction).   
              
This is especially curious as conventional accounts for why the nation fails to deliver on 
its promise frequently rely on an Other or others who are held responsible for the non-
attainment of the full enjoyment and national unity to which its subjects feel entitled. 
These others  - in their role as antagonistic forces through which we are simultaneously 
able to recognise our identity, via our difference to them - then serve as retroactive 
grounds that justify one’s initial investment in the nation (Ahmed, 2004). It appears that 
in the case of the educated middle class in post-soviet Russia, one of the narratives that 
detail why Russia fails to live up to its promise is in fact placing the blame on Russians 
themselves. This troubles the traditional antagonism between a national in- and outside, 
as demarcated by its borders. Instead, the source of the antagonism is found within the 
nation’s core. In more popular discursive terms, the saying “Every country has the 
government it deserves”53, which is commonly used in Russia in explanation for its 
government’s corruption and authoritarianism, is illustrative of this conviction. However, 
how far the speakers include themselves in such pronouncements, that is, whether they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 For example S15. 
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assume subject positions that exclude them from this responsibility, and how this split 
affects subjectivities, will also be explored in the following sections.      
 
Conditions of Russianness 
The survey’s first question asked respondents to think through the requirements of 
becoming Russian (What does it take to become Russian?) The question was left deliberately 
open-ended so as to allow for a number of interpretations. However, it does seem to 
already presuppose that citizenship goes beyond a formal relationship with the state, and 
most respondents similarly subscribed to this notion.  What emerged in their responses 
was that the formal fulfilment of conditions such as obtainment of a Russian passport is 
only the first hurdle to jump. In fact, being Russian appears to require work – both 
immaterial labour, such as ‘loving the country’, and a performative enactment that would 
serve to demonstrate this affective investment. It entails knowledge of Russian history 
and culture, as well as for the Russian subject to subscribe to certain national myths, such 
as the centrality of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (WWII) in forming national identity. In 
some definitions it asks of the ‘affective citizen’ to embody a set of qualities reminiscent 
of those ascribed to the Russian Soul, such as selflessness and spirituality. Together with 
the prescribed love for Russia, the ‘affective citizenship’ circumscribed here makes 
demands on the body to perform and enact this investment in the nation.  The following 
examples illustrate these tendencies, which anticipate some of the chapter‘s central 
motifs:  
 
[…] if one talks about qualities that distinguish truly Russian people, than it is of course 
love for one’s motherland (one especially wants to foster this in one’s children; when you read 
books about the Great Patriotic War, about people’s heroic deeds, for whom defending the 
motherland  was more important that protecting their own life). (S554) 
 
** 
In order to become Russian you have to love both Russia and its inhabitants selflessly.  
And to fight selflessly for the humanist ideals of justice and kindness.  And also 
fearlessness – a disdain of personal gain and self-preservation. (S18) 
** 
One needs to know Russian and the most important events in Russian history. Well, and 
of course work for the benefit of Russia – one can have been born somewhere else. (S19) 
 
Being Russian is presented as both arbitrary, a consequence of where one happens to 
have been born, as well as a kind of achievement, as one has to work towards it. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For more detailed sociodemographic information about the survey respondents, see Appendix H. 
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However, there are also those respondents that link this kind of ‘affective citizenship’ to 
cultural factors that predispose one to Russianness, or to a rejection of it:  
 
How to become Russian? Depends on the person. A Tadjik, for instance, cannot ever 
become Russian, and as for an American or Frenchman: why would they? There is a good 
expression: “a hunchback is straightened out by the grave.”(S7) 
 
The meaning of this proverb is that character cannot be changed at will. The contrasting 
sides of the spectrum set up here are between East (Tadjik) and West (France), with 
Russia as located somewhere in-between. It is implied that one culture cannot assume 
Russian citizenship (in the meaning just alluded to), while for another culture it would be 
unreasonable to want this. This response also speaks of Russia’s symbolic location 
between East and West. At the same time, a simile is made between a burden or 
impairment such as a ‘hunch’, and Russianness – an uncomfortable trait one is born with 
and has to manage for the rest of one’s life.  
        
When prompted to describe what exactly this feeling of Russianness entails (Try to think 
of a moment or incident that made you feel especially Russian.), putting this sensation into 
discourse proved more problematic:  
 
Did you ever feel that you were particularly wet? You can either consider yourself Russian, 
or not. You cannot be a little bit pregnant. (S11) 
 
This response indicates that ‘Russianness’ is not a matter of nuance, but rather a fact 
which either applies to oneself, or does not. As one’s subjective, visceral or cerebral 
experience of Russianness does not alter its presence or absence; no real utility is 
attributed to posing the question. This reading of it is confirmed by a later comment in 
which the respondent insists that one is yet to discover the nature of national identity, 
and that attempts to do so are futile. Indeed, most respondents would most likely have 
similarly struggled or refused to engage had the question in fact been simply what it feels 
like to be Russian. However, by encouraging a narrative approach to answering the 
question, that is, encouraging participants to identify and then elaborate on a moment 
that evoked a sense of national belonging, the survey attempted to circumvent this 
impasse.  
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Delegation 
One typical occasion of feeling Russian referred to in the previous chapter is a large 
sports event:  
 
I feel Russian and at the same time proud when our sportsmen win medals. (S23) 
 
Globally, such types of events are well known to evoke feelings of national pride, even in 
those who do not profess to them in everyday life (Sullivan, 2009; Sullivan, 2014). Events 
like the Olympics and the Football World Cup frequently attract a strong measure of 
criticism for their cost, the inequalities they can perpetuate, or the cynicism they might 
inspire when talking about their supposed meaning for the national body. Nevertheless, 
for the duration of the event they frequently achieve, albeit briefly, to rally the national 
public behind their cause. Governments often try to co-opt this intensity of feeling, 
namely the oft-cited ‘pride’ experienced when members of one’s national team are 
successful, and to transfer these onto, and connect them to other national projects, in an 
extreme form even legitimising the state internationally55.   
          
Many respondents expressed the sense that membership of one’s nation, that is, one’s 
‘affective citizenship’, becomes activated through either very positive, or very negative 
experiences: 
 
There are many incidents, but all of them can be divided into 2 clear categories: 1. when I 
felt uncomfortable, because I am Russian; 2. when I felt proud for the reason that I am 
Russian. (S24)  
 
Indeed, for many participants, the former category appeared to predominate:  
 
Currently, to my regret, I sometimes feel ashamed to be Russian, because contemporary 
Russia does not have culture, kindness or compassion. Instead, there is rudeness, 
drunkenness and hopelessness. Doctors that do not heal but cripple. Airplanes that make 
one scared to fly. It is frightening to walk along the street, because one can end up falling 
through a sewer cover or into a canal rotten with age.  (S23) 
 
** 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The 1938 Munich Olympic Games are some of the most notorious examples, but to a lesser degree this 
also applied to the 2014 Sochi Olympics (comments in preceding chapter.) 
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I practically never think about this. Only when friends visit me from the West and see the 
horrible tarmac, dirt and all that. I start feeling ashamed and remember that I am Russian 
(S34). 
 
** 
 
Fortunately, never, because for me this is actually a negative concept (don’t get me wrong, I 
am a patriot of Russia, but the word ‘Russians’ rather makes me think of cattle and 
certainly does not include the class of intelligentsia). (S20) 
 
** 
 
Well, not myself…but I did feel others to be Russian. (S15) 
 
This is a telling response for this particular cohort. Importantly, the final quote follows 
the account of an incident during which the respondent experienced aggression and then 
inexplicably – and in short succession - kindness from the very same individuals. This is 
in line with the cliché of inconsistency or contradiction that is frequently employed when 
talking about Russia. At the same time, when referring to the negative qualities of 
Russians, the respondents themselves are usually excluded from such pronouncements.   
           
While not specific to relationships with Russianness, these quotes point to a form of 
identification being in place despite an overt denial, or to a situation where the subject 
can switch between two seemingly opposite poles of rejection and strong ‘moments of 
Russianness’, such as in the example of sporting victories cited above and in the previous 
chapter. Derek Hook refers to such cases as “affective (non)commitment” (Hook, 2014):  
 
Not only may someone else believe or feel for me – the unconscious here 
being in effect another person – their state of belief or affect can be a 
condition of possibility for me to extend a latent belief or affect into an 
actually realised form. (Hook, 2014: 139) 
 
This form of delegation enables its practitioners to locate a form of identification in 
others when it is not possible to openly avow such attachments in oneself. At times, and 
considering the many ‘shameful’ aspects of Russian past and present, this location of 
Russianness (or with its identification) in others may indeed not always be the result of 
splitting, as explicated in the preceding chapter. In fact, rather than splitting off the 
unpalatable aspects so as to rid oneself of them, their delegation to other subjects, that is, 
the idea that others find these aspects more tolerable and, by extension, loveable, may 
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enable the subject to hold on to them, thereby becoming an indication of a latent form 
of identification. In Judith Butler’s words: “a radical refusal to identify with a given 
position suggests that on some level an identification has already taken place, an 
identification that is made and disavowed” (Butler, 1993:113).  The negative or cynical 
attitude to one’s nation and national signifiers can thus in some instances be read as an 
overt disidentification, underneath which a latent form of identification continues to 
exist, though this is perhaps not evident as such in subjects’ consciousness. Indeed, if a 
straightforward identification would prove too injurious to the ego, then this enables the 
subject to retain a form of attachment to the nation. If Russianness exists in others 
without the degree of doubt experienced by the participants, then the possibility of 
identification is kept alive in them, and one is able to jump to the nation’s defence 
without an admission of one’s own affective involvement. At the same time, this type of 
relationship is characterised by numerous tensions and self-loathing, opening up a series 
of questions of their consequences, or rather, how subjects manage these tensions. They 
are addressed directly, or at times more implicitly, throughout this thesis.  
            
Indeed, the act of splitting seems to avoid some of the pitfalls of the delegation of 
Russianness in other subjects, with all the paradoxical moves between identification and 
denial thereof these entail. Situating it in the realm of culture, as evident in the interview 
responses, enables a more straightforward articulation of what it is one holds dear:  
 
I don’t know if this reply can be counted as a response to this point…once I was walking 
along the street with a foreigner, and as we walked past a church he asked: ‘What is this 
old thing there? ‘ I replied, that this is actually a church, and that is it indeed very old. 
When I offered to go inside and take a look he declined. I don’t know what troubled me 
more: the lack of interest in another (our) culture, or, even worse, the lack of respect for it. 
(S9) 
 
This contribution implies that the abstract notion of culture, that is, what the 
correspondent holds it to be, contains some precious substance or essence. The 
respondent experiences injury on behalf of this substance, finding herself in a position of 
wanting to defend it by demonstrating its worth. Thus, while the recounted experience 
has initially negative connotations, its side effects are positive: the respondent is not only 
not ashamed of Russia; she has been handed the opportunity of defending it. The fact 
that she finds herself connecting with Russianness over a religious edifice is not 
accidental: just like the discourse of the ‘Russian Soul’ which endows Russians with 
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distinct psychic and spiritual features, it is often religious symbolism which is associated 
with a Russia or ‘motherland’ that contains elements of purity or goodness. Such an 
instance of affirmation of attachment or love for the nation was mostly strikingly evident 
in the following contribution:  
 
1. One incident - a meeting. I met a very good man, a clever journalist and poet who 
frequently repeated, even in the simplest and most unremarkable conversation, the 
words of Apostle Paul on love ("If I speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but 
have not love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal...[…]"56). He didn't just 
repeat the words in order to show off his erudition, he LIVED them. At his home 
there was chaos, frequent arguments and lack of understanding, but he bore it all, 
loving everyone, expressing his gratitude for many things....It took 10 years for me 
to understand, that this is where this person saw this very 'mysterious' (but actually 
simple and bright) Russian soul. Through wishing to reach a communion with this 
SOUL I began to understand my Russianness...(S30) 
 
This being one of the lengthiest contributions, it provides a narrative full of romantic and 
romanticised notions of Russianness. From the manner in which it is framed, the text tells 
the story of a retroactive type of attribution, adhering to the following arc: a) the 
respondent encounters a remarkable person, perhaps an important influence on her, b) he 
is Russian, c) he is religious, or these religious notions were important to him and he took 
them to be expressions of the Russian soul, and d) in retrospect (’10 years’) Russianness 
has become associated with these words as enunciated by or through him. As is especially 
apparent in the response’s final sentence, it is by associating his charisma and kindness 
with an idealised notion of what it means to be Russian retroactively that she comes to see 
her own identity in a positive light. In this retroactive attribution, there is thus a clear 
element of choice. In contrast to earlier contributions, rather than expel what is 
unpalatable through splitting, or delegate what is not in line with one’s self-representation  
(that is, not serving one’s ego), this respondent chooses to identify with a certain 
configuration of Russianness.  
       
As touched upon in the introduction, religious signifiers are readily available in 
contemporary Russian discourses. More recently, the government has sought to strengthen 
official ties with the Orthodox Church, to which in turn the Church has been rather 
receptive57. Indeed, an association with Russian orthodoxy can be seen as a ‘purifying move’  
- a sense of spirituality and a signalling of one’s aspiration towards higher, non-material 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56From Letter to the Corinthians.  
57 More on this in the next chapter.  
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values. The discourse of the Russian Soul, with its mainly literary and philosophical 
connotations, is merged with an aura of impeccability that the Church was endowed with, 
having been unblemished by participation in official life following the policy of state 
atheism in the Soviet Union, and the repression experienced to varying degrees by members 
of the clergy at the time. Additionally, a connection to the church harks back to a pre-
Soviet, imperial past58 - an idea in which both Church and state appear to be invested. 
       
While the seductive qualities of amalgamating religious and national signifiers in the 
context of Russia have been established, the psychosocial researcher would ask what 
kind of psychic adjustments need to be made, or what it is that needs to be disavowed in 
order to enable this love for the nation, as such an outcome is clearly not available to 
everyone.  In the words of Mladen Dolar, what occurs in the above contribution is that 
“[t]he contingent circumstances of one's birth are transformed into an object of love” 
(Dolar, 1993:82) – with religion and spirituality here acting as mediator enabling this 
fusion. In this definition, being truly Russian means loving Russia – it is in the act of 
loving that one acquires true, spiritual citizenship. This is, of course, a retroactive move: 
love comes first (and is borne out of a ‘forced choice’), and in the act of trying to justify 
this love certain characteristics are assigned to the nation. In the case of Russia, a natural 
origin is that of Orthodox Christian liturgy, and the kind of spiritual love (or agape) it 
promotes. However, at the same time it serves one well to remember here that while the 
cultural history of Russia is certainly strongly influenced by its Christian heritage, a 
respondent wishing to justify why Russianness can be attained through cruelty would 
have found equally ‘valid’ evidence – as is true of all nations, though this would naturally 
be less ego boosting.  
         
Frequently, an other is named to account for a nation’s failure to live up to its promise, 
that is, for having stolen the nation’s ‘enjoyment’. Blame is allocated to a class or group 
(usually an ethnic minority) who is identified as the source of a nation’s troubles, the 
paradigmatic case being that of the alleged Jewish-Bolshevik plot in the Weimar 
Republic. What is unusual about the responses gathered in this and the previous chapter 
is not so much the near-absence of overt racism or blame games - in an educated, liberal 
demographic this would have most likely been considered de mauvais ton – but the fact 
that the responsibility for the nation’s historic and present iniquities is seen to lie with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See for example the canonisation of members of the Romanov Dynasty.  
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Russians themselves59. This accounts for the self-loathing and ambivalence so often cited 
in relation to respondents’ Russianness. Indeed, by 2014 for large parts of the Russian 
public the resulting sense of inferiority and internal antagonism seems to have found a 
more traditional outlet, namely by turning these tensions outward, as well as retrieving 
the coveted ‘lost object’ of Crimea, the enjoyment of which Russians have been 
deprived60. If, as Sara Ahmed claims, disappointment in the nation’s failure to lie up to its 
promises can in fact prompt further attachments (Ahmed, 2004, see chapter II), in the 
case of Russia this has given rise to a particularly fraught relationship among the 
participants. It can be positively experienced in mass events, which temporarily and 
collectively enable its affirmation. It can also be delegated to others, retained through a 
process of splitting, or, as indicated in the most recent section, held on to through a 
retroactive attribution of certain signifiers to Russianness.  
           
According to Slavoj Žižek, belief may well be delegated to others, but the centre of such 
a belief structure needs to contain the national ‘Thing’: 
 
Members of a community who partake in a given “way of life” believe in 
their Thing, where this belief has a reflexive structure proper to the 
intersubjective space: “I believe in the (national) Thing” equals  “believe that 
others (member of my community) believe in the Thing.” The tautological 
character of the Thing – its semantic void which limits what we can say 
about the Thing to “It is the real Thing,” etc.- is founded precisely in this 
paradoxical reflexive structure. The national Thing exists as long as 
members of the community believe in it; it is literally an effect of this belief 
in itself. (Žižek, 1993:111)  
 
As detailed in the introduction, contemporary Russia does not appear to have 
contributed to the shape of Russia’s national ‘Thing’ due its arrested discursive field, with 
merely a fear of return to the chaotic 1990s as a form of presence in absence adding a 
current of anxiety. The next section explores which images are recruited instead in order 
to anchor a sense of Russianness. 
 Images of nature 
While it is assumed that every culture has a repository or pool of images that come to 
represent the nation, existing literature on contemporary Russia suggests that Russia 
presents a somewhat special case, in that an absence of newer, post-Soviet signifiers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In a variation it is the fact that the Bolsheviks killed off the ‘glory’ or better part of the country that is 
used as an explanation. 
60 More on this in the Conclusion.  
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(Oushakine, Prozorov) is posited alongside a profound split in society that has lead to 
almost separate discursive realms (Matveev, Zubarevich). The survey question ‘Can you 
list a number of items (objects, sensations) that consider to be truly Russian?’ sought to investigate 
whether there is a recurrence of specific images among the respondents’ sample, and 
more importantly, which function these serve. Not surprisingly considering their overlap 
in terms of sociocultural background, contributions from survey respondents echoed 
facets of Russianness alluded to by the interview participants. For the survey’s 
participants, key symbols and reference points include characters and scenes from 
Russian literature, the victory and sacrifices of World War II (or the ’Great Patriotic 
War’), the cultural output of pre-revolutionary Russia, the abovementioned religious 
imagery, as well as images of the Russian countryside: 
 
The Volga river, vodka, birch trees…because we grew up with this. (S3) 
** 
Frost, Kremlin, winter, bliny, Butter Week61, nature, beauty, forest, spirituality […]. (S6) 
 
 
At the same time, not everyone subscribed to the idea of there being ‘inherently Russian’ 
signifiers, going as far as rejecting any easy internalisation of symbols of the nation, past 
or present: 
 
There is no such image. Everything is banal – tanks, airplanes, drunkards, devastation 
in the provinces, grandmothers, priests in churches, Bentleys and Ferraris, bandits and 
cops, pitiful little soldiers and hazing, hallways that smell of piss, country cottages and 
sovkhozy62 that are falling apart. (S25) 
 
The rejection of these images here indicates a refusal of the question, that is, the request 
to provide images that do or could epitomise the nation. At the same time, the selection 
provided speaks of a second kind of rejection: that of the nation itself, because of its 
failure to provide moments worthy of being cited here. Other respondents coupled this 
with a very modern sensitivity to the inauthenticity of symbols, highlighting the 
accidental, arbitrary nature of one’s place of birth, thereby relating it to the ‘passionate 
attachments’ referred to earlier in this chapter: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Or ‘maslenitsa’ (масленица), a religious and folk holiday celebrated during the week before Great Lent. 
62 State-owned farms dating back to the Soviet era. 
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I tried to put together a list of objects, and it featured the standard birches, satellites, 
combine harvesters […] That seemed banal. […] There is no point in listing them. In 
this sense different people share everything if we take into account that we have wide-open 
spaces and forests, whereas others have deserts and the jungle. Everything depends on who 
was born where. As they say: you don’t choose your motherland. (S2) 
 
This links it to one of the integral demands of identification outlined in chapter II: if to 
identify requires the ability to represent, then this representation only ever succeeds to a 
certain degree. It is the failure to represent and subsequently assume a signifier in its 
entirety that may provide one of the important motivations behind further identifications 
in adulthood, as well as behind the continuous operations of metaphor and metonymy in 
Lacanian thought: 
 
[…] human construction is never able to institute itself as a closed and 
self-contained order. There is always something which frustrates all efforts 
to reach an exhaustive representation of the world – whether natural or 
social. (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:132) 
 
As the images cited are frequently clichéd, one may be justified in asking whether this 
response to the question represents a kind of ‘acting out’, that is, a playful challenging of 
the question, or whether this is a consequence of having to operate within the confines 
of existing discourses – be they word-representations or images. For some respondents, 
one way of escaping these constraints is to describe these sensations using the 
fragmented language of dreams: 
 
A feeling of carefreeness, […] Objects: the broken door of a cold hallway – a village road: a 
magnificent landscape and impassable dirt under one’s feet. (I cannot explain it.) (S16) 
 
** 
The sensation of awakening - when a dream begins to fade and reality is perceived 
through a waking dream – the state between sleeping and being fully awake. (S18) 
 
What comes to the fore here is the dream-like nature of these associations. They 
represent an acknowledgement of the difficulties of conveying in language what appears 
to exist to outside of it, instead opting for a series of images and scenes. At the same 
time, both contributions are reminiscent of the cinematic language employed by 
influential Soviet filmmaker Andrey Tarkovsky. He was evoked directly by participant 
S33, whose contribution gave the current chapter its title. However, this may not be 
entirely accidental. Rather, it could point to the interrelation of cinema and 
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psychoanalysis, that is, their cotemporaneous emergence and mutual reliance on the 
language of dreams. In the films of Tarkovsky, and The Mirror  (1975) in particular, time 
and memory emerge as mutually dependent, or closely intertwined (Bloom, 2009; Botz-
Bornstein, 2007; Žižek, 1999), so that the poetic language of Mirror becomes at the same 
time both intimate and universal, that is, individual enough to represent the respondents’ 
feelings while able to encompass a sense of Russianness away from more clichéd symbols 
of nationhood. 
Similarly, the responses to the pictures forming the latter part of the survey (see 
Appendix G) were indicative of resisting too close an association with national emblems 
such as Russian dolls or Vladimir Putin, especially when imposed from the outside. After 
all, the symbolism pertaining to nationhood often consists of clichés. Responses can 
therefore be situated both in modernity, as evident in the doubt in any true meaning 
behind the sign, and in postmodernity, for instance in the irony and playfulness displayed 
in the handling of the pictures. However, in the frequent evocations of scenes of nature, 
the Russian countryside and a rural way of life, this aloofness is replaced by genuine 
moments of idealisation:  
Banya. Snow. Skis. Foraging for mushrooms. Village. Hayloft. That’s in the village. 
There is no such thing in cities. There, you don’t understand at all who you are. (S7) 
 
** 
In the village there is more Russianness. (S7) 
 
These images are seen to be ingrained in, and formative of national character and 
identity, as illustrated by interview respondent Andrey’s comment:  
 
[…] we have a horizon, it’s wider, it’s wider. Maybe it’s partly geographically, because I 
believe that geography has some, some, partly impact on people life and in Russia we 
always have forests after our back, so Russia is a country that is open somewhere, 
somewhere in the darkness, to the North, to this North forest, so something like this. 
 
Greater authenticity is often believed to be located in the countryside; at times it is 
portrayed as the sole remaining site of Russianness, because unlike towns and cities it is 
seen to be less affected by the currents of history. In the Soviet Union of the 1970s, the 
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least political decade of its history63(also referred to as zastoi or ‘stagnation’), one of the 
most prevalent literary movements was that of ‘village prose’. It saw many writers who 
felt increasingly constrained by the artistic tenets of Socialist Realism leaving cities and 
turning to Russian village life for inspiration and a more authentic, that is, more ‘Russian’ 
source of material (e.g. V. Pasputin, V. Shukshin, B. Mozhayev).  This is not always  or 
necessarily linked to Russia’s natural beauty: in Solzhenitsyn’s Matrena’s House or 
Матренин двор  (1963), one of the earliest and more famous examples of the genre, the 
narrator ultimately discovers a truly ‘righteous person’ amidst the poverty and grime of 
the Russian village.  
 
Indeed, ‘nature’ appears to be one of the most powerful signifiers in the contemporary 
discursive repertoire of Russia. As referred to above, it can accommodate notions of 
spirituality and religiosity, ideas of freedom and openness together with a generosity of 
spirit (“we have a horizon, it’s wider”). At the same time, it can be incorporated into 
ideas of nationhood, or the more affectively invested variant of ‘motherland’ (see 
Sandomirskaja, 2003, and exemplified in Solzhenitsyn’s late, openly nationalistic 
thought). Its very openness enables the integration of personal quirks and aesthetic 
sensibilities, as documented by Irina’s response in Chapter IV, where the oft-cited 
spirituality of the Russian countryside becomes transformed into magical properties, 
allowing her to performatively enact the part of a “magical forest witch” retaining within 
her “a mysterious, ancient light”. This ability to encompass fantasmatic properties linking 
to both social and individual fantasy is the key to operations of ‘cathectic’ investment, 
that is, the element that enables subjects to assume and become invested in a discourse. 
In short: beyond its size and pristineness, the signifier ‘nature’ is able to contain a vast 
array of meanings: "Our descriptions do not naturally and immutably refer to things, but 
- this is the defining feature of the symbolic order - things in retrospect begin to 
resemble their description"(R. Butler, 2005: 31).  
          
The process of splitting, which has been extensively referred to throughout this and the 
previous chapter, can also be seen at work in the formation of images of nature. The 
respondents’ predominantly urban location means that the city becomes symbolic of the 
everyday or overtly unpleasant aspects of existence, whereas the (often) remote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Compare to a similar assessment of the 2000s: http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/artemy-
troitsky-peter-pomerantsev-oliver-carroll/talking-point-is-culture-new-politics-in- 
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countryside along with the fact that one returns to it for specific, often recreational or 
escapist purposes enables its romanticisation:  
 
For me these are all linked with childhood, summer, the forest, the village. I grew up in a 
city. In the city, if it does contain anything Russian, it’s devoid of cheer. In the village of 
my childhood, on the other hand, everything was full of joy. (S15) 
 
Returning to the ‘crisis of investiture’ of modernity, and how it makes visible the gap 
between oneself and existing places or slots in the symbolic matrix, it is precisely by 
recourse to fantasy that subjects can fill out this gap in interpellation, “just as the 
'sublime object' fills out what is missing in the master signifier” ( R. Butler, 2005: 57). 
While fantasy is clearly integral in the elevation of nature as the site of true, unblemished 
Russianness, it can hardly serve to connect this particular cohort more closely to society. 
Nature here is not representative of community – in fact, it becomes precious because of 
its (perceived) removal from contemporaneity. Rather than serving to interpellate this 
cohort of subjects in the name of community, it provides justification for distancing 
oneself from it. This is indicative of the ‘arrested discursive field’ of post-Soviet Russia, 
which has failed to provide subjects with contemporary instantiations of such images and 
signifiers tying them to the nation. The suggestion that the figure of Vladimir Putin 
might serve as a potential master signifier of Russianness, embodying "the king as the 
place-holder of the void" (Žižek, 2002: 267) will be discussed in the next chapter.   
 
Mythical scenes  
This and the previous section speak of the role of images, an aspect of identification that 
has been alluded to in Chapter IV’s discussion of the frequently cited cinematic and 
literary scenes. Indeed, it appears that by encouraging respondents to define Russianness, 
the very openness of the question lead to the proliferation of images and symbols being 
cited. This went hand in hand with an aesthetisation of the past enabled by these scenes, 
and the prelapsarian fantasy that –while these symbols and markers now represent the 
past, they were at one time more meaningful, and more intrinsically representative of 
what it means to be Russian.  At times, this process also appears to function in reverse, 
in that the provision of images (see Appendix G) created a multiplicity of affective 
responses. 
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The photograph that garnered the most affective, that is, affectionate and positive 
responses, was the picture featuring pioneers on a 1970s street in the centre of Moscow. 
This was a photograph introduced to ‘test the waters’ of nostalgia present in this 
particular cohort. Whereas by and large the other images provided did not engender a 
personal connection, this picture led to thoughts of:  
 
Our happy Soviet childhood, when there were ideals, friendship and living was joyful. 
(S23)  
 
Indeed, it appears here that the inclusion of the photograph encouraged a response 
somewhat reminiscent of Soviet-era propaganda slogans. The same respondent, 
however, articulated a similar relationship earlier on, when asked to think of 
moments that felt Russian to her:  
 
As for sensations, those are probably memories from a Soviet childhood spent in 
Moscow and the Urals, when it was a normal occurrence to help the elderly living 
nearby, and when subbotniks64 where a normal occurrence. There was kindness among 
people. Though this is not a description of the word Russian, rather of ‘Soviet’. But for 
me there is no great difference. (S23) 
 
A true sense of Russianness is here buried in the past – similar to the retroactive 
amalgamation of spirituality and Russianness observed earlier. Meaningful experiences 
for the respondent (now looked upon with all the trappings of nostalgic reminiscence) 
are conflated with what Russia could embody because of an expectation that the 
association must be positive. This discursive and psychic operation is not performed 
consciously. In order to enable this attachment, or rather, to imbue at least certain 
aspects with unambiguously positive overtones, a degree of disavowal is necessary65. 
For younger participants, this specifically means a disavowal of knowledge in order to 
allow access to certain favourable associations:  
 
The only knowledge I have of pioneer organisations is through books and my mum’s 
stories. That’s why it’s hard to form an objective opinion. It must have been great. (S5) 
 
The way the past is referred to in these responses is reminiscent of the psychoanalytic 
notion of Nachträglichkeit or, ‘afterwardsness’, whereby:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Official days of ‘volunteer work’ in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.  
65 See also the instances of disavowal in Chapter IV.  
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[…] every new experience potentially leads to a restructuring of the psyche, 
so that new memories and experiences can give new meanings to the past 
– not too dissimilar to the way history is continuously reworked in 
historiography (List, 2009: 114).  
 
The past, or rather, one’s recollection of it, is compared with the present, which, 
especially for the nostalgic, is inevitably found lacking. In Russia, the difficulties of the 
post-Soviet period are thus contrasted with what preceded them. In Stephen Frosh’s 
words, this operation can be understood “as the reinvention of the past in the light not 
only of the present, but also of the future – of what we might hope or fear to become” 
(Frosh, 2013: 54). This element of revising the past also connects it to a need for quasi-
mythological narratives positing the existence of a Golden Age. Myths can serve as 
points of historical identification, positioning subjects in the symbolic matrix and 
providing the ego ideals after which they can model themselves. For this cohort, one 
mythical reference point already mentioned is the Second World War. Another, equally 
prevalent narrative is that of true Russianness having had its apogee before the 
Revolution, and of then having been lost with it. This moment in time is perhaps more 
pertinent for the current sample of respondents, as the pre-revolutionary period is also 
what is often associated with the Russian intelligentsia’s brightest and most influential 
epoch – an additional identificatory element for many: 
 
With ‘Russian’ I associate the Russian intelligentsia which left Russia before the 
Revolution. (S23) 
 
 
** 
It was only until 1917 that Russians still had a full sense of personal dignity, 
independence and acknowledgement of their civil rights. (S3) 
 
** 
Now for me this is more of a negative term. I am sure it wasn’t like this in the 19th 
century66. (S20)  
 
According to Frosh, such narratives contain inherent dangers, in that they can lead to an 
eventual clamouring for a return of the lost object:  
 
[…] in imagining the existence of a lost object that can or must be 
‘recovered’, a mythology is created that has a number of potentially 
nefarious effects. It is, by definition, backward-looking to a supposed time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 In response to the request to define Russianness, MB. 
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when there was a pure culture of the now-oppressed, a kind of romance of 
origin that can be called on to establish the distinctiveness and perhaps 
purity to which the group can return (Frosh, 2013:59) 
 
And while the perils of constructing a societal narrative based on such a “romance of 
origin” are evident in historical precedents, for the respondents it has resulted mainly in a 
situation of withdrawal and social paralysis. As mentioned in the introduction, the cause 
for this is assigned to the prolonged disruption of the 1990s following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The utility of this discourse of ‘trauma’ as a way of reading a nation’s 
present has been challenged (Berlant, 2011), among other reasons because it would 
potentially enable the social researcher to interpret any major change or transition in 
terms of a societal trauma.  However, the multiple devastations of the 1990s in Russia 
certainly correspond more closely to this definition – at the very least, they resulted in a 
time of material deprivation for many, as well as a series of  - often involuntary - personal 
and societal changes, coupled with a sense of disorientation. The insistence on certain 
mythological narratives can thus be understood as “attempts to make sense of contingent 
and perhaps traumatic sets of events by means of a narrative” (Leader, 2003: 36). The 
deprivations and injustices of the 1990s acquire meaning and even hope if it is posited 
that things were different once. While for some respondents, this sense-making process 
means this starting  “out with “an individual myth” made up of elements drawn from his 
or her past” (Leader, 2003: 38), such as in participant Irina’s imaginary existence as a 
‘magical forest witch’, most of these myths have attained a degree of consistency. Not 
only do such myths ensure a continued belief in the existence of the ‘national Thing’, 
Slavoj Žižek also argues that reality itself can only be read and understood through the 
lens of fiction:  
 
The fundamental paradox of symbolic fictions is therefore that, in one 
and the same move, they bring about the "loss of reality" and provide the 
only possible access to reality: true, fictions are a semblance which 
occludes reality, but if we renounce fictions, reality itself dissolves (Žižek, 
1993: 90) 
 
 
However, beyond providing a map that provides coordinates to an otherwise 
incoherent and confusing existence, myths harbour the power to mobilise 
subjects, for example in quests to recover the lost national object.  
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In chapter IV, Andrey describes Russia’s past in the following manner:  “And 
actually, the great part of Russian history is just a loss of these opportunities”. The 
story of the nation, and of Russia in particular, thus becomes a story of loss. Not the 
loss of an actual country, though for those who have experienced emigration this may 
apply, but the loss of an ideal Russia. While one cannot disregard the actual 
deprivations and tensions of life in contemporary Russia, holding up this version of 
an ideal and idealised Russia in one’s psyche may entail a state of constant mourning. 
Additionally, it can also make subjects prey to strategies of overcoming, or 
compensating for this loss. Suffering the loss of an ideal and its subsequent mourning 
can in fact lead to a sense of triumph and omnipotence over the lost object – in other 
words, a ‘narcissistic satisfaction’ emerging from the fact that the ego has managed to 
sever attachment to it. In reference to a point made by Melanie Klein on the process 
of mourning, Gail Lewis observes that:  
 
One of the ways in which hatred expresses itself in the situation of 
mourning is in feelings of triumph over the dead person [lost object]....In 
my experience, feelings of triumph are inevitably bound up even with 
normal mourning, and have the effect of retarding the work of 
mourning...In my view, this ‘narcissistic satisfaction’ [when ego severs 
attachment to lost object] contains ...the triumph. (Lewis, 2010: 15) 
‘Feelings of triumph’ not only account for the sense of haughty detachment or revulsion 
that some Russians express in relation to their country of birth, it also reveals that a 
revelling in these feelings of superiority can serve to extend the ‘work of mourning’. 
More importantly, when the challenge of coming to terms with loss is not mastered, they 
might be projected onto the other, or become subject to compensatory behaviour 
(Treacher Kabesh, 2013), such as when others are recruited to account for the ‘theft of 
enjoyment’. Finally, when the process of mourning is disrupted entirely or never takes 
place, a situation of melancholic or regressive identification can occur, whereby the 
nation’s gaze is forever turned back in celebration of past glories. However, rather than 
insist on past greatness, the interview and survey participants appeared fixated upon, or 
resigned to, moments of loss, which prevented the nation from ever reaching its full 
potential. If blame was allocated, then to an internal other, leading to a narrative in which 
Russians themselves provided obstacles to reaching enjoyment. Following Berlant, this 
and the previous chapter can therefore also be regarded as contributions to the study of 
'attrition of fantasy' – the fantasy here being that of the nation, by cataloguing “cases 
of adjustment to the loss of this fantasy” (Berlant, 2011: 11). 
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Conclusion 
I certainly despise my fatherland from top to bottom but it annoys me when this sentiment is shared 
by a foreigner. (A.S.Pushkin) 67 
 
 
The findings of chapters IV and V portray a disaffected group that sees itself as 
being situated outside the symbolic confines of Russian society. Importantly, this 
observation applies across the distinctions between emigrants and those who have 
remained on Russian soil. Processes of disavowal and splitting continue to manifest 
themselves in order to enable the ‘acquisition’ of affective citizenship. In the present 
case, the splitting into two different Russias can enable subjects to withdraw 
from political actuality whilst retaining an affiliation to an imagined Russia. This state is 
enabled by the absence of a language or discourse to qualify their position within 
the political matrix of contemporary Russia. There is thus frequent disparagement of 
Russianness in its contemporary manifestations, which exists alongside a romanticisation 
of an ideal, or spiritual Russianness, when the existence of such is not denied outright. In 
other instances, identification with Russianness is delegated to others, who continue to 
believe in the nation, as it is, on behalf of the subject. When not experienced in certain 
powerful moment of collective enjoyment, such as mass events, identification often 
remains latent, only becoming activated when the subjects feel required to jump to the 
nation’s defense. Nature emerges as a powerful signifier able to attract and amalgamate a 
whole series of meanings ranging from spirituality to authenticity and freedom. Crucially, 
however, as such it is not able to interpellate subjects on behalf of society, as it is partially 
sought out due to being untarnished by history and politics.  
            
The survey resulted in a multitude of images, with descriptions at times taking on 
cinematic qualities when not outright inspired by films, as evident in the title quote. In 
part this proliferation was prompted by the survey format, however, it also represents a 
strategy to circumvent the limits of textual discourse.  At the same time, nostalgic images 
serve as powerful stores of ambiguous identifications and positive affect. Certain 
mythological narratives are recruited to make sense of what happened to the nation’s 
potential (the October Revolution), and when it last appeared at its greatest (the Second 
World War). Respondents seem engaged in a collective process of mourning the loss of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 In the original:  "Я, конечно, презираю отечество мое с головы до ног — но мне досадно, если 
иностранец разделяет со мною это чувство." (А. С. Пушкин, из письма Вяземскому П. А. , 27 мая 
1826 г.) 	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an ideal Russia, which is at times coupled with a sense of triumph at having overcome 
any overt attachment to Russianness. The next chapter examines how these latent 
attachments to the national Thing become activated in the public discourses surrounding 
the performance and subsequent arrest of Pussy Riot.  
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Chapter VI: ‘Velvet Revolution’ or ‘Frenzied Uteri’ – Making sense of 
Pussy Riot 
 
The outrage surrounding Pussy Riot’s performance in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour and subsequent protests to their prison sentences appear to run counter to the 
idea that it is impossible to encourage Russians to position themselves vis-à-vis the 
nation in its contemporary form, or to engage in a debate at the heart of which are 
national sensibilities. As referred to in the introduction, existing literature on post-Soviet 
Russia frequently claims that at the heart of the nation lies an absence of symbolic 
functions or subjective formations with which Russians could identify. However, the 
emotional response to the group’s ‘punk prayer’ indicates that a collective nerve had 
been hit. 
             
Affect is therefore an integral component, as it can be regarded as both a distinguishing 
feature of the reactions, but also as the initial phenomenon that sets in motion the 
working of collective defence mechanisms. By examining the “discursive inscription of 
the affective dimension” (Stavrakakis, 2007), that is, the different positions, patterns and 
interrelations that affect assumes within discourse, it becomes possible to gain an 
understanding of the ways in which Russia desires, or fears, to see itself. This also 
requires a pinpointing of the moments that prove anxiety-provoking, as a collective 
rejection or disavowal of these might similarly assist in an examination of the connection 
between the social and libidinal links that underpin the community. Taking a close look 
at Russian media discourses surrounding  'Pussygate', this chapter represents the first of 
two case studies of public discourses. The analysis suggest that in their rejection or 
championing of the group’s performance, participants in the debate have found ways of 
both shifting the threat Pussy Riot represents, and of once again ‘enjoying the nation’. 
The events and their aftermath 
In February 2012, 5 members of Russian feminist punk rock group or ‘collective’ Pussy 
Riot entered the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, crossed themselves in front 
of the altar and started singing a ‘punk prayer’, invoking the Mother of God to become a 
feminist, to “chase Putin away” and calling Patriarch Kirill a ’bitch’ (suka). The action 
was filmed, and later a clip of it was placed on YouTube, underlain with a studio recording 
of the song performed at the cathedral68. Criminal proceedings against the group 
commenced shortly thereafter, and in March members Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lPDkJbTQRCY  
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Maria Alekhina were arrested, followed by third member Ekaterina Samutsevich shortly 
after. Prosecutors accused the women of attempting to ‘incite hatred against the 
Orthodox church’ and ‘hooliganism’. Initial trial dates for June were later moved to the 
end of July, and on July 17 the verdict was announced: 2 years in a penal colony for each 
of the women- one year less than demanded by prosecution. The group of lawyers 
representing the women appealed the verdict, and after an appellate hearing Ekaterina 
Samutsevich was released on probation on October 10. The formal grounds for her 
release were her non-participation in the ‘punk prayer’, as she had been detained outside 
the church before the performance began. 2 weeks later Alekhina and Tolokonnikova 
were sent to penal colonies in Perm and Mordovia, respectively, where they spent 21 
months sowing uniforms for members of the Russian military. Tolokonnikova and 
Alekhina were released on 23. December 2013 after Vladimir Putin had granted a series 
of amnesties to political prisoners, including businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to tie 
in with the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi. 
 
Making Sense 
 
What rhetoric can explain is the form that an overdetermining investment takes, but not the force 
that explains the investment as such and its perdurability. Here something else has to be brought 
into the picture. Any overdetermination requires not only metaphorical condensations but also 
cathectic investments. That is, something belonging to the order of affect has a primary role in 
discursively constructing the social. Freud already knew it: the social link is a libidinal link. 
(Laclau, 2004: 326, emphasis in original) 
 
National and international reactions to the case range from discomfort to outrage and 
disgust, especially nationally, and at the other end of the spectrum, from support to 
unbridled excitement, especially internationally. In order to understand the strong 
responses that have accompanied the case from supporters and opponents of Pussy Riot, 
one need look beyond the abovementioned chain of events. Questions that venture into 
the origins of the visceral responses to Pussy Riot have to identify potential sources of 
the public outrage, and to ask what kind of images of the nation emerge in the 
repudiation or support of the group’s actions. The ‘sense’ at which Russian 
commentators arrive does not come out of nowhere – it seems rather that the case 
helped touch a  (public) nerve or tension which was already partially exposed, but 
required a certain kind of prodding - to stretch the metaphor - in order to arrive at a 
point where it resulted in a collective reaction, verbal or otherwise. Even a cursory 
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examination therefore reveals that the case helped to transform latent tensions into ones 
that could be manifested in discourse. Reactions to the case indicate not only an affective 
investment in the discourses they produce, or rather, in the moments of their production 
and proliferation. They also appear to share certain structural similarities with psychic 
defense mechanisms.  
 
The ‘making sense’ of this chapter’s title therefore refers to two things: firstly, the ways 
in which everything from the group’s name to the motivation behind their performance 
has been subjected to intense scrutiny in Russia, and how one’s choice of interpretation 
reveals attachments or repudiations of a specific vision of Russia and Russianness. 
Secondly, the excessive production of rhetoric that accompanied the case, and the 
multiplicity of meanings condensed into these discourses, invite a reading that uses some 
of the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis. Using them, one may be able explore ‘the 
condensations and displacements that punctuate the signifying chain” (Lapping, 2012:74) 
to infer some of the force that drives them into existence. In Claudia Lapping’s 
understanding, this kind of analysis, which – like the analysis of dreams - pays attention 
to the symbolic relations between discursive elements, “makes it possible to explore the 
relations between dispersed instances of data as constitutive of a complex web that 
condenses meanings and displaces psychical intensities across chains of signifiers” (ibid., 
p.75). Finally, in order to locate the discourses surrounding Pussy Riot within a wider set 
of discourses about Russia, and identification with Russianness, the current analysis will 
also pay attention to the particular historical and social origins of the language that is 
operationalised (Gusejnov, 2012).  
Context 
With an awareness of existing accounts of the troubled or apathetic nature of Russians’ 
attachment to the nation, one may be tempted to ask whether the vehement reaction to 
the case means we need to revise what was previously said about the void at the heart of 
‘Russianness’, the absence of “clearly defined positions and functions with which the 
post-Soviet subject could identify” (Oushakine, 2000: 1011)? Has the “vacuum”69 of 
values and beliefs created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, finally been filled? Or, 
alternatively, do these discourses of rejection suggest one dealt with a type of suspension 
of discourses of investment, that is, a phenomenon of delay and suspension rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Mentioned for example in Gathmann, M. “Lady Suppenhuhn”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung online, 
25.08.2012 
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simply one of absence? This would tie in with the latent type of identification discussed 
in Chapter V.  
 
The surge in public protests and demonstrations since parliamentary elections in 2011 
would certainly support this claim. Russia appeared to be in a state of crisis - a crisis that 
differed in a number of aspects from the perpetual crisis in which it had found itself 
since the end of the Soviet Union. Since Putin’s ascent to power, there had been a 
semblance of stability - even the economic crisis of 2008 did not appear to immediately 
shake Russia to its economic or political foundations. Importantly, his government has 
largely relied on the public’s non-engagement with politics, an almost complete 
withdrawal from the public sphere that resembles that of the pre-perestroika Soviet Union 
(Yurchak, 2005). What has therefore been posited as the absence of national 
identification in Russia has played into the hands of the ruling elite, in whose interests it 
was to support and enhance this tendency, making the 2000s “the least political moment 
of modern Russian history”70. 
          
More recently however, important authoritarian institutions displayed a fear of losing 
their grip on power. Both government and the (Russian Orthodox) Church, as two 
examples of the country's strongest authorities - who are incidentally making ever more 
moves to come closer together -, demonstrated their apprehension about losing 
influence. Their extreme reaction to Pussy Riot’s performance in the Cathedral of Christ 
the Saviour was just one case in point: 
 
When authority is waning, the temptation is often to show force. 
Repression is always an option; deterrence works. Russia has not 
experienced such fierce repression since the darkest days of Brezhnev in 
the 1970s. 71 
 
  
 A more relevant consideration for an analysis of ‘Pussygate’72 is how that emerging 
failure on behalf of the authorities to believe in the integrity or solidity of their structures 
has affected Russians. If apparent to observers outside the inner circle of power, it seems 
apt to assume that this must have had an effect on Russian society as a whole.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/artemy-troitsky-peter-pomerantsev-oliver-carroll/talking-
point-is-culture-new-politics-in- 
71 http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/marie-mendras/back-to-no-future 
72 As the case was occasionally – and jokingly - referred to in the Russian press. 
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Theoretical framework 
A psychoanalytic approach would claim that in times of crisis, which tend to be marked 
by institutional failure, subjects are forced to rely on their subjective defence 
mechanisms. Russia presents a special case here, in that trust in its institutions has always 
been low, as a series of more conventional sociological and social psychological studies 
(e.g. Marková, 2004) have demonstrated. However, a shift may have occurred when these 
authorities - monolithic and corrupt as they may have always appeared - signalled their 
own loss of faith in the legitimacy of their places in the symbolic structure. Continuing 
this line of thought, these intrapsychic defence mechanisms have the tendency to get 
externalised and assume symptomatic form, thereby expressing themselves in an 
interpsychic manner. It is in when they become manifest in discourse that they become – if 
never fully legible – then at least available for analysis and interpretation. According to 
original psychoanalytic formulations, the activation of defence mechanisms in times of 
societal crisis or conflict can also lead to a form of regression to a more 'primitive' state - 
civilisation ‘falls away’ and with it the social norms and forms of sublimation acquired. 
The original Freudian notions of the primitive and the civilised are of course extremely 
problematic (see e.g. Khanna, 2003 on Freud’s usage of the term 'dark continent'), but it 
is possible to ask whether there is anything worth retaining, as long as one remains aware 
of the contentious historical location of this idea. 
          
This account of the transition from intra- to inter-psychic processes may be a crude 
approximation, but it provides a useful way of 'thinking oneself' into certain discursive 
formations, if we concede that they can share certain structural similarities with these 
interpsychic defence mechanisms. Methodologically, a strategy that is sensitive to how the 
unconscious operates in and through language needs to be wary of making an 
‘overpsychologising move’, that is, a neat mapping of psychological phenomena onto 
discursive ones. One tactic that could assist in avoiding this is to focus on structural 
factors and symbolic relations within a discourse or set of discourses (e.g. Hook, 2012; 
Lapping, 2012). In other words, an examination of form rather than content, not unlike 
the analysis of the overdetermination, displacements and condensations of the manifest 
dream content carried out by Freud. 
            
The approach assumed in this thesis concerns itself with speech and with the meanings 
and objects, both overt and covert, that emerge from it, but also with the force that sets 
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discourses in motion: "What characteristically generates language in us is thus the 
workings of our defenses" (Alcorn, 2002: 80). It requires an investigation of the 
particular arrangement or constellation of specific discourses, which may result in them 
resembling obsessive, hysteric or perverse structures, while at the same time aiming to 
evade the pitfalls of pathology. Affect is an integral component here, as it can be 
regarded as both a distinguishing feature of the discourses analysed, but also as the initial 
phenomenon that sets in motion the working of the defenses. Stavrakakis, seeking to 
combine Lacanian psychoanalysis with Laclau’s later contributions to the analysis of 
political discourse, insists that any process of identification has a dual nature, “discursive 
and affective, symbolic and libidinal” (Stavrakakis, 2007: 225). It is therefore the libidinal 
component in identificatory processes that is linked to affect. From here, it may be 
possible to conclude that an affective response carries a connection to phenomena that 
are perceived as threats to the ego, or, contrariwise, produce enjoyment - jouissance in a 
more Lacanian vein. Problematically, few suggestions are provided as to how to locate 
affect within the symbolic forms available as material to the discourse analyst. Derek 
Hook addresses this difficulty when he speaks of affect as ‘extra-discursive’:   
[…] that is, as not existing beyond the range and influence of symbolic 
forms, even though it may of course escape explicit symbolic registration, 
or, more specifically, the codification of acceptable discursive form (Hook, 
2011: 112).  
 
However, if we concede that the affect-laden response to the case is an indication of a 
‘passionate attachment’ (Butler, 1997) to the nation, or rather a fantasy thereof, then the 
discourse analyst may be able to discern the shape of this fantasy object in the vehement 
rejection of those aspects of the nation, or a version of its ‘performance’ (a term that is 
particularly apt in the present discussion) that are seen to contradict or threaten it.  
 
What has been outlined so far in this thesis are therefore two alternate, yet 
complimentary approaches to locating national identification, and what is identified with: 
one that collects “the ‘narrative ensemble’ of likeable, heroic and often fairly grandiose 
self-representations that it [i.e. a given community) promotes and identifies with” (Hook, 
2012), that is, the repository of mythological narratives and symbols, and the second, 
current one of studying an absence, or impossibility, through the policing or vehement 
reaction that occurs when its invisible borders are transgressed. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter V, one could also apply this logic to some of the gestures in support of Pussy 
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Riot, which then become acts of displaced identification:     
   
Hence, the peculiar logic in the sympathetic gesture by which one objects 
to an injury done to another to deflect attention from an injury done to 
oneself, a gesture that then becomes the vehicle of displacement by which 
one feels for oneself through and as the other. (Butler, 1990: 100) 
 
Members of the opposition may reject the possibility of a straightforward identification 
with Russia, and feel the need to maintain and voice a minimal, “cynical” distance 
between themselves and a particular identity constellation. In order to avoid too much 
‘injury to themselves’, subjects can then only take offense as if on behalf of another 
subject. 
                
Keeping in mind that from a psychoanalytic perspective a discourse requires libidinal 
investment in order to sustain it, one might also ask what the specific emotive response 
to Pussy Riot enables Russians to accomplish. ‘Accomplishment’ here implies an 
attachment to the symptom, to the specific discourse produced. Does it assist them in re-
affirming positive, ‘ideal-type’ images of the nation to which they – despite prior displays 
of the opposite, or of indifference – continue to be attached? Do Pussy Riot’s actions 
represent a kind of excessive enjoyment, which needs to be disavowed through 
denigration and punishment? Do the women perhaps serve as a surface onto which the 
anxieties pertinent to the crisis of government are projected? There are clearly elements 
both in the women, and in the possible gratifications of participating in the Pussy Riot 
debate, that inspired the emotional responses, which other cases have failed to 
encourage. In order to delve deeper into the underlying motivations that inspired 
participation in the public discussions, and how those might link to wider concerns of 
(dis)identifying with the nation, one possible approach is to turn to psychoanalysis, 
because, as opposed to more traditional forms of discourse analysis, it carries the 
potential to go beyond the obvious, the verbalised and literal. A large part of the 
chapter’s analysis is dedicated to the examination of discourses of rejection and 
(dis)identification. It was felt that in their policing of Russianness and the demarcation of 
features deemed undesirable as embodied by the women of Pussy Riot, these discourses 
in fact point to latent forms of identification, or to the potential construction of libidinal 
communities through a shared sense of outrage. The strongly negative reactions to the 
punk prayer in Russia are contrasted with a shorter section on discourses by the group’s 
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supporters, as the latter are seen to align much more closely with the voices of their 
Western defenders, relying on discursive avowal or idealisation rather than various 
techniques of managing a perceived threat. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that 
both detractors and defenders of the group can be found among members of the liberal, 
educated elite which formed the population of interest for chapters IV and V. 
Consequences of this divergence will be addressed at the end of this chapter.  
             
The majority of sources cited are based on a Russian Google (google.ru) news alert with 
the keyword ‘Pussy Riot’, which was active between August 2012 and December 2012. 
Additionally, a number of sources that offered a sustained engagement with the group or 
the case up to March 2013 were considered – altogether approximately 25 Russian-
language articles were analysed closely. Articles were chosen on the basis of whether they 
featured a lengthier exposition of the author’s position regarding the group’s actions and 
the government’s response to it. Online platforms and sources that appeared several 
times were: snob.ru, mk.ru (Moskovskyi Komsomolets), kp.ru (Komsomolskaya Pravda) and 
echo.msk.ru (Ekho Moskvy).  
 
Church and President 
In Western media discussions of the case, the religious aspect of the group’s protest was 
largely neglected. At most, there were elements of a discussion into the nature of cultural 
relativism – would a similar act have gone unpunished in St Peter in Rome, or St Paul’s 
Cathedral in London? Usually, commentators agreed that an administrative fine would 
have been considered sufficient. In contrast, Russian contributions to the debate – in 
particular those rejecting the performance as a valid form of protest – frequently 
privileged the religious element above others, stressing the need to defend the nation’s 
moral foundations:  
 
[…] In Russia there are things that are absolutely off limits. One must not saw 
through a building’s load bearing beams under the pretext of refurbishment, or one will 
end up burying everyone.73 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 […] в России есть вещи абсолютно табуированные. Не надо под предлогом ремонта здания 
пилить его несущие балки - похоронит всех. 
http://www.pravda.ru/politics/parties/other/19-09-2012/1128474-0/ 
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The foundational character of religion in general and Russian Orthodoxy in particular, is 
illustrated poignantly here through the metaphor of the load bearing beams. The danger 
of tampering with them is evoked through the ominous image of the building, that is, the 
nation, collapsing and burying its inhabitants underneath the debris.  
             
Without wishing to underestimate the personal significance that religion may have in the 
lives of many Russians, the disproportionate outrage over Pussy Riot’s performance 
cannot be explained by wounded religious sentiment alone. In fact, there appears to be 
some agreement that frequently an attachment to Orthodoxy is a matter of personal 
aesthetic, rather than moral preferences, where churches:  “were perceived simply as 
beautiful pieces of architecture or as the bearer of beautiful traditions, inserting an 
essential essence of spirituality into Russia’s ugly consumer society”74. As outlined in 
introduction, since perestroika and the cultural shift enabled by it, and more pronouncedly 
under Vladimir Putin, the Orthodox Church in Russia has been closely linked to political 
concerns. To reiterate:  
 
For Putin, Russian is Orthodox and Orthodoxy is Russia, depending on 
his audience. The first proposition provides cover from external 
domination; the second proposition coaxes unity and, when necessary, 
motivates imperialism (Admiraal, 2009:205). 
 
 
There is some truth to the notion that Orthodoxy benefited from the structural and 
economic breakdown of the Soviet Union and the anxieties this provoked (Eremicheva, 
2010: 55) by providing a new kind of reference point to stabilize the disorganized, open-
ended discourse of a new, post-communist Russia. However, it was a conscious strategy 
on behalf of the government to tie the image of the nation to Orthodoxy, thus alluding 
to its role, or a fantasy thereof75, in pre-Bolshevik Russia. It is employed in order for 
Russia’s former imperial greatness to become part of the national imaginary once more. 
While nominally a secular state, the president has made a point of repeatedly appearing in 
public with Kirill, Patriarch and head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and emphasising 
his own position as a believer by attending church regularly. Religious motifs are also 
increasingly entering presidential discourse – thus in his appearance in front of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 http://opendemocracy.net/od-russia/sergei-lukashevsky/how-god-came-to-vote-for-putin-background-
to-pussy-riot 
75 This harking back to a Golden Age falls in line with the Žižekian idea that, in order to conceal its non-
existence, society or a nation needs to create the myth of a prelapsarian Age of Glory, which only ended 
when it was deprived (usually by an outside force) of its essential qualities (Žižek, 1997: 14). 
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country’s Federal Assembly in December 2012, Putin decried the absence of ‘spiritual 
ties’ in the nation, using the rather unusual metaphor of a paper clip. Kirill had employed 
this very metaphor in July, when he referred to the Russian Orthodox Church as that 
same tie holding the nation together. It will therefore come as no surprise that the recent 
increase in criticism of, and public acts of protest against the government have affected 
the Church. The Church is seen to be meddling in secular affairs, and its clergy is 
regarded by many as harbouring an unseemly interest in worldly status symbols as 
evidenced by priests driving luxury cars and Kirill being photographed with a Swiss 
Breguet watch estimated to be worth over £20,000. The threat that both these authorities 
experience to their position in Russia is one of the motivations behind the 
disproportionately severe punishment of the 3 Pussy Riot members, according to 
sociologist Lyubov Borusyak:  
 
The state, president and the institution of the Orthodox Church reacted 
badly to their loss of mass support. A pretext to return this support was 
necessary, even indispensable. And when a pretext is needed, it is always 
found. It turned out that Pussy Riot’s performance was perfectly suited for 
it. 76 
 
 
The problem with Pussy Riot’s ‘punk prayer‘ for the government and the Church is 
therefore not what some perceive to be its blasphemous nature, but the anxious, unstable 
time at which it was performed.  Due to their close ties, a threat to the Putin regime may 
now automatically implicate the Church. 
** 
In some media treatments, the conflict is pitched as a direct confrontation between Putin 
and Pussy Riot, which symbolically stand in for old, authoritarian, and new, democratic 
and free-spirited Russia, or between a punitive masculinity and a liberated and hence 
threatening femininity. In fact, it soon became evident that the President wavered initially 
as to whether to participate in the debate. As will be explored in greater detail in the next 
chapter, he is fully aware and exploits to the maximum his dual role as both the most 
powerful political figure in the country and also its symbolic head. His public comments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Государство и президент, институт Православной церкви болезненно реагировали на то, 
что они теряют массовую поддержку, и нужен, даже необходим был повод поддержку 
вернуть. А когда повод требуется, он обязательно находится. Казалось, что выступление Pussy 
Riot для этого прекрасно подходит.  
http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2012-10-05/5_reaction.html 
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tend to be interpreted as orders, or at least indicate a personal involvement in the case; 
therefore the wording is always rather careful. At the same time, there appeared to have 
been a need for him to take sides, and not merely because the ‘punk prayer’ addressed 
him directly. To counter suspicions that Putin might be worried about a potential loss of 
authority – and thereby providing all the more fuel to these very suspicions – his 
statements tried to convey the sense of a circumspect individual, filled with a fatherly 
concern for the nation, who saw the case as an affront to his moral sensibilities, rather 
than to his authority: 
As a matter of fact, it was correct to arrest them, it was the correct decision made by the 
court. Because one must not damage the foundations of morals, morality, and destroy the 
country like this. What are we left with then?77            
 At the same time, he wilfully misinterpreted the group’s actions time and time again78:  
A few years ago they hung three stuffed dolls in one of the big Moscow supermarkets, one 
of the participants of this group hung three stuffed dolls in a public place with a slogan 
calling to free Moscow from Jews, homosexuals and migrant workers…After that they 
organised a session of group sex in a public place. This, as one says, is their business, 
people have the right to do whatever they want if this does not infringe any law, but in a 
public place, it seems to me, that even then the authorities should have been alerted. And 
then they even put a clip of it on the Internet. (ibid.)79  
However, disproportionate as the punishment may have been, it is pertinent to realize 
that even when activists, government critics and members of the opposition are harassed 
by police or imprisoned, these cases rarely garner the same amount of attention in local 
and international media. When one of Russia’s most famous critical voices, Anna 
Politkovskaya, was killed in 2006, Vladimir Putin referred to her publicly in a single, 
laconic statement: “Her death caused us more harm than any of her publications”80.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 http://rostov.kp.ru/online/news/1265200/ 
78 Both Voina and Pussy Riot. 
79 Пару лет назад в одном из больших супермаркетов Москвы они (участницы панк-группы) 
повесили три чучела, одна из участниц этой группы сегодняшней повесила три чучела в 
публичном месте с надписью, что нужно освободить Москву от евреев, от гомосексуалистов и от 
гастарбайтеров — иностранных рабочих... После этого они устроили сеанс группового секса в 
публичном месте. Это, как говорится, их дело, люди вправе заниматься всем, чем хотят, если это 
не нарушает закон, но в публичном месте, мне кажется, что уже тогда следовало бы обратить на 
это внимание властей. Потом еще выложили запись в интернет. 
80 http://www.mk.ru/politics/article/2012/09/20/751288-mirovoe-bstvo.html 
	   145	  
Reactions 
When a fisherman casts his fishing rod into the water, he does not always know whether the 
fish will swallow the bait, and what kind of fish it will be. The same applies to this situation: 
the state, the Church, as well as society, had they been healthy and stable, might not have been 
lured by it, which is what would have been the likeliest scenario. But this did not happen 
(Borusyak, 2012). 
As suggested above, the vehemence with which the Pussy Riot debate has been 
conducted distinguishes it from other public scandals that preceded it: “Nothing like it 
has ever taken place over here” (Borusyak, 2012). More appears to be at stake for all 
parties involved. However, it should be pointed out that the amount of attention that the 
women’s arrests and prison sentences have garnered in Western media does not serve as 
adequate representation of the case’s reception in Russia. This applies both to the 
amount of criticism directed at it, as well as to the general level of public awareness - 
while qualitatively unusual, the number of actively vocal participants remains rather 
modest. According to a survey conducted by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public 
Opinion, more than 60% of respondents claimed not to have followed the trial81. 
However, 86% did indicate a general familiarity with the case. Those who signalled the 
greatest degree of interest in the trial were individuals with higher education (10%) and 
inhabitants of the ‘two capitals’ Moscow and St Petersburg (15%). Both these groups are 
strongly represented in Chapters IV and V.  
According to another survey conducted by the Foundation for Public Opinion in August 
2012, a 53% majority of Russians in fact support the court’s verdict82. An earlier survey 
by Levada-Center found that only 5% of respondents felt that sentencing was unnecessary, 
with 66% of respondents agreeing that a prison sentence or forced labour would be 
more appropriate forms of punishment83. Two significant points emerge here: the 
aforementioned lack of engagement with politics or matters of societal interest84, that is, 
“social dispersion and/or narcissistic withdrawal (Oushakine, 2000: 1011), which is a 
consequence both of the late Soviet era, and the tumult and ‘non-identity’ of the 1990s. 
The other is that, because participation in the Pussy Riot – debate is by no means 
prevalent and mainly restricted to the country’s cultural elite, there must be something at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 http://top.rbc.ru/society/12/09/2012/669236.shtml 
82 http://fom.ru/obshchestvo/10606  
83 http://www.levada.ru/31-07-2012/rossiyane-o-dele-pussy-riot 
84 http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/artemy-troitsky-peter-pomerantsev-oliver-carroll/talking-
point-is-culture-new-politics-in- 
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stake for those taking part, a kind of ‘psychic pay-off’, for example as a reward for 
defending the coveted object or self-representation that is under threat at this time. 
Reactions in the West 
In the West, the reaction to the arrest, trial, and subsequent verdict has overwhelmingly 
been one of outrage at the harshness of the punishment metered out. International 
human rights organisations and members of various European parliaments publicly 
criticised the Russian government for its handling of the incident.  Eventually, Pussy Riot 
were nominated for the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought85, and 
took up 16th place in a list of Top Global Thinkers 2012 published by the journal Foreign 
Policy. The list of celebrity supporters is ever-growing and now includes artists such as 
Madonna, Sting, Sir Paul McCartney and Yoko Ono. Two statements serve as good 
representations of the overall tone of the public discussion in the West. One is Slavoj 
Žižek’s statement about the group’s significance, following the verdict’s announcement:  
 
Their message is: IDEAS MATTER. They are conceptual artists in the 
noblest sense of the word: artists who embody an Idea86.  
 
The other is by a journalist writing for German magazine Der Spiegel:  
Because the Revolution can be sexy. Future revolutionaries – especially when 
they come with black cherry eyes and cite Solzhenitsyn or Simon de Beauvoir 
while sitting in a glass cage – are more successfully publicised in news footage 
than any diatribe by grey-bearded, longsuffering dissidents.87  
To summarise what is conveyed in these two exemplary quotes: Pussy Riot insist on a 
vision of an alternative Russia. Their message is at odds with the current authoritarian 
regime’s position, and the women were punished for their brazen display of contempt 
for the government, religion, and the current rules of engagement with them. They 
represent a new type of revolutionary – young, attractive women who take their cue from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Its first recipient was Nelson Mandela. 
86 Published on 
http://dangerousminds.net/comments/the_true_blasphemy_slavoj_zhizhek_on_pussy_riot 
87 Denn Revolution kann sexy sein, und Revolutionärinnen in spe, zumal wenn sie kirschäugig Solschenizyn oder Simone de 
Beauvoir im Glaskasten zitieren, lassen sich in Kurznachrichtensendungen besser unters Volk bringen als jede noch so 
leiderfahrene Suada eines graubärtigen Dissidenten. (DER SPIEGEL 33/2012 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-87737196.html, emphasis added,) 
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dissidents and philosophers, but employ this knowledge in a media-friendly manner in 
order to challenge the system88.  
 
Responses to the response 
In Russia, this led to a kind of ‘response to the response’ coming from the West, a 
further elaboration of the assumption of a political and personal stance that the case 
provoked and simultaneously enabled. For opponents of Pussy Riot, supporting them 
largely equates with being Western-centric, documenting that the centuries-old division 
into Slavophiles and pro-Western Russians still holds relevance today, with the so-called 
‘creative class’ being grouped in the latter camp:  
 
“Progressivism”, the desire to be contemporary, free from the past and its 
traditions by all means (and to be fashionable as well (Internet, iPad, Pussy 
Riot, Occupy Arbai89) has played a mean joke with our intelligentsia. It 
separates itself further and further from the people by not wishing to 
recognise its entitlement to tradition and to spirituality.90 
 
 
The statement by Eduard Limonov, leader of the extremist National Bolshevik Party, 
and someone who used to be a Soviet enfant terrible himself after the publication of his 
scandalous memoir in the 1980s, is typical not only of the criticism of Pussy Riot, but of 
the tone used to disparage the opposition movement in general. Its seemingly elitist 
obsession with new technology and media-friendly sound bites, often in English, is 
juxtaposed with the people’s need for moral and spiritual values, which Pussy Riot are 
seen to have ridiculed. Speaking of ‘our intelligentsia’, Limonov describes behaviour and 
a moral stance that is deemed frivolous because it is far removed from the people. As 
currently the most outrageous members of this cultural elite, Pussy Riot are similarly seen 
by their opponents to be personifying an excessive kind of enjoyment, a type of 
jouissance that becomes all the more menacing as it insists on displaying itself publicly. 
One way of explaining what it is that makes the group so threatening is that they may be 
seen to be in possession of a type of enjoyment from which ‘ordinary’ Russians are 
barred or to which they’ve lost access - a coveted quality or ability which is then 
exaggerated and treated as threat to a more properly Russian, and therefore more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 They are also frequently mentioned together with the activists of FEMEN, no doubt for being Eastern 
European and female, but their tactics in fact differ significantly.  
89 Name given to recent protest movement in Russia, after statue of poet in Moscow square where 
meetings were frequently held.  
90 http://limonov-eduard.livejournal.com/246726.html 
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reassuring, way of life. Without overstating the parallels with analyses of racism, there is a 
link to be made here with the idea that fear and hatred towards an other are often an 
indication of envy, of believing the other to possess a highly-coveted quality, which may 
then become fetishized – in this case the ‘creative class’’ obsession with new technology 
and a Western outlook (e.g. Hook 2005, 2011b; Žižek, 1989, 1993). 
Spectrum of affect 
Returning to the initial questions guiding the analysis, it is helpful to first identify the 
gamut of affective responses most prevalent in the debate. To clarify: while these 
responses are characterised by affect, by emotional overtones, it is not affect itself that is 
being investigated here. Instead, affect here is treated as indicative of discourses either 
having assumed the structure of defence reactions, or of having become attached to 
identity structures such as fantasies and anxieties which can be explored 
psychoanalytically. To briefly draw a parallel with clinical work and the problems of 
establishing a diagnosis: a manifestation of affect can rarely be linked with certainty to a 
specific psychic process: 
 
The advice that Edith Jacobson gave in the 1950s is still absolutely precise: 
she warned that affect is never enough to make a diagnosis, although the 
quality and the intensity of the affect can give a clue as to the underlying 
thought process (Leader, 2011: 135). 
 
At their most intense, these responses have included a sense of anxiety, outrage and even 
physical disgust, as exemplified by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s statement in 
September:  
I think in this case a suspended sentence would be sufficient. But from an emotional point 
of view – and I apologise of the un-parliamentary expression – what they did makes me 
nauseous, the way they look and the hysteria that’s accompanied this story.91 
As will become apparent in the following sections, adversaries of Pussy Riot often resort 
to aggressive or violent language – at times with barely veiled sexual connotations. These 
two registers are combined in a discourse marked by profanity, which becomes all the 
more contradictory as the members of Pussy Riot are so frequently criticised for their use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Здесь, на мой взгляд, достаточно условного наказания. Но с эмоциональной точки зрения — я 
извиняюсь за непарламентское выражение — меня тошнит от того, что они сделали, от их 
внешнего вида и от той истерики, которая сопровождает эту историю. 
http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2012/09/12/1033560.html 
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of expletives - still something of a taboo in Russia, particularly for women. Even in more 
benign manifestations of this discourse, the three women are repeatedly referred to as 
‘silly fools’ (дуры) or ‘idiots’ (идиотки) by both journalists and bloggers. Finally, the 
group’s name and politics regarding gender and sexuality evoke a whole row of negative 
responses, ranging from unease to revulsion and outright rejection.  
From mental illness to demon possession 
The language of psychoanalysis, as observed by scholars such as Nikolas Rose (1999) and 
Ian Parker (1997) in their interpretation and further expansion of the Foucaultian 
concept of the psy-complex, has been appropriated not only by professional practitioners 
and academics working in the field. It has also entered popular discourse and, in the case 
of Pussy Riot, has been aligned with the conservative gender politics of Russia. As 
indicated by the chapter’s title, the notion of hysteria – in a conceptualisation that is 
widely acknowledged as obsolete is not only applied to a translation of the group’s name 
– its implications serve as motivation for the women’s behaviour, who are remote- 
diagnosed with a number of disorders, from a form of mental illness to actual possession 
by demons. This type of argument circulated by the detractors of Pussy Riot is a classic 
strategy to weaken the arguments put forward by women – coming from an unreliable, 
possibly hysteric or mentally unstable source, the arguments themselves are unlikely to be 
credible. One might ask whether this is one of the strategies to keep at bay the anxiety 
which these young women have stirred up. Much of the aggression that is on display is 
directed towards the lifestyles the women are seen to represent. Paradoxically, the group 
members are seen as both too feminine to be taken seriously as political activists, such as 
when their activism is linked to ‘broken hearts’ and their feminist standpoints treated as a 
consequence of a disappointment following unsuccessful relationships with men92, yet 
also as not feminine enough, such as when they are criticised for their lack of adequate 
display of motherhood. 	  
What’s in a name? 
The team of lawyers representing Pussy Riot have recently tried to have the group’s 
name registered as a trademark in Russia in order to be able to sell merchandise using the 
name Pussy Riot93. Rospatent, Russia's regulatory body for patents and trademarks, 
rejected the application on the grounds that some Internet dictionaries and translation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/1026944/ 
93 This provoked a further rift between the women and their lawyers, as Ekaterina Samutsevich insists they 
had requested a registration of the trademark name chiefly in order to prevent its unauthorized use, and 
not its commercial exploitation. 
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engines provide an obscene translation of the name. However, according to research 
conducted by the BBC’s Russian language website, both Google and the popular Russian 
server Yandex translate it as ‘kitty mutiny’, whereas the translation software Babylon 9 
renders it into English as ‘Big Kitty of Disorder’. All other websites mentioned in the 
official rejection statement do not provide a translation of the group’s name.   
           
The dread of any form of ‘obscenity’, coupled with an anxiety surrounding both gender 
and sexuality, and a wish to police both, is especially prevalent in a country with relatively 
conservative gender politics such as Russia. This means that special emphasis was put on 
the Pussy Riot’s links with street-art group Voina, whose members at one time included 
Samutsevich and Tolokonnikova, and in particular two acts performed by Voina, namely  
“Fuck for the Heir Puppy Bear” and “How to Snatch a Chicken”. For the first, members 
of the group, including Tolokonnikova, performed public sex in a museum in Moscow as 
a way of mocking governmental policies that were implemented in order to raise the 
country’s birth rate. For the latter, a female activist stuffed a frozen chicken into her 
vagina in a supermarket and subsequently left without paying. These actions are linked to 
Pussy Riot’s ‘punk prayer’ in order to illustrate how, if left unchecked, they could 
contribute to the moral decay of society, going beyond a mocking of religion to the 
wholesale erosion of family values.  
          
The anxiety, said to have been inspired by the women’s overall demeanour, is illustrated 
straightforwardly by the public’s relation to the name Pussy Riot.  In contributions to the 
debate, a correlation is frequently made between a personal unease with the name, how 
one chooses to translate it into Russian, and how the women should be judged 
altogether. Language, like any symbolic system, is marked by condensation and 
overdetermination of meaning, leaving it forever open to interpretation. This openness 
seems particularly anxiety-provoking when it comes to translations of the group’s name. 
The unease caused by the multiplicity of meanings becomes all the more pronounced as 
the name contains a threat – the promise of violence and change inherent in the word 
‘riot’, as well as sexual, potentially obscene connotations. Both words are in English, 
making its sense doubly obscure, as well as implying a potential pandering to the West, 
or Westernised ideas. The threat that the group represents is therefore partially embodied 
in its ambiguous name. This ambiguity needs to be managed; meaning needs to be fixed 
– for example by staking a claim to the name’s definite translation, which can focus on 
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regressive or progressive elements of the name, exaggerate or understate the sexual or 
violent associations. The spectrum of translations into Russian ranges from ‘Frenzied 
Vagina’, the most popular choice94, to ‘Frenzied Uteri’, ‘Frenzied Kitten’ and, finally, 
‘Velvet Revolution’. 
 
In October 2012, online business newspaper Business Gazeta published the results of a 
qualitative survey it had conducted among its readers (mainly entrepreneurs, but also 
academics, professional translators and members of the creative industries)95. The survey 
asked the following question: “Do you know how to translate the name of the group 
Pussy Riot into Russian?” and published 20 detailed statements.  The following quote is 
representative of the tone that can be encountered in many of them:  
 
[…] And actually this is what it [i.e. the name, MB] aims to do – the violation of 
linguistic norms goes hand in hand with the violation of social norms. 
 
 
An easy equation is made here between words and actions – a name that carries 
violent connotations is almost automatically assumed to aim at violent actions. 
This kind of mental operation puts the symbolic and the literal on the same plane. 
The diffuse threat exerted by Pussy Riot – crystallised in its name – is therefore 
processed in an almost psychotic manner. We may recall that a psychotic structure 
is characterised by subjects’ inability to use language playfully, or to distance 
themselves from words or symbols that are treated as interpellations or calls for 
action (Leader, 2011). In other words, it is “a relationship between the subject and 
signifier in its most formal dimension, in its dimension as a pure signifier” (Lacan, 
cited in Evans, 1996: 158). This threat is further qualified in the following quote:  
 
If in their publications, the media were to use the Russian translation instead of the 
English version, the perception in society would be completely different. The group would 
not attract so many sympathisers. After all, what is a riot? Chaos and destruction. And 
the use of this word in combination with female genitals points to a feminisation. Pussy 
Riot oppose the traditional family, and support homosexual relations. This is abnormal. 
This is a form of perversion.96 
 
Several elements emerge here: there is an implicit criticism of the group’s decision to use 
an English name, as if this suggests a performance exclusively for the Western gaze, or for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 According to http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/68151/, 49% of respondents favoured this 
translation.  
95 http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/68151/ 
96 ibid. 
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the small circle of initiated Russian ‘intelligentsia’ mentioned previously in Limonov’s 
statement. The image that is further evoked is doubly menacing: the wholesale ‘chaos’ and 
‘destruction’ of one’s way of life, including that of traditional gender dynamics and –
identity. The women’s self-proclaimed feminism and non-traditional lifestyles are seen as 
direct attacks on the ‘traditional family’ – one indication of which is an alleged support of 
‘homosexual relations’. 
How is this danger to be kept at bay, and how are subjects to manage the sense of 
revulsion that the performative evocation of the other’s enjoyment seems to provoke? 
After all, what does it represent if not illicit enjoyment, “something that the desiring 
subjects hanker after; it exemplifies the displaced element of their being that they 
experience as unjustly lost"(Hook, 2012:143). It is therefore both desired by, and 
unavailable to those who have made themselves subject to the Law. One way of 
containing it, as we have seen, is to denigrate the other by exaggerating or unjustly 
dwelling on certain aspects of their demeanour and what this is seen to represent: 
How to translate the name of this group? But there are unprintable words…”Frenzied, 
possessed vagina” – this is how this combination of words is translated. I follow this 
punk group’s case, and I am deeply disgusted by what the girls have done. Of course the 
sentence is very harsh, but on the other hand it serves as a demonstrative flogging for 
those who trespass in a similar way.  
At the same time, repeated references to forms of punishment that could or should be 
administered to the women could mean that there is a link to be made between the 
violence inflicted upon them in the form of incarceration and forced labour, and 
fantasies of violence acted out in some of the anti-Pussy Riot discourses. These 
considerations are important as the latter part of the chapter will illustrate the role 
enjoyment plays in elicitations of identification - both in the act of identifying 
perpetrators of a ‘theft of enjoyment’, and in creating communities of the offended 
joined together in wounded attachments.  
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Return of the Repressed 
 
An article published in September 2012 makes this link explicit:  
Maybe the icon defilers and Pussy Riot just need a good flogging? 
Incidentally, as a survey by All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion 
showed, every fourth Russian is not opposed to such corporal punishment. 
27% of respondents are in favour of adding corporal punishment to the 
Criminal Code97.  
One could claim that the author playing devil’s advocate here, but it remains justified to 
ask why there appears to be a need to link the two. Does this excerpt not follow the 
logic of negation, whereby, even when an explicit connection between two symbols or 
images is overtly denied, it is nevertheless through the very fact of these having been 
mentioned together that an unconscious link can be presupposed? The recurrent 
fantasmatic enactments of corporal punishment inflicted on the women, which finds its 
expression in the sexualised, even ritualised image of a flogging, therefore points to a 
violence that has spilled over into, and permeates discourses of Pussy Riot. However, it 
may have its origin in events or discourses preceding these recent events. Russian history 
of the 20th century is full of both brief eruptions of brutality, and sustained periods of 
destruction. There has been violence of a total -and totalitarian - nature, such as during 
Stalinism; or, of a less paranoid and absolute, but nevertheless traumatic kind, such as 
during the chaotic 1990s. This violence seeped into, and was re-enforced by discourses 
of these periods – be it the official Stalinist rhetoric with its strange euphemisms such as 
“Life has gotten better; life has become more cheerful”98, and its ubiquitous, thinly 
veiled references to state brutality, such as “Лес	  рубят,	  щепки	  летят”, which can 
roughly be translated as “You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs”. A more 
prominent violence in language became the norm in the 1990s after the abolishment of 
official state censorship. Obscene and slang terms, previously taboo, entered popular 
culture through films and books of the period (Borenstein, 2008). 
One argument to be put forward here is that while official remembrance of the trauma 
of Stalinism has been all but banished, the period’s linguistic manifestations have never 
fully disappeared, representing another instance of the ‘return of the repressed’ already 
alluded to in the introduction. Its violence has therefore been (almost totally) repressed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97  http://www.tv100.ru/news/pussy-riot-nado-prosto-vyporot-62201/ 
98 Жить стало лучше, жить стало веселее. 
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but discourses of the Putin period have retained the ‘performative aspects’ (Gusejnov, 
2012) of this phase in Russian history. A telling example is a statement prepared after a 
meeting by the ‘Workers’ Collective Togliattiazot99’ in October 2012, in which it announced 
that it: 
 […] is prepared to receive the Pussy Riot hooligans in their business after completion of 
their sentence in order to re-educate these party-girls from the capital in their healthy 
work atmosphere so as to help them become worthy members of society, as well as real 
mothers. In these conditions the workers’ collective ‘Togliattiazot’ gives a firm workers’ 
‘no’ in response to the boulevard-haunting loafers from the capital and their ‘foreign’ 
group of supporters.100  
One need not perform a discourse analyse in this instance to recognise the proto-Soviet 
language in use: the announcement is spoken from a position of collectivity and 
propriety, in opposition to the small minority which is being condemned here for its 
loose morals and general attitude of frivolity.  According to Gusejnov, this is in fact how 
the Pussy Riot debate is conducted by the group’s critics: ”on the one side – the enemy, 
one the other – one of us” (Gusejnov, 2012: 4). The threat of a compulsory re-education 
programme smacks of the ambitions of the early Soviet period to create New Soviet 
Man, and the reference to ‘real’ motherhood – presumably versus the simulacrum of 
maternity provided by ‘these party-girls’ – is reminiscent of fascist discourse. The 
omnipresent paranoia and fear of foreign infiltration so typical of Stalinism is also 
represented here in the reference to support by non-Russians101. 
            
Why then this resort, or regression to archaic, potentially traumatic language? Gusejnov’s 
argument, with more than a hint of Kulturpessimismus to it, is that the failure to conduct a 
proper Destalinisation of language since the 1950s means these linguistic resources have 
been available throughout, in fact experiencing an increased ‘demand’ in the last decade. 
The fact that Stalinist rhetoric is ‘formulaic’ and ‘derisive’ as well as uniquely ‘accessible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 A chemical plant in Southern Russia.  
100 "Коллектив "Тольяттиазот" готов принять хулиганок из Pussy Riot после отбытия наказания 
на свое предприятие, чтобы в здоровой трудовой атмосфере перевоспитать этих столичных 
тусовщиц и помочь им стать полноценными членами общества и настоящими матерями", - 
говорится в резолюции митинга."В этих условиях трудовой коллектив "Тольяттиазот" говорит 
твердое рабочее "нет" в ответ столичным бульварным бездельникам и их "забугорной" группе 
поддержки", - говорится в резолюции митинга. 
http://www.interfax.ru/news.asp?id=269151 
 
101 See once more the link with the quote by Limonov. 
	   155	  
to the common man’102, together with the – according to Gusejnov – prevalent Stalinist 
social practice of the “joyful repression of consciousness” (ibid., p. 6), that is, the 
suppression of any tendency to sympathise with the other, led to a society that is 
uniquely intolerant and rigorous in its demands to punish the other – perhaps as a result 
of having split off these uncomfortable aspects of itself, and then needing to locate them 
in others:  “let’s imagine a society which lives […] without self-analysis – not reflexively, 
but deflectively” (Guseijnov, 2012: 4, my emphasis).  
              
In other words: while a ‘return of the repressed’ is usually linked to neurotic symptoms, 
that is, a repression of infantile wishes which subsequently resurface as behavioural 
symptoms or fantasies, the title of this section reflects the argument that there is a case to 
be made here for a return of the repressed in and through language. The improper ‘working-
through’ of the past, evidenced by the unreflecting use of the linguistic memes of 
Stalinism which have been emptied of any links to historical context, means that it thus 
retained a violence which is now coming back to haunt the speaking subject and its 
discourses. This violence is symptomatic of an inability to tolerate the ambiguity inherent 
in the multiple meanings of the group’s name and its performances referred to in the 
previous section. Rather than retain a position of ambivalence regarding Pussy Riot, a 
stance that appears ‘safer’ to the most vocal opponents of the group is one of rejection. 
This insistence on a firm stance has been taken to an extreme by on of the most notable 
detractors of the group, who has taken to the case with a quasi-religious fervour.  
 
Man on a Mission 
The shrillness which the tone of discussions about PR can attain, has reached a well-
publicised apogee in a series of documentaries and interviews involving infamous 
investigative TV journalist Andrey Mamontov. This ‘enraged parishioner’103 approaches 
the case with an ardour that can only be described as religious, treating it as he does as a 
fight between the forces of good and evil. Between spring and autumn 2012, he 
produced and broadcast three documentaries about PR (each entitled "Провокаторы" 
– “Agitators”) on Russia’s Channel One (Perviy Kanal – Rossiya). The main thesis 
underlying all three programmes is that the cathedral performance was not a political act 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Guseijnov refers to this catchy quality of Stalinist discourse as ‘conduration’ (кондурация), from the 
Latin 'condurare', meaning 'to harden'. 
103 http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/09/13/mamontov/ 
	   156	  
of protest, but instead aimed to provoke and create a rift in the Orthodox Church, 
thereby weakening the country’s ‘moral foundations’. However, he insists that the 
women alone were not capable of organising and staging something as elaborate as the 
‘punk prayer’. In the third and final instalment of the programme, Mamontov shows 
what he presents as conclusive evidence that it was in fact supported and paid for by 
recently deceased, London-based oligarch Boris Berezovsky and a number of foreign 
organisations. He refers to members of the group exclusively as "кощунницы"– 
‘blasphemers’, and translates their name as “crazed female genitals”, thus providing 
further substance to the link made in an earlier section between the public’s relationship 
to the name and one’s overall stance.  
What emerges repeatedly in Mamontov’s films and public statements is a tendency to 
arrive at a partial understanding of their message. This is particularly remarkable when 
considering that some observers have criticised the group for their lack of a clear agenda 
(Chehonadskikh, 2012). There is no such hesitation in Mamontov:  ‘they’ are literally 
trying to destroy Russia’s faith, and with it the entire country. Other aspects of his anti-
Pussy discourse are a complete absence of doubt as well as a genuine outrage; the 
interview from which quotes are utilised for this section had to be interrupted at some 
point as he got too enraged to continue. In fact, demonstrating and eliciting affective 
responses has become something of a trademark:  Mamontovshchina is the title given to a 
genre of documentary films, which relies on immediate emotional responses, by the 
audience, rather than a firm factual base104. For Mamontov, there are only two positions 
in the debate – for or against; good or evil.  No platform is provided or even imagined 
possible for a more ambivalent stance. The films are seen to be part of a plan to help 
combat wicked forces - with the author and host clearly speaking from a position of 
hubris.  The ‘mission’ on which Mamontov sees himself is one for which he was 
personally selected: “I was only appointed by God”105 in order to defend “God’s 
presence in this world”. This insistence on having a divine calling is coupled with a sense 
of being personally addressed and attacked by Pussy Riot:  “They came into my home. 
[…] They touched my faith. So now what, I’m supposed to forgive them?”  
Mamontov’s idea of having a higher calling to save Russia from moral decay, following 
the symbolic operation of splitting society into good and bad elements, carries certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/09/13/mamontov/ 
105 All quotes from now on:  http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/09/13/mamontov/ 
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similarities with psychotic structures, or even with the paranoid-schizoid position 
introduced by Melanie Klein. This sense of a mission is taken on with great gravitas and 
verve, leading to what one might term an excessive production of language and images in 
the form of 3 feature-length documentaries. This is by no means an attempt to 
pathologise Andrey Mamontov the individual – after all he was commissioned to 
produce these programmes by state television and has a solid background in investigative 
journalism.  One should instead assume this outrage to be, if not entirely strategic, then 
at least carefully planned in its public form of expression. It appears that Mamontov has 
touched upon a specific configuration of the Pussy Riot discourse and is willing to 
become a sounding board for it.  However, this does indicate that the more extreme 
configurations of the anti-Pussy Riot discourse seem to have similar characteristics to a 
quasi-psychotic structure.  
As mentioned previously, Mamontov conducts the discourse by first of all appealing to 
affect. He principally achieves this through personalising the way the debate is held, that 
is, by presenting the performance as an attack on the religious and moral sensibilities of 
each upstanding citizen of Russia. When the interviewer refuses to be swayed by an 
appeal to morals or religion, Mamontov changes tactics to further enhance the potential 
for insult: 
It’s your birthday, your mother and father are seated at the table, and suddenly strangers 
in masks come in and start dancing on the table, scattering the apples and the cake. 
And you wouldn’t complain to the police?106 
The scene of three young masked women dancing and singing in a cathedral is 
transformed into the image of a peaceful family celebration disrupted by the terrifying 
intrusion of strangers. There is no immediate connection between these two scenes, but 
nevertheless the association is presented as perfectly logical by the interlocutor. Instead, 
one is left wondering to what moral or spiritual authority the TV journalist is appealing 
here in order to seek assistance against what he presents as an intolerable threat. What 
emerges is an injunction to feel affronted, to demand punishment. Therefore, when the 
interviewer fails to see the connection between the two abovementioned images, and 
subsequently insists on describing the court verdict as too harsh, he in turn is at the 
receiving end of Mamontov’s anger:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Ibid. 
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A.M.: ”This means there is nothing sacred for you. It’s like your mother 
being insulted. Is your mother sacred to you?” - “Yes.” –A.M.: “So if your 
mother is being insulted, there is no need to punish anyone? What, you’d 
be silent?”107 
Like the logic that dominates the world of the paranoid subject, this discourse, while 
remaining fixated on certain individuals or objects that are seen as sources of harm, has 
integrated them into a more elaborate conceptualisation of the universe. According to 
Mamontov’s programmes, the crisis in which Russia has found itself is the result of “this 
infernal liberal mollusc, which has spread its tentacles all over the country”: 
In my opinion, Russia is at breaking point right now. We’ll either slide into collapse, or 
we overcome this ideological void by using our minds to try to understand, what we live for. 
No one outside Russia cares about this. There is a country with lost of natural resources 
and a huge territory. It is to be treated like a colony, so that everything turns out like it is 
in the West, with total globalization. […]  So that all borders get erased, so that there 
won’t be the great Russian people, great Russian literature, and instead just a smallish 
regional state. In order to achieve this, people’s brains need to be washed and Western 
values need to be introduced. I am against this.108 
According to the above, the case of Pussy Riot occurs at an especially vulnerable time 
for the country – an assessment that most commentators would agree with. However, 
Mamontov’s analysis differs in what is at stake for Russia: here, it is a nation that is set to 
lose its sovereignty, and Russians as a people may lose their identity due to a process of 
cultural and moral colonisation by the West. It possibly comes as no surprise that in 
times of societal crises, paranoid narratives increasingly gain currency. This is further 
illustrated by that fact that in Russia of the 1990s there was a similar prevalence of 
conspiracy theories. One of the most popular manifestations was the Dulles Plan, an 
alleged Cold War- era plot by the CIA with the distinct aim of bringing down the Soviet 
Union through the erosion of its moral and aesthetic foundations109. In both the current, 
‘psychotic’ anti-Pussy Riot discourse and previous narratives of national threat and 
disintegration, blame is either allocated directly to the West, or to the country’s liberal 
opposition, which is seen to be financed by foreign supporters that seek to weaken 
Russia.         
Again, it is worthwhile here to stress that the aim is emphatically not to pathologise 
specific individuals, but to pay attention to the patterns and structure evident in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 http://moscow-post.ru/redactor/krizis_nravstvennosti_ili_plan_dallesa_xxi_veka10102/ 
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discourses they employ, perhaps deliberately, in order to trigger affect and engender 
solidarity in the audience. The discourse in question exhibits features similar to paranoid 
defence mechanism, and the more defensive, heated and desperate (indeed, frenzied) the 
discourse becomes, the more it exhibits similarities with the reoccurring ‘psychotic’ 
features in psychical structure, that is, either 1) a paranoid preoccupation with a ‘big 
Other’ or Father which is larger than life and pulling all the strings, such as in the 
abovementioned conspiracy theories, or, 2) the apparent opposite, a complete lack of 
mooring, the absence of an obvious Other of shared social norms and prohibitions, the 
disorienting failure of any anchoring to a given social law. Indeed, some would go so far 
as to argue that specific phases in a nation’s history display specific ‘patterns of 
discourse’, which can share structural similarities with psychic structures. In other words: 
Just as the world’s weather is determined by global and local forces, 
so is the world of human discourse. Global patterns of discourse 
reflect the shared libidinal styles of large numbers of speakers loosely 
united as a community by the discourse that structures their 
identities (Bracher et al, 1997: 32). 
 
Who gets to speak for Russia? 
So far, the analysis has focused on the group’s opponents. However, this investigation 
would be skewed without some consideration of the nature of pro-Pussy Riot responses. 
While some commentators choose to employ humour or irony to distance themselves 
from the earnest, moralising tone of the group’s opponents, there are also those who 
approach this debate with similar seriousness. Like the detractors, they see this case as a 
symbolic struggle over the country’s future, so that it becomes pivotal to take a stand 
against the treatment the women have experienced. The group’s supporters engage in a 
similarly affect-laden discussion over who gets to speak for Russia, and what kind of 
Russia is to be envisioned. For them, too, the question arises of what the moral or ethical 
foundations of this nation are to be. A sense of social and cultural alienation speaks 
through these reactions – the ‘creative class’ is in the minority, but at the same time it has 
always relied on this sense of isolation or distinctness to make up its identity and fuel its 
struggles. 
The intelligentsia’s idealistic - and mostly ineffectual - struggle for a different Russia is 
reminiscent of the discourse of the hysteric, representing one of Lacan’s four discourses. 
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These are often presented as the French psychoanalyst’s contribution to an analysis of 
social relations from a structural perspective, particularly pertinent to France in the late 
1960s. However, “the hysterical structure of discourse also characterizes other instances 
of resistance, protest, and complaint” (Bracher, 1997: 122), so that it can be applied not 
only to hysterics’ questioning of their sexual position, but also to revolutionary or quasi-
revolutionary moments, such as the recent Occupy movements in many parts of the world:  
In the post-shock society, where alternative politics is relegated to the 
ghetto and official public life is concentrated on the affirmative rituals of 
representatives of power, the only way to break the situation of passivity 
and silence is – somehow – to practise this hysterical and obscene speech. 
(Chehonadskikh, 2012: 4) 
 
When envisioning a different Russia, a question that perpetually occupies those in the 
opposition is where the nation’s gaze should turn for inspiration. Should it be looking 
toward the West, as much of the capital-dwelling ‘creative class’ seems to suggest, or 
should the gaze turn inward, and perhaps even to the past? The second option at times 
relies on historical, or rather, imaginary notions of Russian greatness founded on a 
mixture of Orthodox Christianity and literary images of a pre-communist, Tsarist 
Russia110. 
Present-day Russia, on the other hand, tends to be defined in terms of its ‘backwardness’, 
explained by an unfinished civilising process: 
Russian society is adolescent, nasty, having undergone Christianisation only in 
appearance. That is why Russians stick to people from their own circle. And whoever 
happens to be outside might as well end up at the stake (especially, if this pleases the 
bosses)111. 
This is the tone to be encountered frequently. It is characterised by arrogance, and a 
missionary zeal to educate the majority of the Russian people, thereby liberating them 
from their primitivism. The monstrous society they inhabit:  “[…] wants to respond with 
the most violent means possible to those who uncovered the great societal hypocrisy” 
(Guseijnov, 2012:7). Directions for readers of such pieces penned by the opposition 
include the following recommendation: “I think that looking up online the unfamiliar 
words and names from my text is a useful exercise”112.  Not only are those who oppose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See the chapter on ‘Natasha’s Dance’ for further examples.  
111 http://www.rosbalt.ru/blogs/2012/09/07/1031550.html 
112 http://www.rosbalt.ru/blogs/2012/09/07/1031550.html 
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Pussy Riot declared undereducated and lacking in aesthetic sophistication, they are also 
accused of being driven by an inability to distinguish between symbolic and material 
reality: “A central position hereby is assumed by the logic of violent physical acts in 
response to symbolic ones” (Gusejnov, 2012: 6). This intolerance of ambiguity, and 
suspicion of the open-endedness of language is in line with the present chapter’s analysis. 
However, the opposition’s agenda of enlightenment from above means that they suffer 
from a similar zeal to fix meaning in order to align it with this agenda: 
In the given context, if we are to look at the word order, we can see that the word pussy 
comes first, which means it serves as an adjective. According to dictionaries, it is to be 
translated as ‘tender, soft, velvety’. Riot, on the other hand, means uprising, revolution. 
Together it can be translated as ‘velvet revolution’. There is no evidence of indecent 
meaning here. What they had in mind was the same kind of revolution as the one take 
that took place in Czechoslovakia. It’s a global idea – a change in power without 
bloodshed. I am certain that this is the only correct translation.113 
This version skirts around the deliberate provocation and shock-value of the 
group’s name, in order to produce the most benign, acceptable translation possible. 
While some may thus criticise the absence of a concrete vision at the heart of Pussy 
Riot’s project, for the participants in the debate this very absence has supplied 
ample space to fill this absence with their own projections in order to celebrate or 
vilify these. Overall, the reading favoured by the group’s supporters, is illustrative of 
the profound split in contemporary Russia, where the nation itself is divided into 
two groups: the uneducated and uncouth masses, and the cultivated, liberal elite 
which, in the footsteps of the intelligentsia, sees itself as holding the monopoly on 
being able to speak for Russia (Matveev, 2014; see chapter I). However, this means 
that the very nature of Pussy Riot’s acts of protest, in the context of the most recent 
manifestations of the protest movement in Russia, may make it unsuitable for 
effecting any true change. An important facet of this split which was made apparent 
as part of an examination of discourses of Pussy Riot is that this split is to some 
degree reproduced among the liberal, educated elite in Russia. The outrage that 
many participants in the debate felt when the coveted object of the nation was 
perceived to be threatened (facets of which were described in Chapters IV and V), 
is in direct contrast to other members of the intelligentsia’s elevation and 
celebration of the women and the kind of Russia they represent.  
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Conclusion 
One really wants to love one’s country, as a kind and merciful place, one that is at the same time 
strong and prosperous, but it isn’t working. It hasn’t worked to mobilise society in order to combat 
the ‘blasphemous women’, to close ranks behind the state (Borusyak, 2012).114 
This chapter sought to explain the surge of negative affect following Pussy Riot’s 
performance and subsequent involvement with the legal apparatus. The affective 
reactions were read in terms of a response to a threat. The threat referred to here was 
directed at ‘coveted’, fantasy objects, which form the heart of any process of 
identification.  These led to the proliferation of discourses that structurally resemble 
defence mechanisms, with these structures – at their most extreme - being inhabited by a 
logic similar to that of the psychotic or the hysteric. The discourses speak of a fear of 
disintegration and chaos, of wishing to avoid a return to the traumatic nineties. They 
appear to circumscribe different variations of the same fantasy object – that of the nation 
as not just resilient, but triumphant, as well as giving further clues into the nature of  
‘passionate attachments’ (Butler, 1997) to this object.  
If we recall that any process of identification requires affect in the form of libidinal 
investment in order to sustain it, then the affective responses to the case appear to point 
to a form of identification: 
The important point is to realise that without this cathectic (affective) investment 
in an object […] there will not be a symbolic order either. So the affective, the 
cathectic investment, is not the other of the symbolic but its very precondition. 
(Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2010: 236) 
Following this analysis, it can perhaps be more convincingly argued that previous 
declarations to the opposite effect, that is, statements that seem to indicate a lack of 
identification with the nation or indeed a refusal to do so, in fact point to Butler’s idea 
that this can be an indication that identification has already taken place. This ‘wounded 
attachment’ is potentially a more readily available form of national identification at this 
particular historical juncture. It is an identification that needs to mask itself, and which, 
like something shameful, cannot easily be admitted to the ego.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Очень хочется любить свою страну, но доброй и милосердной, при этом сильной и 
процветающей, однако не получается. Как не получилось, мобилизовав общество на борьбу с 
«кощунницами», сплотиться вокруг государства.  	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One way of bringing identificatory processes to the fore is therefore to stage a possible 
loss of this ideal. Borusyak (2012) seems justified in saying that a more stable society 
would be able to tolerate this potential danger, but in these rather tense times for Russia, 
it was relatively easy to present one of the many acts of protest as a threat to the very 
foundations of the nation. However, this is not to say that Pussy Riot was selected as an 
arbitrary target for attention and punishment. The disconcerting nature of their particular 
configuration of femininity, together with their brazen criticism of the country’s two 
major authorities, provided a perfect target. For the group’s opponents, their public 
displays of protest represent a form of ‘stolen enjoyment’, from which they themselves 
were barred and to which the only reaction possible was therefore one of a rejection that 
demands punishment. Indeed, a sense of solidarity based on outrage, that is, a type of 
wounded attachment, can even serve as a basis for identification. Perceived (or actual) 
injustices shared by a given community can in fact quite easily summon up a 
commonality of identification – the Holocaust and anti-Semitism serving a similar 
function in the case of Jewish group identification. 
Žižek claims that: “A nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be 
materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national myths.” (1993: 
112). Returning specifically to national identification, he presents this enjoyment as the 
key to understanding a community’s coherence in opposition to other communities – 
each society attempts to cover over its inherent antagonism by ‘outsourcing’ it. One way 
of comprehending the prolonged negative responses to the case, and the subsequent 
counterreactions by the opposition is therefore that they also provide a way of ‘enjoying 
the nation’, of loving it, to connect to the quote at the beginning of this section. In more 
Butlerian terms: the nation is ‘performed’ in the act of feeling outraged. While not 
everyone gets to partake in it, two distinct types of enjoyment have emerged:  the 
opponents of Pussy Riot find it in the enactment of outrage and anger. This is not to 
dispute the emotional reaction or confusion that some may have experienced at first, but 
this has been amplified wilfully in order to prolong the enjoyment that accompanies 
these sensations, as there is surely also enjoyment in the deliberate celebration of, or 
indulgence in affect. Parts of the ‘creative class’, on the other hand, finds their enjoyment 
and forms of identification in a celebration of the aesthetics of protest, the appreciation 
of which it presents only itself as possessing. Both parties are granted a sense of knowing 
how to protect the national ideal. This, seemingly contradictory location of ‘enjoyment’ 
in both groups in fact points to its paradoxical nature, whereby the double meaning of 
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passionate attachments can imply both a collective celebration of positive affect, as well 
as a modality of collective complaint and outrage. In fact, it appears that in specific cases 
a libidinal community can be manufactured almost overnight in light of offence by 
fostering a solidarity of jouissance, of shared suffering or injustice. Russian reactions to 
Pussy Riot therefore revealed not only the tensions and antagonisms in Russian society 
generally – they also point to a split at the heart of the intelligentsia, whereby some find 
enjoyment in the new type of jouissance the women represent, while others celebrate their 
outrage at the group’s contempt for traditional values. The next chapter examines how 
presentational mechanisms around the Russian president’s persona seek to elicit a 
different kind of identification or ‘leader love’ in the populace. 
 
  
	   165	  
Chapter VII: Fantastic Mr President: The Masks, Myths and Mirrors 
of Putinism 	  
 
Who is Mr. Putin? This question has never been fully answered.  (Hill  & Gaddy, 2012:1) 
 
Vladimir Putin’s image of hyper-accentuated masculinity has garnered a lot of public 
attention in the West. Some of the President’s techniques of image management indeed 
appear so heavy-handed as to positively invite ridicule, so that commentators frequently 
assume a stance of ironic distance and critical deconstruction towards this strategy. The 
abundance and multitude of images, both still and moving, that have been produced 
during the Putin presidency and his stint as Prime Minister have enabled a great amount 
of interpretational work: "The most striking aspect of the Putiniana generated during the 
2000s, however, is neither its obsequiousness nor its iconoclasm - or even its ludic nature 
- but the sheer wealth and diversity of Putin images, many of them as "managed" as the 
"democracy" during his presidency” (Goscilo, 2013:27). This emphasis on spectacle lends 
itself to an analysis that incorporates notions of the ’pseudo-event’ or ‘hyperreality ‘ 
(Boorstin, Baudrilliard, Eco) as well as the making of modern myths (Barthes), which 
have in common a postmodernist concern with a blurring of boundaries between reality 
and simulation. The primacy of representational mechanisms to all elements of the 
discourse of Putinism, including its fantasmatic aspects, make this the starting point for 
this chapter. However, the underlying theoretical concern is how this is linked to 
processes of identification with a leader or authority figure, as well as later variations on 
this, such as Adorno’s examination of fascist propaganda. There is additional value in 
studying the Putin myth115, not only to understand which strategies of identification have 
been mobilised, but also to examine further ways of determining to which degree they 
have succeeded or failed. At the same time, it is clear that in privileging notions of 
fantasy, ideology and interpellation the scope of the present analysis will be less 
restrictive so as to incorporate these concepts, especially given identification’s proximity 
to love. 
Instead of following a more conventional format that seeks to answer a specific set of 
research questions, this chapter is structured around a series of contradictions or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Note that the term ‘cult’, as in ‘cult of personality’, has been consciously avoided to draw attention away 
from any simplifying parallels with Soviet or fascist examples. 
	   166	  
paradoxes. The chief paradox here is that by investigating the quasi-mythical 
instantiations of, and fantasmatic discourses surrounding, Putin’s persona we are more 
likely to encounter the investments of Russia and Russians in a certain configuration of 
both authority and Russianness, as embodied in the figure of Putin, or else their 
complete rejection of both. This is useful for this study, as it links back to the thesis’ 
overarching focus on processes of identification. Further, seemingly mutually exclusive 
positions that can be encountered are those that view the entire era of Putin and 
Putinism as a highly ideological age with a coherent vision. Interpretations of the state’s 
ideology range from a quasi-Stalinist set of tenets to a ‘managed democracy‘, with added 
values and ideas borrowed from Russian Orthodoxy and idealised versions of pre-
Revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union, all with a ‘neo-traditionalist twist’116. 
Those that insist on Putin’s ability to rally mass support can point to political polls that 
continue to verify this (Cassiday & Johnson, 2013). They have sometimes framed him as 
a populist leader who has provided a cause, or set of causes, around which to gather the 
support of the Russian public, although without necessarily professing a well established 
ideological stance. The President’s occasional forays into explicit language seem to 
provide the kind of ‘obscene supplement’ that, as Slavoj Žižek suggests, is needed to 
produce charisma in a leader. However, in the company of other contemporary political 
figures in Russia such as opposition leader Alexey Navalny and, more compellingly, his 
buffoonish alter ego Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Putin is more likely to emerge as a technocrat 
– unless fantasmatic speculations imbue him with a sinister magnetism. The potential (or 
incitement) for interpretation has recently resulted in an increasing recourse to an 
analysis of Putin’s character that uses a strongly psychologised language.                      
 
Masks, myths and mirrors 
 
It’s the hot summer of 2001 […] Events develop swiftly and completely 
unexpectedly. The President decides to head out for Chechnya with a spetsnaz squad 
to destroy the rebels’ lair […] He does this and is the only one left alive. 
 
This is the synopsis of Russian adventure novel President published in 2002, featuring 
Vladimir Putin as its protagonist (Cassiday & Johnson, 2013: 41). According to Birgit 
Beumers, the standard Russian cinematic hero of the early 2000s is similarly one that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mark-lipovetsky/indiscreet-charm-of-russian-cynic 
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invites parallels with Putin: the protagonist is frequently a former KGB-agent and killer 
who redeems himself through his deeds – deeds which ultimately benefit society 
(Beumers, 2008). Indeed, it is the figure of Putin that has arguably dominated the public’s 
perception of Russia not only within borders, but also outside them. Public appearances 
have included him singing and playing the piano at a charity gala, flying a plane to help 
extinguish the devastating forest fires in the summer of 2010, driving a Russian-made 
Lada across Siberia, and shooting grey whales with a crossbow.  
             
The epithet ‘fantastic’ of the chapter’s title therefore refers to two things. Firstly, to the 
public persona of Vladimir Putin, with its emphasis on overall prowess through much-
publicised exploits which aim to highlight not only his decisiveness and no-nonsense 
approach to leading the country, but also his desirability as a man. This perception is 
strengthened by the Presidential team’s unprecedented – for Russian politics – reliance 
on images, often the result of specifically created PR spectacles, leading some observers 
to conclude that over the past decade or so “Putin and the Kremlin were in permanent 
campaign mode” (Hill & Gaddy, 2012:6).  
           
Secondly, the title of this chapter also alludes to the fantasmatic discourses about Vladimir 
Putin, which endow him with a power that far surpasses actuality. These discourses 
circulate in different guises in Russia and the West, with even those that employ sarcasm 
and parody representing clear attempts to strip him of that power. The argument 
presented here is that in order to explain the public preoccupation with the Russian 
president one has to go beyond a mere citing of the Cold War legacy. The fact that 
processes of identification require a fantasmatic element in order to get activated links 
this back to the focus of the thesis, which in part represents an attempt to understand 
and uncover the links between individual and social fantasy.  
         
The image of “strongman” Putin may have attracted much mockery in the foreign press, 
however, these comments frequently point to another prevalent element of the discourse 
of Putinism: a barely concealed suspicion and open disagreement as to the ‘real’ nature of 
the President’s agenda. To quote from a Russian source, these discourses "claim to find 
behind the façade of sterile technocracy something like a ‘real Putin’ with a substantive 
political project that was, depending on the taste of the observer, either extremely liberal 
or extremely authoritarian – but always extreme, as if the only way to compensate for the 
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surface nihilism of Putinite politics was to imagine its ‘real’ content to be so extreme as 
to somehow deserve being hidden" (Prozorov, 2009:68).  Similarly, to many observers  - 
Anne Applebaum only being one of the more famous proponents (see also Hill & 
Gaddy, 2013) - Putin’s project is seen as profoundly ideological, while a number of 
Russian scholars conclude the opposite – that what continues under, but historically 
precedes Putinism, is the “deactivation of the entire ideological field” (ibid.: 76). In fact, a 
number of Russian commentators and political scientists view Putin as the	  президент	  
пустоты	  or President of Emptiness, thus functioning as the ‘mirror’, in a society without 
an ideology beyond consumerism. A President who is all surface appears to reflect 
subjects’ investments and concerns, but does so without presenting any attempt to add 
his own, and has thus failed to interpellate subjects. 
 
Searching for the real President 
The argument around which the present chapter is structured is at first glance 
paradoxical in nature. It maintains that the public’s preoccupations with Putin and his 
'true nature' are both misguided and at the same time correct. That is, when the West - 
and, to a lesser degree, Russia itself - looks to the figure of Vladimir Putin in order to 
draw conclusions about national sensibilities, this is a naive endeavour, and in fact adds 
fuel to the force which drives these fantasmatic discourses of Putinism into circulation. 
There is not much to be gained by trying to fathom the President’s 'real' agenda, at least 
when we want to understand contemporary Russia. While in no way denying the 
authoritarian, at best pseudo-democratic nature of his regime, the relationship between 
Putin - or his public persona - and the populace is in fact far more reciprocal than often 
assumed. Many of the pseudo-events organised by his team of PR advisers seem to 
represent evidence of the 'collective Putin'117 trying to anticipate ‘what Russia wants’, 
perhaps in an attempt to stimulate the kind of identification or leader love that Freud 
talks about.  
The purpose of this chapter is not to uncover or describe the ‘real’ Vladimir Putin’s 
character or agenda. It concerns itself with the creation of the Putin persona, his “many 
masks—commander-in-chief, erudite technocrat, the all-knowing, all-seeing eye, and 
compassionate Tsar-batiushka”118, which are the result of efforts by the President 
himself, his PR advisers, as well as the collective interpretational work undertaken by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 http://russ.ru/pole/Bolee-luchshe  
118 http://seansrussiablog.org/2013/05/27/results-from-the-direct-line/ 
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public in Russia and the West.  In short: the ‘masks’ or guises are the essence, rather than 
what might lurk behind them. In line with postmodern approaches to how public leaders 
are constructed and perceived by subjects, one may also be tempted to treat the 
President as a product marketed to, and consumed by, the public119; a notion that is given 
support not only by the energy put into presentational mechanisms, but also by the 
amount of cultural output and memorabilia which features him (e.g. Goscilo, 2013). As a 
result, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin becomes a leader for his time, having come to 
power at the beginning of the 21st century, an age that is claims to be ostensibly post-
ideological in its politics (Fukuyama, 1992). At the same time, he heads a country that 
finds itself in the difficult position of having to assemble an identity which seeks to 
rescue and combine at times antithetical elements of a largely discredited or ‘failed’ 
history. The following section will give a brief overview of the last 13 years under Putin, 
which have seen a marked change in the Russian public’s relationship with its 3-time 
President and former Prime Minister. 
The Putin Years 
Now that the figure of Putin is ubiquitous, it is hard to imagine that upon his ascent to 
the post of Prime Minister and, shortly after, President of the Russian Federation, he 
seemed to have come out of nowhere. He appeared like a ‘grey cardinal’, having been 
seemingly groomed for the presidential role by the Yeltsin ‘family’, consisting of 
President Yeltsin’s close political associates and rich businessmen such as Boris 
Berezovsky.  What seemingly qualified him for the position was more than 15 years of 
service to the KGB (5 of which – indeed the crucial period of perestroika – had been 
spent in Dresden in the then-GDR), and a mixed record in various managerial and 
administrative positions in his hometown of St Petersburg and Moscow, as well as a brief 
spell as Head of the FSB, the post-soviet successor to the KGB. 
      
Upon entering office as President in 2000, Putin quickly achieved high popularity ratings 
as his first term brought about a period of stability and economic growth: “Public 
opinion polls conducted during the first term in office indicate that his approval rating 
between 2000 and 2004 remained consistently between 70 and 80 per cent […] after his 
two terms in office ended in May 2008, a stunning 86 per cent of Russians polled 
expressions of approval of Putin.” (Cassiday & Johnson, 2013: 37). This makes for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See for example the ‘Putin Toothpick’ 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/03/08/040308ta_talk_lipman 
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stark contrast with Yeltsin’s 3% approval towards the end of his term - a direct result of 
the chaos and poverty of the 1990s, which culminated in the country’s currency 
devaluation and default on its debt in 1998, as well as the President’s erratic behaviour. 
Following the maximum 2-terms as President, Putin became Prime Minister in what later 
turned out to have been a power-sharing deal. Of interest to this chapter is that the  - as 
it was perceived - more liberal and mild-mannered Dmitry Medvedev never reached 
Putin’s level of popularity, with Putin continuing to outpoll other Russian political 
figures, including Medvedev, by a significant margin. An analysis that is privileged by 
some commentators on Russia sees this is as evidence of the fact that a larger-than-life 
president is more in line with ‘what Russians want’, as Putin “satisfied a yearning for a 
strong leader who could make the Russian family proud” 120. However, one has to be 
very careful here to avoid concretising a Russian ‘national desire’. Whilst one can 
concede that Russians throughout history have been exposed to strong leader figures, 
equating a historical past with an inherent propensity is a dangerous enterprise, as it 
treats nations and groups as essentially static, prone to repeat the same historical patterns 
over and over again.  
 
Instead, it is in part the Putin administration’s skills in orchestrating PR or pseudo-events 
which have secured him so firm a position in the national imaginary. The President was 
initially perceived to be something of a technocrat, but his regime soon displayed a 
penchant for newsworthy occasions, which highlighted the President’s singular 
determination and prowess. However, a watershed moment seems to have occurred with 
Putin’s announcement of a third candidature for presidency and blatantly rigged 
parliamentary elections in 2011. This resulted in a wave of anti-government protests, in 
which Putin’s party United Russia received the epithet “Party of Thieves and Crooks”, 
and the President himself becoming a target of much of the public’s discontent. 
Chronologically, this was therefore a very interesting time in which to examine the Putin 
phenomenon: his approval ratings had fallen and were at their lowest since he became 
President in 2000121. At the same time the Western press – in large part due to social 
media and ‘memification’ – became more preoccupied with Putin the man and Putin the 
image, with the two becoming ever harder to distinguish. If, following the point made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 http://www.boston.com/2012/01/07/russia/tl6p5zMMq7OxLdqFptAnUN/singlepage.html 
Note also the psychoanalytic language employed by the author, whereby the public’s disenchantment with 
Putin is explained in terms of how “a good father can become a bad father”.    
121 Though still rather high: http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/01/13/vladimir-putins-
approval-rating-has-been-holding-steady-for-almost-two-years/ 
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earlier, it is posited that processes of identification take place continuously, that is, a 
‘taking in’ or ‘falling in love with’ aspects of a person, and for this to include public 
personae, then it seems justified to ask what it is that has made some of the public fall 
out of love, or dis-identify with Putin.  
              
Explanations offered for this partial waning of positive emotions towards the President – 
those that do not rely on notions of identification - include ”the global economic crisis 
and increasingly widespread concerns about the erosion of democracy in Russia” 
(Cassiday & Johnson, 2013: 38). In response, Putin is seen to have switched the focus of 
his rhetoric from the business elite and educated middle-class to a broader base more 
receptive to populist language. However, a different view offered of the causes of this 
sudden and explosive expression of discontent with the Putin regime is that in fact 
“Putin has never been especially strong […] But he has succeeded in creating a system 
that is relatively stable because it makes him look much stronger than he actually is”122. 
This implies that the impression of authority and strength was to a large degree just that: 
an impression. Putin’s success lay in managing that impression, and in the specific 
relationship between post-soviet Russians and the State. Krastev and Holmes argue that, 
in the experience of Russians born during the USSR and after, rigged elections were 
indeed the norm and regarded almost as a token of power, at least the power to 
manipulate outcomes in the one’s favour. 
      
An invisible line seems to have been crossed when Putin’s run for a third term in office 
was announced: a cynical distance to politics did not preclude a (perhaps temporary) 
sense of outrage at being fooled so blatantly. An, always context-specific, sense of 
propriety had been disturbed through this manoeuvre, which revealed just how gullible 
the Putin regime required its electorate to be. The government’s brutal response to the 
protests then also demonstrated it to be devoid of legitimacy, that is, credible means to 
restore faith in its sovereignty: “to destroy a Potemkin village all that is required is to 
change the camera angle to reveal the improvised props holding up the flimsy façade. 
[…] What finally ruined the show was that it provided no entertainment either.”123 In 
order words: most were aware that the words ‘managed democracy’ lean heavily on the 
first word. Nevertheless, the Putin regime was able to attain a type of consensus with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-02-17-krastev-en.html 
123 ibid.  
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populace, to a significant degree based on the economic stability that accompanied 
Putin’s first two terms in office. Putin and his PR team had manoeuvred him into a 
position where he seemed not only the most capable, but also the most presentable 
candidate. However, it appears that the relentless manipulation of his image had left the 
hollow core all too visible, as will become apparent in the next section.   
 
The President as Spectacle 
 
The Putin administration is not the prime mover of Russian popular culture but rather a part 
of it (and even, perhaps, a product of it) (Borenstein, 2008:277). 
 
 
News reports on Russia’s state-owned Pervyi Kanal  (Channel One) frequently follow a 
similar schema: at a certain point during the programme, a serious sociopolitical problem 
is presented to the public. President Putin is then shown addressing his Cabinet or a 
team of experts, either interviewing them in his office or at an official meeting so as to 
identify the issue’s causes and highlight its urgency, or instructing them directly how to 
deal with the problem. The scenario’s narrative framing is so repetitive that it appears 
intentional, or even scripted. Indeed, after more than 13 years of Putinism it could have 
transcended this impression and acquired the status of ‘cultural schema’, that is, the only 
manner in which news reports are expected to be framed. Other, past ‘scripted events’ - 
that is, events that do not occur spontaneously and have been planned with the media in 
mind - include the President driving a Russian-made Lada across Siberia, finding a pair of 
ancient amphorae on a diving trip in the Black Sea, and catching a pike weighing 21 kg. 
What emerged later was that on his journey across Siberia he was in fact accompanied by 
a large entourage and had changed cars several times, that the amphorae had been placed 
there prior to his entering the water, and that the pike’s reported weight may have been 
grossly exaggerated124.  
        
A typology of events featuring the President would have to allude to the fact that all of 
them aim to highlight a certain skill or positive facet of his character, often one that falls 
into the broad category of traditional masculinity (on which more will be said later on). 
They usually involve the accomplished handling of a prop, or, perhaps more curiously, 
interaction with animals. Their political or strategic necessity is not always apparent and, 
as indicated above, their staged nature is either transparently obvious or is revealed later 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/29/putin-catches-giant-fish_n_3669547.html 
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on. However, as is usually the case with any type of ‘pseudo-event’, its success is 
“measured by how widely it is reported…The question, “Is it real?” is less important 
than “Is it newsworthy ?...Its relation to the underlying reality of the situation is 
ambiguous. Its interest arises largely from this very ambiguity….”  (Waterman, 1999: 15 
cited in Mikhailova, 2013: 77). Notably, this quote refers to strategies employed by US 
politicians, which implies that the multitude of Putiniana – relating here both to the 
generation of images and the creation of Putin-related artefacts – is a worthwhile object 
of study, both in how it relates to the time in which it occurs generally, and to its Russian 
electorate more specifically.  
            
A blurring of boundaries between reality and entertainment in what one could broadly 
delineate as the arena of political communication, and in many cases a replacement of the 
former by the latter is characteristic of the late 20th and early 21st century. This has led to 
the creation of numerous ‘pseudo-events’, some of which the public may no longer 
discern as such, treating them instead as events in their own right. One consequence is 
the normalisation of such spectacles as the press conference, or more elaborate events 
such as Putin’s annual ‘telethon’, during which he responds to questions by the 
electorate, sometimes for a length of up to 4 hours. At the other end of the spectrum, 
this blurring of distinctions can also generate a greater cynical distance from politics in 
general, as the search for any ultimate truth will always be thwarted. It can even create 
the impression that “in the entertainment industry when there is a sign it seems there 
isn’t one, and when there isn’t one we believe there is” (Eco, 1986: 53). Symptomatic of 
this disorientation is the media speculation surrounding a walk the President took in St 
Petersburg following the funeral of his first judo coach125. He ostensibly wished to spend 
time alone  - without bodyguards or the press – in his old neighbourhood, but pictures of 
Putin on his solitary walk soon flooded the Internet, often accompanied by the question 
of whether this was actually staged, perhaps to imbue Putin with greater emotional 
depth, which would link it to several recent occasions on which he was seen shedding 
tears in public. 
The President as Master Signifier 
In terms of the chapter’s focus, this begs the question of whether the Putin spectacle is 
more performance than coherent message, and whether the endless creation of signifieds 
is not in fact a sign of the signifier’s absence. The Putin brand may well be “a talisman, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 http://www.kommersant.ru/news/2251781 
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symbol of the Good Life under VVP126 " (Goscilo, 2013:13), but one might argue that it 
has no inherently positive, stable referent either. Indeed, the state-sponsored search for a 
new, unifying Russian Idea had been officially discontinued in the 1990s (Hill & Gaddy, 
2013: 43) 127.  The numerous debates about the intent and meaning behind the staged 
scenarios are also indicative of a fascination with presence in absence: “Works about Putin 
often focus on the strivings and travails of presidential observers or admirers; the reader 
glimpses the center of power only briefly, and then from such a limited perspective that 
the President’s nature, actions, and accomplishments remain largely unknowable” 
(Cassiday & Johnson, 2013: 46). This means that the persona of the President is both 
elusive and adaptable. An interpretation of this important facet can go in two parallel, yet 
disparate directions. 
        
In one, it can be treated as an example of the mirror-like quality of the prezident pustoty – 
whose surface reflects the investments of a society ‘without an ideology beyond 
consumerism’ (Cassiday & Johnson, 2013: 40).  The emphasis here remains on serving as 
a potential figure of identification, but rather than giving this figure a definite set of 
predicates as was the case for leaders such as Stalin or Lenin, the post-communist, post-
modern era requires its leaders to be more oblique to suit individual tastes and fantasies -
“Needless to say the use of electoral photography presupposes a kind of complicity: a 
photograph is a mirror, what we are asked to read is the familiar, the known; it offers to 
the voter his own likeness, but clarified, exalted, superbly elevated into a type” (Barthes, 
1972/1991:91.). This is strongly reminiscent of Levada’s statement that the fascination 
with Putin lies in his ability to remain obscure. Obscurity here implies the potential for 
voters to recognise themselves in the politician’s image – but in an idealized, heightened 
form. It is important to strike the right balance between that which is familiar and that 
which is strange yet desired. Returning specifically to theories of identification, references 
to the importance of images as well as the emphasis on similarity – on recognizing, or 
mis-recognising oneself point to an identification in the imaginary - the mechanism by 
which we identify with the “image in which we appear likeable to ourselves” (Žižek, 
1989: 105). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin 
127 Though one might be tempted to read Putin’s public appearances and speeches as continued efforts to 
locate the nation’s moral and ideological core. See for example his usage of the term ‘spiritual ties’ (of the 
nation) in December 2012, as mentioned in chapter 6.  
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The second interpretation also stresses the importance of the essential ‘open-endedness‘ 
of the President’s character - beyond the basic coordinates which feature his masculinity, 
laconicism and decisiveness – but moves the focus away from the need to identify with 
the leader, and is more hesitant to use comparison with Soviet-era ‘cults of personality’: 
 
The adaptability of the President’s image suggests that the Putin 
phenomenon is about something other than the actual politician Vladimir 
Putin. The Putin cult, if indeed we can call it such, flourishes in 
contemporary Russia not because of what it purports to depict – the strong, 
national leader who many Russians, beginning in the early 1990s, seem to 
have felt they needed – but rather because of the forms of communication 
and the symbolic practices it enables. (Cassiday & Johnson, 2013: 49) 
 
 
In line with Oushakine’s (2000, 2007) idea of the recycling of old forms and stylistic 
conventions in post-soviet Russia – which he links to an institutionalization of the 
transition and an ‘arrested discursive field’ – contemporary symbolic practices in Russia 
follow the structure of previous, familiar cultural forms of expression, which are now 
utilised to promote the “formation of individual identity and desire” (Cassiday & 
Johnson, 2013: 51).  
       
A third interpretation would side with those commentators that have remarked upon the 
parallels between the pseudo-events of the 2000s, and acts related specifically to the ‘Cult 
of Personality’, which reached its apogee during Stalinism. After all, both types of 
spectacle served to continuously reiterate a leader’s brilliance, albeit in less hyperbolic 
terms in the case of Vladimir Putin.  However, the focus on the more overt parallels 
neglects the fact that the underlying ‘conditions of possibility’ that produced the two 
phenomena are different. Both may rely on fantasy scenarios (or the activation thereof), 
but the public arena in which they occurred is different entirely. In fact, this arena seems 
to be changing so rapidly that Putin and his team appear to have to devise ever-new 
variations of spectacle, and of Putin himself, in an attempt to catch the public’s attention. 
Some of these strategies and instantiations will be discussed in the next sections. They 
thus build up to a discussion of the investments the – Russian, as well as more generic – 
public might have in leader figures, and whether it is merely a question of the populace 
requiring a “Sovereign who will personify the subject and thus relieve it of all of its 
impossible internal satisfactions” (Swedlow, 2010: 118).  
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Between hypermasculinity and hyperrealism 
 
In a manner that in many ways rehabilitates Russia’s recent and distant past, Putin has 
positioned himself as a living and breathing representative of a masculine Ideal—and by extension, a 
signifier of the strong and prosperous nation-state that Russia could potentially become 
(Nowakowski, 2012: 107). 
 
As briefly indicated in the previous section, political leaders of the 21st century are now 
relying on a mobilisation of libidinal energy to gain followers ever more openly. This is 
not to deny that in the ‘cults of personality’ of the 20th century featured a strong libidinal 
element among others. Now, however, there is a greater emphasis on the erotic appeal of 
politicians. This appeal is no longer merely implicit; it is explicitly written on politicians’ 
bodies and entails more openly flirtatious behaviour. In attempts to woo the electorate, 
the public are positioned as partners in a flirtatious game of 'will we / won't we?’ 
         
Candida Yates argues that some - mainly Western - politicians now engage in traditionally 
feminine techniques of flirtation, emphasising their ‘metrosexuality’ (Yates, 2010). This is 
contrasted with the more paternal or patriarchal figures that dominated the political 
scene in the past.   Alongside this first type exist more ‘retrosexual’ forms of masculinity. 
Examples she provides include Silvio Berlusconi, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Vladimir Putin – 
all politicians whose public appearances frequently involve machoesque posturing, 
placing much more emphasis on physical and sexual prowess. Highlighting a male 
politician’s desirability is discussed by Yates as something of a legitimate, even 
“hegemonic strategy within the cultural arena of political communication” (Yates, 2010: 
282), especially in “the contemporary context of ‘post-ideological’ party politics (ibid., 
p.283). However, unlike many Western politicians who have had to tread the fine line 
between traditional forms of masculinity and the more ‘metrosexual’ form of flirtatious 
masculinity outlined by Yates, it is the Russian President in particular who has acquired 
something of a reputation for his frequent and unusual displays of this rather traditional 
brand of masculinity128.  
 
Yates’ argument is reminiscent of the Freudian account of identification, when she posits 
that the kind of charisma that a successful politician must possess and mobilise is that 
which is capable of “courting voters and warding off their latent aggression” (Yates, 
2010: 287). Here, too, the skilful politician, like the skilful leader in Freud’s account 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 http://www.ilpost.it/2012/02/27/lerotismo-di-vladimir-putin/ 
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(1921) is the one that manages the negative, aggressive aspects. One may recall here that 
identification and love are close not only in the developmental trajectory of the child, but 
also with identification becoming a stand-in when love is not possible or foreclosed, here 
representing a regressive form of identification. Political flirtation can therefore be treated 
as existing along this spectrum, but relying heavily on staged scenarios in the media to 
achieve its full impact. This argument is further supported by Yates’ emphasis on the role 
of seduction, “and the fantasies, which accompany the ‘real not real’ quality of its 
interactions” (Yates, 2010: 287). In other words: it serves one especially well to pay 
attention to the fantasy scenarios inherent in the political spectacles devised and 
coordinated by a politician’s advisers.  
 
These fantasies are not always of a distinctly sexual nature: they can be interpreted as 
representations of the unconscious “wish to identify with narratives of mastery” (Yates, 
2010: 297). An example that starkly illustrates the almost infantile quality of these 
representations of masculinity, which here assume an almost dream-like character, is the 
synopsis of the Russian adventure novel President mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter. It is safe to assume that the book is not read for its literary merits, but because 
of the predictable, almost instrumental pleasure it yields. The pleasure is that of 
identifying with the protagonist who is able to use violence legitimately in his quest for 
justice. The novel is not about Putin per se, and should perhaps be located as part of a 
tradition of entertainment products – the focus here being on consumption - such as US 
American films that feature the country’s President either in danger and being freed by a 
heroic renegade, or the President himself getting involved in attempts to save the country 
(such as 1996’s Independence Day). The figure of the President here appears as a mere 
fantasmatic vehicle, representing masculinity, power, and altruism – a quality that is 
admired despite or because of the overt cynicism of much of Russian discourse on and 
around politics (Pomerantsev, 2011, see also chapter I). In this vein, his pursuit of 
physical fitness becomes symbolic of mastery of the self as much as of sexuality. 
       
At the same time, publicity exercises that openly sexualise Putin appear to have increased 
noticeably in recent years, in contrast to the more buttoned-up demeanour of his first 
term, when he was perceived as something of a technocrat. In the West, this has 
attracted its fair share of mockery. A telling example is the reaction of Guardian 
columnist Marina Hyde, who treats the Russian president’s occasional, but well-
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publicised displays of bare chest as a sort of compulsion or exhibitionist tendency: “if he 
[President Putin] can find a way of attending to the matter shirtless, I suppose he might 
have a crack.”129 This Western derision is contrasted with the Russian female 
population’s supposed response to Putin’s displays of masculine prowess. In women, he 
is seen to inspire adulation, whereas the male electorate is seen to be wishing to emulate 
him. 
          
Some of the more directly sexualised examples include an online advertisement in the 
run-up to the 2012 presidential elections entitled ‘For the First Time’, which drew a 
thinly veiled parallel between losing one’s virginity ‘to the right guy’ and voting for Putin 
upon becoming eligible to vote130; a calendar produced by female students of the 
Moscow State University’s journalism department for his 58th birthday which features 
them posing in lingerie131; and the song and video ‘Someone Like Putin’132, which may 
have been sponsored by the Kremlin.  It is worth pointing out two things here: not only 
does Putin prefer to distance himself publicly from such forms of veneration; the lines 
between retro- and metrosexuality in the arena of political communication can also at 
times become rather blurred. The latter video in fact invites parallels to the YouTube - 
video ‘I got a crush on...Obama’, which was produced during the 2008 US presidential 
election campaign and which, though not produced by Obama’s campaign team, was 
endorsed enthusiastically when it became an online hit.   
         
With this in mind, one may still inquire why this form of masculinity appears to be so 
timely a publicity device in Russia. Novakowski’s quote from the beginning of this 
section indicates that the President is being recruited as a kind of personification of the 
nation, representing a movement away from the chaos and decline of the 1990s and 
towards strength and a sense of a better future. Eliot Borenstein similarly treats 
Putinism’s more recent emphasis on this aspect of the President’s persona as a form of 
‘compensatory masculinity’:  “Putin […] represents the restoration of long-lost vigor and 
confidence. The Yeltsin years considerably lowered the bar for the country's next leader: 
Putin's specific policies and actions arguably matter far less than his reassuring symbolic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/lostinshowbiz/2013/aug/22/whales-kim-basinger-peta-
vladimir-putin 
130 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Noo0lzJILaM#t=12 
131 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happy_Birthday,_Mr._Putin! 
132 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zk_VszbZa_s 
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function as a "real man" who can husband the nation's resources and promise a return to 
greatness" (Borenstein, 2008:227). 
        
At the same time, this ‘retrosexual’ or traditional form of masculinity does not preclude 
the existence and occasional highlighting of a softer, more family-oriented side. In the 
case of the President, his actual family has remained out of the spotlight almost 
completely. This makes him a better fit for a more paternal role vis-à-vis the nation, 
while much media attention is devoted to “Putin’s tender attention to animals” 
(Mikhailova, 2013:75). Examples include him: “praising the horse that carried him across 
the Siberian steppes, cuddling with puppies and other small animals, feeding a baby elk 
from a bottle” (ibid.) There are also several incidences of him publicly administering 
kisses to animals and little children. Mikhailova views this as an indication that the kisses 
- which can be read as symbolic as much as material acts - are meant to serve to cement 
his image of “Father of the Nation”, albeit as a tender rather than stern patriarch. An 
alternative reading, however, is that despite the seemingly excessive masculinity of the 
presidential persona, it incorporates masculine and feminine aspects. One analyst 
concludes that for his leadership style “the best comparison now may be a transgender 
cross between the former Argentine leader Juan Perón and his legendary wife, Eva 
(“Evita”)”133. While masculinity is therefore a central facet of the national vision as it is 
performed by Vladimir Putin, his ambition to stand for, and speak on behalf of all of 
Russia cannot neglect the nation’s ‘maternal characteristics’.  
 
Two ways of reading his association with animals present themselves, both of which 
point to the symbolic range this public relationship can offer. In the first, these tiger cubs 
and elks could serve as stand-ins for humans, or more generally as a means of expressing 
emotions that cannot otherwise be shown with human subjects (Hook, 2013), such as 
certain kinds of nurturing and love. Goscilo, however, disputes this, instead reading the 
presidential kisses as acts of power: “Putin’s kisses target those who are powerless and 
incapable of reciprocity [...], they sooner imply Putin’s exercise of arbitrary power and 
symbolic possession”(Goscilo, 2013: 200). The second reading sees the frequent 
encounters with animals, together with the many photographs featuring the President in 
scenes of unspoilt nature, as intended to imbue him with Russianness. As detailed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nina-l--khrushcheva-examines-the-affinities-between-
russia-s-leader-and-argentina-s-post-war-strongman#Y6FZtM27CSX5oPU5.99 
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chapter V, nature as a signifier holds special relevance to many, as a site unblemished by 
history and politics. In the case of Vladimir Putin, this could represent an attempt to 
transcend associations with specific regimes or even politics more generally: 
 
Though perhaps vulgar for those with more refined tastes, Putin's 
shirtless forays into the wilderness are seen by many Russians as the picture 
of vitality - a sharp contrast to the state of the country and that of its drunken 
resident of the 1990s. (Zonis et al 2011: 72 in Baer, 2013: 166) 
The "semiotic chaos of post-Soviet society" (Baer, 2013: 170) left “many Russians 
searching for a way to define themselves in the absence of an ideological master 
narrative" (Baer, 2013: 160). New identity configurations therefore often rely on an 
assemblage of elements from all periods of Russia and Soviet history. The next section 
explores how the Russian president, too, engages in the practice of bricolage in order to 
cover the greatest territory in the ideological spectrum.  
Spirit of Bricolage 
A few months ago there was a huge ‘Putin party’ at Moscow’s most glamorous club. 
Strippers writhed around poles chanting: ‘I want you, prime minister.’ It’s the same logic. The 
sucking-up to the master is completely genuine, but as we’re all liberated 21st-century people who 
enjoy Coen brothers films, we’ll do our sucking up with an ironic grin….(Pomerantsev, 2011) 
 
An alternative view is that the Putin spectacle – that is, the emphasis on the President’s 
masculinity as well as the public’s supposed enthusiastic response to this, are all part of a 
game in which each of the players wears a series of masks which are donned 
opportunistically. Thus it is not merely Putin who is assuming a pre-defined role – it is all 
of Russia, making this an almost reciprocal relationship, whereby each side is attempting 
to anticipate the agenda of the other. 
       
As mentioned in the introduction, Peter Pomerantsev claims that the Kremlin’s ultimate 
ideology is that of cynicism, or postmodernism incarnated in a political project.  Writing 
an article on the regime’s ‘puppet master’ or chief ideologue Vladislav Surkov, he 
characterises Putinite Russia as “a world of masks and poses, colourful but empty, with 
little at its core but power for power’s sake and the accumulation of vast wealth.”134 He 
continues characterising this as a deliberate “strategy of power based on keeping any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n20/peter-pomerantsev/putins-rasputin 
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opposition there may be constantly confused, a ceaseless shape-shifting that is 
unstoppable because it’s indefinable.” However, this obliqueness has also been 
interpreted in somewhat less Machiavellian terms by some commentators, who feel that 
Putin acts as “a mirror in which everyone, whether communist or democrat, see what he 
wants and hopes to see”135. Others feel that "Putin stands in for the void in an attempt to 
conceal the non-identity of the postcommunist order" (Prozorov, 2009:70), that, “if 
Putinism can be assigned anything like a set of determinate predicates, it could be 
summed up in terms of an unlimited valorization of capitalism” (ibid.) 
       
What appears certain even from so brief an overview of its perceived characteristics is 
that Putinism lacks a series of coherent signifiers, which would enable the production of 
a more rigorous set of tenets to form or produce its ideology. It relies on the figure of 
Putin – a figure that is itself ‘empty’, that is, consisting of a series of attributes that are 
modified to adapt to changing times. Elements of Putinism range from imperial notions 
of all-Russian greatness which hark back both to pre-revolutionary Russia, as well as the 
rhetoric of the Cold War, to authoritarianism as well as elements of Western-style 
democracy; from regret and nostalgia for the Soviet Union to an endorsement of 
capitalism. In the eyes of many observers, the figure of a strong leader such as Putin, in 
its very idiosyncrasy, is seen as the only potential candidate capable of suturing this 
incoherent ideological field. Indeed, his larger than life-public persona resonates strongly 
with the figure of the ‘charismatic leader’ and his ability to mobilise mechanisms of 
identification described by Freud in his Group Psychology (Freud, 1921). The narcissistic 
dimension of these types of group identification also ties it to the imaginary type of 
identification as discussed in Chapter II. 
          
Tendencies in the realm of political and cultural identity that have been noted by 
observers of contemporary Russia can thus be roughly divided into two camps. On the 
one hand, there are those who group public discourse in the country around such 
signifiers as nationalism and patriotism. The conclusion is that these are being 
operationalized to fill the ideological void and political apathy of post- communist 
Russian subjects. Yet there are also those critics who doubt not only the efficacy of this 
political project, but also the existence of any coherent agenda by the Putin/Medvedev 
government: 	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Right now there is no ideology. The current regime does not have an ideology, 
as the word ‘stability’ cannot be considered an ideology. They do not have any 
ideology apart from money. Everyone knows this, and they don’t try too hard 
to hide it (Lev Rubinstein, 2012).136 
 
Pulitzer-prize recipient Anne Applebaum belongs in the former category when she 
attributes the content of Putinism to a firm set of beliefs emanating directly from the 
president: 
Times have changed, but the personality and beliefs of Vladimir Putin, the 
current Russian president, still matter just as much as those of his predecessors 
– if not more. In a state where authority is still vested in personalities, not in 
institutions, the Russian president’s vision of his country, his understanding of 
its history, his training as a KGB officer and his personal experience of life in 
the Soviet Union now have an incalculable impact on Russia political life.137 
 
While her documentation of Putin’s rise to the power is well researched, her analysis of 
the ideology of Putinism suffers from a serious flaw. The basic tenet is one of wanting to 
hold on to power, an idea in whose service the country’s main institutions have been 
manipulated, intimidated or modified. What fails to emerge from this analysis is any kind 
of positive content that would be secured through this maintenance of power – unless 
we posit that cratocracy is itself a sufficient ideological base. The recruitment of the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the reliance on ‘traditional family values’ – as well as the 
persecution of those propagating, or seen to propagate other lifestyles, has always felt 
rather accidental even to Russian commentators. The fact that 20th century Russian and 
Soviet history was characterized by a series of cataclysms, and, most recently, the ‘non-
period’ (Prozorov, 2009) of the 1990s means that the attempt to create a sustained yet 
positive narrative of historical progress is thwarted by the inevitable negative flotsam 
attached to any seemingly positive event. What has been salvaged so far is the heroic 
sacrifice and victory of World War II, and more vague references to the imperial and 
cultural glory of the Tsarist Russia. 
 
Thus, while Applebaum insists that the “underpinnings of Putinism are in fact quite 
sophisticated and are becoming more so with time” (Applebaum, 2013), thereby denying 
the haphazard or even anti-ideological nature that Russian commentators have been so 
keen to point out, Russian analysts claim that:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 http://www.rusrep.ru/article/2012/05/28/rubinshtein/ 
137 Page 1 of speech given at LSE IDEAS: http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/su13-2-
putinism.pdf 
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Stylistically, Putin may easily be considered a conservative, a reformist and a 
revolutionary all at once, just as the substantive programme of his presidency 
lends itself to similarly multiple characterizations as liberal, nationalist and 
socialist. Thus, if there is such a thing as ‘Putin’s ideology’ (Chadaev, 2005), it 
is self-consciously syncretic, combining the master signifiers from the entire 
ideological field (‘freedom’, ‘social justice’, ‘strong state- hood’, etc.) in a bland 
‘catch-all’ political discourse (Prozorov, 2009:65). 
 
If we therefore accept the claim that Putinism lacks a coherent ideology and secures 
power merely for the sake of power, then its means of maintaining sovereignty have be 
ensured elsewhere. The regime is clearly unable to interpellate subjects on the basis of a 
national vision or idea, the search for which has remained inconclusive. One such means 
is the use of force, meaning that: “Cratocracy can surely threaten its subjects with use of 
force or even actualize this threat in exemplary acts of violence. What it can never do is 
govern its subjects insofar we understand government in the Foucauldian sense of 
positive and productive use of power” (Prozorov, 2009:209). 
        
While Putin’s regime has not shied away from the occasional and demonstrative use of 
force – notable examples being the arrests and imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
members of Pussy Riot, and the Bolotnaya Square protesters – this does not account for 
his popularity with voters. Much of it can perhaps be explained by the long-lasting period 
of economic stability associated with his presidency, as well as the lack of viable 
alternatives. However, the above describes attempts by the President and his PR team to 
enter the Russian popular imaginary. While some of the positive public responses may be 
filed away as cases of opportunistic pandering, equally, in many instances of openly 
expressed admiration for the President, no material or even social rewards can explain 
them.  	  
 “A composite of King-Kong and the suburban barber” 
 
A muse for men as well as a far from obscure object of desire for women (Goscilo, 2013:9). 
  
One facet of Putin’s persona that has received less attention so far in this discussion is 
that of the populist leader – another feature he is seen to share with Berlusconi. 
Examples of his forays into obscene and vulgar language include the promise to ‘finish 
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(Chechen - MB) terrorists in the crapper’ in his days as Prime Minister138, to a more recent 
instance, again evoking unorthodox ways of punishing Chechen rebel fighters:   
 
When, a couple of years ago, a Western journalist asked him an awkward 
question about Chechnya, Putin snapped back that, if the man wasn’t yet 
circumcised, he was cordially invited to Moscow, where they have excellent 
surgeons who would cut a little more radically than usual.139 
 
These ‘outbursts’ – recruiting the Russian ‘national other’ of the Muslim separatist, and 
combining it with sadistic and darkly sexual imagery – occur very sporadically, but always 
attract media attention – the other type of incident being that of Putin publicly telling 
risqué jokes (see Hill & Gaddy, 2013). While it may in part be related to the violence of 
the past that has remained unexorcised from contemporary Russian discourses (see 
chapter VI), it appears to be employed with strategic intent. But why would the Russian 
president see the need to “embellish his thuggish image” (Hill & Gaddy, 2013: 137)?  
           
One prevalent explanation sees the deployment of populist rhetoric as a way of 
strengthening bonds with the community; that it is in fact tailored to appeal specifically 
to its ‘ordinary’ members and “prepared in advance in conformity with the Russian 
‘national character’”140.  In the case of Putinism, however, and in contrast with Ernesto 
Laclau’s more optimistic take on the phenomenon of populism as serving to create new 
political identities (2005), the President’s tightly choreographed publicity stunts and 
linguistic ‘mishaps’ in fact serve to encourage a move away from politics, as a way of 
continuing and maintaining the depoliticisation which commenced in the late Soviet 
period (e.g. Yurchak, 1997).  
         
Populism can attach itself to any number of demands – in fact its reliance on ‘empty 
signifiers’ is one of Laclau’s core assumptions, but in Putinism, this demand emanates 
from the presidential administration itself, and represents an attempt to discourage 
political participation and potential dissent. Thought of in this vein, the potpourri of 
values drawn upon by Putin and his advisors is not intended to represent a coherent set 
of tenets, but chiefly aims to create an emotional effect, discouraging further analysis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Wikipedia entry on origin of the expression: 
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C_%D0%B2_%
D1%81%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5 
139 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n14/slavoj-zizek/berlusconi-in-tehran 
140 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n14/slavoj-zizek/berlusconi-in-tehran 
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which is easily achieved in a rhetorical move such as that of enunciating what cannot be 
said, in a manner that is normally taboo.  
        
Russian observers have noted that Putin’s regime is in fact becoming more openly 
populist with time141, following a disenchantment with the elites that Putin was 
previously able to rely on. First indicators are an increased recourse to Soviet symbolry, 
by which he is seen to be appealing to those that hanker after the ‘glory days of yonder’ – 
those citizens who had lost the most with the breakup of the Soviet Union. In other 
words “the losers below, ‘the silent majority of Russians’, who are ‘mostly atomised, 
middle-aged individuals, beaten-down, unheroic philistines trying to make ends meet as 
decently as they can’, after twenty years of betrayed expectations.”142 According to Žižek, 
“the popular movement needs the identificatory figure of a charismatic leader”( Žižek, 
2006:557). Indeed, Putin’s leadership qualities have often been commented upon, with 
Sakwa referring to Max Weber’s comments on charisma when speaking of Putin:  
 
Charisma knows only inner determination and inner restraint. The holder of 
charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience 
and a following by virtue of his mission. His charismatic vision breaks down 
if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent 
(Weber, quoted in Sakwa, 2004: 249). 
 
 
However, if all of a ‘popular movement’s’ coherence and content are provided by its 
leader figure, then this also proves to be its weakest point. Putin may be the ‘master 
signifier’ that brings together the disparate, at times haphazard elements of Russianness 
and fuses them into the (non)ideology of Putinism, but the public’s rejection of Putin 
then also leads to the disintegration of this vision. With everything intentionally hinging 
on the figure of the President, a turn to theories of identification therefore seems apt. 
 
The President as Father and Brother 
As outlined at the beginning of this thesis, one of its methodological aims is to explore 
and reveal the affective, that is, libidinal bonds underpinning community. In fact, it is 
suggested that a structural dislocation, followed by a period of stasis or indeed latency, 
can make these bonds visible. Keeping this in mind when returning to the crucial role of 
the figure of Putin in the post-Soviet social imaginary, it may indeed be the case that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 http://slon.ru/world/novyy_rezhim-994537.xhtml 
142 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n02/perry-anderson/russias-managed-democracy 
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[..] everything turns around the key notion of identification, and the starting 
point for explaining a plurality of socio-political alternatives is to be found 
in the degree of distance between ego and ego ideal (Laclau, 2005:62). 
 
Taking as its starting point the Freudian account of identification and its role in group 
formation and –coherence, Laclau goes on to assert that a leaderless society is in fact 
impossible; a conclusion which was echoed by Žižek’s earlier comment. At the same 
time, a group or community cannot sustain its existence through leader-love alone: “a 
durable group whose only libidinal tie is love for the leader, is equally impossible” 
(Laclau, 2005:82). Freud insisted that a group requires a  “double kind of tie”, that is 
“identification, and putting the object in the place of the ego ideal (Freud, 1921:96)”. 
Despite identification’s proximity to love (as discussed in Chapter II), they are therefore 
nevertheless distinct processes which take place simultaneously. The artificial separation 
of them – especially along gendered lines of female desire to have, and male desire to 
emulate as indicated in the quote at the beginning of this section – remains 
unconvincing.  
             
The leader needs to find ways of appealing to the group that will put him both in charge 
and in the midst of its members, so as to be both of and above them. How might one 
understand this dual identity? In Laclau’s words “his identity is split: he is the father, but 
also one of the brothers” (Laclau, 2005:59). However, this paternal role has been 
assessed in two different ways. In Laclau’s take, group membership makes him 
‘accountable to the community’, so that identification in facts suppresses authoritarian 
impulses and creates “a far more democratic leadership than the one involved in the 
notion of the narcissistic despot” (Laclau, 2005:60).  Adorno, too, argues that the bond 
underlying group identification centres around the figure of the leader, but rather than 
seeking to exonerate the populist leader from the accusation of despotism, his focus is 
on the fascist leader. In his analysis, the primary identification with a powerful, 
authoritarian father figure that takes place in fascist regimes is linked to a kind of 
regression or return to more archaic or ‘primitive’ state. The paternal leader figure here 
resembles the primal father for whose murder the ‘primal horde’ is then forever trying to 
make amends.  
          
The group members’ commonalities with the leader then do not serve to quell the 
dictatorial tendencies in him – they are merely evidence of the narcissistic aspects of 
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group identification: “While appearing as a superman, the leader must at the same time 
work the miracle of appearing as an average person, just as Hitler posed as a composite 
of King-Kong and the suburban barber” (Adorno, 1951/2001: 141).  In fact, a 
highlighting of the leader’s heroic, superhuman qualities can therefore never fully bypass 
the imaginary (in a Lacanian vein), that is, rivalrous aspects of identification: “for the sake 
of those parts of the follower's narcissistic libido which have not been thrown into the 
leader image but remain attached to the follower's own ego, the superman must still 
resemble the follower and appear as his “enlargement””(Adorno, 1951/2001: 142). 
Barthes’ analysis of the techniques employed to secure voter appeal in electoral 
photography, which was briefly referred to in an earlier section, confirm as much: the 
politician needs to be both familiar, and “exalted, superbly elevated” (Barthes, 
1972/1991:91) Nevertheless the leader figure, in Adorno’s analysis, is not impervious to 
historical contingency: while the authoritarian element may be more pronounced under 
fascism, it decreases in importance in a less repressive society. What remains is the need 
to convey an “impression of greater force and of more freedom of libido” (Freud, 1921 
in Adorno,  1951/2001: 142) than the rest of the community. 
          
Thought of in terms of theories of identification, a somewhat exaggerated identity 
becomes necessary if the leader is to be accepted as such. However, the amalgam of 
ordinary and extraordinary components needs to be prepared carefully to suit the 
national tastes, as these tastes are subject to change. The constant attempts by Putin and 
his advisors to present new impressive facets of his persona implicitly demonstrate an 
understanding of this fact, however, they also give evidence of how much the President 
is still searching for means to secure his appeal. More recently, this reliance on publicity 
stunts has attracted increasing derision in Russia:  
 
The Russian people have currently reached a stage at which they are ready 
to settle the question of whether Mr Putin is the Lord’s emissary on Earth. 
Vladimir Vladimirovich himself keeps silent about this and most likely has 
not yet arrived at a specific conclusion. On the one hand, Putin and his 
congregation do agree that he is infallible like God, and that a critique of his 
person counts as a deadly sin. Truly, his actions, too  - like those of God - 
are hard to grasp for the human mind.143 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 http://vestnikcivitas.ru/docs/1628 
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This is has led to the question of whether national sensibilities have changed in a way 
that is not accounted for by Putinism.  After all, besides economic stability, the system 
relies wholly on its figurehead, and when the public shows signs of Putin-fatigue, this 
might point to increasing detachment and disidentification. 
 
 
From Collective Putin to Concrete Putin 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, permit me to ask you: if Putin is such a louse or nit, then who 
are we? If we are so clever, magnificent and wonderful, then how come that for 12 years we have 
been unable to get the better of such a trifling opponent144?  
  
 
The President on the Couch 
One symptom of the President’s lessening credibility is speculation regarding his state of 
body and mind. Where previously some of the excesses of Putin adulation - such as the 
small religious sect based outside Moscow, which has elevated Putin to sainthood - may 
have attracted ridicule145, in 2013 commentators were actively involved in metaphorically 
stripping the President so as to inquire about his physiology and psychology. This found 
its perhaps most extreme expression – following rumours that the President had had to 
cancel an international trip due to back problems – in a journalist asking: “[…] but tell 
us: does Putin shit?”146 
          
The more recent shift in the Russian discourse of Putinism is also illustrated by media 
reactions to a drawing, which the President produced during a visit to a school in the 
Urals on the annual ‘Day of Knowledge’ on September 1st 2013. His rather crude drawing 
was meant to represent ‘a cat from behind’, and while the strained effort to uncover a 
hidden meaning in the image – a meaning that would provide the public with a deeper 
understanding of Putin himself – is characteristic of earlier periods, the fact that the most 
prevalent interpretations indicated the presence of unresolved psychological issues, was 
not147. When a psychologist was invited to comment on the President’s psyche based on 
the drawing, he came to the following conclusions: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Akunin Chkhartishvili, 22.08.2012, Facebook posted later re-posted on 
http://www.politonline.ru/rssArticle/15348101.html 
145 http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/putin-sekte-in-russland-heiliger-wladimir-bitte-fuer-uns-
a-788824.html 
146 http://polit.ru/article/2012/10/26/sverh_putin/ 
147http://newsru.com/russia/03sep2013/putincat.html 
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First of all, one could mention that here is a person who  […] avoids 
contact with other people […] a loner” […] Second, there is indication of 
some attempts at originality [.], but merely attempts, this person does not 
actually have any outstanding creative abilities, but wants to demonstrate 
something unusual.148 
 
Finally, and despite Putin’s own best efforts, his drawing style was also seen to be 
“characteristic of people who are not very certain in their manliness, or don’t see 
themselves as particularly manly individuals.” 149 Perhaps in line with this suggestion, 
there had around the same time been several very public displays of feeling (or 
sentimentality) by the President, when he was filmed shedding tears during his 
inauguration, and later during the performance of a popular song from the Soviet era. 
            
In the present chapter’s line of argumentation, this emotive performance is not seen as 
indicative of any ‘true’ emotion, but rather as the launching of a new facet of Putinism.  
The response to a sentimental Soviet-era song, as well as the increased recourse to Soviet 
symbols points to an attempt to reconstruct Putin as a man of the people.  However, this 
reconceptualization carries the inherent danger of making the President all too flawed 
because all too human, in other words: not enough of the ‘superman’ and too much of 
the neighbour, with all the tensions this entails. With shrinking distance to the populace 
comes a loss of his previous air of invulnerability, or rather a loss of its pretense, so that 
a trend away from idealisation to humanisation opens up the possibility of replacing one 
– now simply ordinary – politician by another. 
 
In order to conceal what is in essence a lack of faith in one’s symbolic mandate (see Chapter 
II), more directly authoritarian measures such as mass arrests have therefore been applied 
by the government. These, however, only serve to highlight further the regime’s inability 
to fully ‘govern’ its citizens in the Foucauldian sense. The other type of response to the 
President’s waning popularity and credibility has been a reliance on the type of spectacle 
that is traditionally used to created a temporary sense of solidarity as it hails all subjects 
as part of the national body: the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. The simultaneous 
self-presentation as strict but merciful ruler, which Putin seeks to convey with the 
amnesty of political prisoners such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky and 2 members of Pussy 
Riot - whose prison terms had incidentally been close to completion – appears to belong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148http://tvrain.ru/articles/vrach_psiholog_o_risunke_putina_hvost_koshki_fallicheskij_simvol_tak_risuj
ut_odinokie_ljudi_pretendujuschie_na_originalnost-351287/ 
149 ibid. 
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to a different period of Putinism altogether, illustrating the constant quest to 
performatively secure an identity configuration that turns the President into an object 
worthy of identification. 
 
Conclusion 
The increasing impression that Putin – along with the rest of political life in Russia - is 
more simulacrum than reality has been reinforced by the presence of one of his sharpest 
critics, who maintains an entirely virtual presence. Lev Sharansky is a ‘virtual dissident’150 
created by an anonymous blogger to continue a politics of opposition in the vein of 
Soviet dissidents through his frequent appeals to morality, along with calls to defend 
human rights and freedom of expression. While still holding dominion over state 
violence as a last resort, Putinism’s hyperreal President is thus confronted with a 
hyperreal adversary. The ever-changing masks of the President – despite their 
unquestionable appeal, in large part due to their ease of communicability, reveal a hollow 
core.  The meandering between more exaggeratedly heroic and more human guises point 
to an essential instability at the heart of Putin’s public persona. It is difficult to determine 
whether this was driven by a change in national sensibilities, or indeed originates in the 
government, but the consequences in both cases are akin to a ‘naked emperor—effect’. 
 
Constructing Vladimir Putin as the master signifier of Putinism established a need for a 
figurehead that was sufficiently empty to appeal to a number of societal groups or 
classes.  However, the absence of a more ideological and less personified point de capiton 
or ‘quilting point’ meant that the Putin regime was also inherently reliant on processes of 
identification in order to secure its place in the national body.  At the same time, 
attempting to secure such lasting libidinal bonds in a changing society is a risky enterprise 
– what may have seemed impressive at one time can seem worthy of ridicule in another, 
at that point only serving to further alienate him from the populace. The non-ideological, 
personalised edifice that is Putinism thus contains the seeds of its own failure, and it is 
only a matter of time until it becomes even more apparent that “though subjectification 
occurs by means of symbolic identifications, this identification itself is not only false, it is 
a hindrance to the subject in terms of living a fully authentic life” (Swedlow, 2010: 118). 
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Chapter VIII: Moments of Russianness - Conclusion. 	  
This thesis investigated processes of national identification, applying psychosocial 
methodology to discourses produced in Russia during the period of Putinism. Its starting 
point was a body of scholarly literature claiming an absence of symbolic functions or 
subjective formations, which could provide the post-Soviet subjects with identificatory 
positions (Oushakine, Prozorov). This is coupled with a lack of existing empirical work 
examining national identification utilising a psychosocial approach. The research fills this 
lacuna by looking for moments of identification across different texts, such as interviews, 
surveys and media representations. The identifications encountered in the thesis are 
precarious and marked by tension, speaking of the loss of a fantasy of the ideal nation, 
and of an internalisation of images and scenes borrowed from literature and history. The 
study also offers a consideration of the implications of such attachments for Russian 
society, highlighting the crucial interdependence of psychic and social realms, whose 
intersection is most acutely apparent in discourse.  
 
This final chapter will outline the study’s major findings across three main trajectories. 
The first focuses on the thesis’ methodological and theoretical contributions. While the 
tropes and discursive operations identified in the thesis are fundamental to how certain 
parts of the populace make sense of their Russianness, the thesis did not seek to provide 
a comprehensive overview of Russian subjectivities in the early 21st century. Instead, it 
examined how, in relation to the nation, certain discourses are constructed and 
reproduced, and what can be gleaned about the meaning and function of these recurrent 
tropes and patterns. One of the most surprising findings of the thesis is the prevalence of 
image-rich discourses and signifiers. Not only do they assume a pivotal role in imaginary 
identification, recent events in Russia also point to how the construction of mythological 
narratives not only structures subjects’ perception of reality - for some, it has an impact on 
how they seek to structure reality itself.  
 
The second, related point will foreground how each of the thesis’ four empirical chapters 
makes a separate yet conjunctive contribution. Each chapter assumes a distinct vantage 
point, whose findings will be laid out in some detail. At the same time, it is emphasised 
how they share theoretical concerns, thereby providing further insight into a number of 
aspects of the same phenomenon of national identification. This naturally also involves 
reviewing the study’s methodological challenges, as well as pointing to potential future 
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directions for research. Thirdly and finally, the conclusion will devote some space to the 
issue of temporality and temporal location of the researcher. Most of the discourses 
analysed in the thesis were produced between 2010 and 2013, thus predating the events of 
this year. Highlighting the thesis’ relevance thus also entails making a connection to the 
developments of 2014.  
 
Theoretical and empirical contributions 	  
Split subjectivities  
The introduction gave an account of the discursive conditions of (im)possibility for 
national identification in Russia of the 21st century. One of its main arguments was that 
that by focusing on processes of national identification, rather than nationalism or 
national identity, it is possible to gain insight not merely into how and where national 
signifiers are reproduced, but which signifiers are privileged and to what degree they are 
assumed by subjects. This is especially pertinent in the case of a discursive backdrop 
marked by a ‘crisis of group-identification’ (Leonova, 1999).  Post-soviet Russia was here 
described as shaped by a type of discursive paralysis or ‘aphasia’ (Oushakine, 2000) in the 
field of cultural and ideological production, facilitating a continued recycling of archaic 
signifiers.  The emptier or more open-ended a signifier is found to be, the greater its 
potential to harbour a myriad of meanings and connotations. At the same time, the 
resulting situation of social dispersion and withdrawal from the public sphere was 
exacerbated by multiple layers of cynicism afflicting the post-Soviet subject. The lack of 
signifiers anchoring subjects in the present also enabled the gulf between intelligentsia 
and the majority of Russians to expand to the degree where they appear to be speaking 
from entirely separate discursive realms.  
          
After this survey of the discursive field of post-Soviet Russia, Chapter II gave an overview 
of theories of identification, with the latter part of the chapter in particular devoted to 
identification in groups and the community. This process was shown to be both ambivalent 
and inherently precarious, involving feelings of love as well as aggression, attempts at 
emulation as well as rivalry. Identification was stressed to be a process rather than a psychic 
or discursive fact. It represents a continuous approximation by subjects to be like the other, 
or incorporate the other into themselves (i.e. have the other). In its final sections, the 
chapter also spoke of the structures and detours some types of identification can assume in 
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response to specific historical and societal conditions. Chapter III (Reading formations of 
national identification) then introduced strategies of investigating modes and vicissitudes of 
attachments to the nation encountered in discourse.  While the original methodological 
focus of the research lay on discourse analysis, ultimately a more distinctively psychosocial 
reading methodology was developed. The type of methodology applied to the thesis 
incorporates influences such as the analysis of political discourse introduced by Laclau and 
Mouffe, together with the more psychoanalytic reading offered by Stavrakakis. Overall, the 
analysis of discursive strategies encountered during the research entailed a thematic 
ordering of discursive motifs particularly charged with affect, as well as an examination of 
the function of specific recurrent patterns. The psychosocial form of analysis performed in 
the thesis necessitated greater flexibility in order to be able to identify moments when the 
subject feels it coincides with the signifier, and to delineate what characterises such 
moments of seeming authenticity. Conversely, it also sought to determine when and why 
the gap between oneself and the signifier is felt most acutely. In chapters II and III, the 
battery of signifiers structuring subjects’ self-representation was crucially divided into those 
making up the “image in which we appear likeable to ourselves” (Žižek, 1989:105), as is 
relevant in the process of imaginary identification, and the place from which subjects believe 
they are being viewed and judged, as is salient in symbolic identification.  
 
The first part of the thesis’ empirical element, chapters IV and V, illustrated how the 
process of splitting demarcates subjects’ relationship to Russianness.  
Indeed, this split subjectivity – wanting to elevate those features that make up one’s 
identity, together with a contradictory desire to denigrate all that is Russian, is one of the 
characteristic features of the discourse of Russianness among this cohort of educated 
urban Russians. Respondents denigrated the nation at hand, but expected the ‘ideal 
nation’ to make itself loveable. This resulted in the parallel presence of a good and a bad 
nation in subjects’ accounts, so that what was perceived as worthy of love could be 
retained and internalised, while the ‘worthless’ Russia was expelled. The celebration or 
fetishisation of elements of a remembered and imagined history was fundamental to how 
many respondents constructed Russianness, but the unavailability of these components 
simultaneously thwarted any attempts at constructing an identity that would be moored 
in present-day Russia. In conjunction with the sense of disorientation, some texts 
suggested that the discursive enactment of disidentification could serve as a solution to 
the problem of such a ‘wounded attachment’. Fantasmatic identification with signifiers 
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from film and literature enabled the creation of a series of ‘private Russias’, which could 
be seen as further empirical and theoretical elaborations of Santner’s original concept 
(1996).  
 
Myths of Russianness 
In fact, one of the study’s distinctive contributions concerns the pivotal role of images 
and symbols in discourse, thus challenging Michael Billig’s critique of the  “over-
evaluation of the visual modality in much western philosophy and psychology (Billig, 
2006:16)”. As mentioned in the previous section, it was frequently the aspects of 
Russianness located in the realm of aesthetics and culture that were deemed capable of 
inspiring affective investment. Characters and scenes from Russian novels and films were 
identified with fantasmatically, being first deemed worthy of identification, and then 
retroactively established as distinctly Russian. The survey element asking participants to 
comment on a series of pictures and photographs (Appendix G) responded specifically 
to this tendency, which had been established through the interview analysis. However, in 
an unexpected development, bar one picture (‘Young pioneers in Moscow’), responses 
were less affective than expected. Instead, respondents came with their own plethora of 
images and scenes.  
          
Reasons for this willing citation of images and imaginary contents are two-fold. The first 
relates to the prelapsarian belief held by some interviewees that true (meaning: lovable) 
Russianness existed in the past, after which it was lost through historical change or a 
similar ‘fall’. Enabling this idealised relationship to the past required a disavowal of the 
problematic aspects of Russian and Soviet history, in order to be able to hold on to, and 
fetishise, a certain version that can be integrated more easily into fantasy. The images 
cited provide ego-substantiating contents that can support a form of imaginary 
identification in the face of a lack of such signifiers in actuality. Crucially, it is only by 
introducing psychosocial ideas that this facet of subjects’ relationship with discourse 
could be adequately theorised. By not looking simply to discourse, or utilising notions of 
nationalism, but rather grappling with so crucial a dimension of identification, it becomes 
possible to understand what ties the subject to the community, even in the face of denial 
of such bonds. These affectively sustained images and scenes have an important libidinal 
function, and work in conjunction with discourses and ideology.  
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Second, accessing such image-rich discourses also enables respondents to partially 
manage the challenges of defining one’s relationship to the nation in words. This was 
alluded to in greater detail in chapter III. This distinctive sub-facet of the 
representational dynamics in question, which function often in a quasi-mythical way, was 
also evident in the recurrence of nature as a signifier. Its ability to accommodate a 
multiplicity of meanings accounts for its power and continued relevance. However, as it 
is partially sought out due to being regarded as untarnished by history and politics, it 
cannot easily interpellate subjects on behalf of society, thus offering no resolution to 
Russia’s doubly acute ‘crisis of investiture’. At the same time, the continued existence of 
an ideal Russia is guaranteed by such seductive signifiers slotting into mythological 
narratives in circulation.  
         
 The notion of Nachträglichkeit provided one way of referring to the ways the past is 
continuously reworked in the service of accommodating memory and experience. In fact, 
recent events suggest that in post-Soviet Russia the borders between truth and fiction are 
even more porous than was assumed. It seems as if fiction has seeped into, and moulded 
Russian actuality, though this process is not exclusive to Russia. In fact, it made be a 
response more generally to conditions in which an impasse of national identification has 
occurred. One example is the myths of the heroism and sacrifice of the Second World 
War, which gave the Soviet Union one of its few universally acknowledged moments of 
glory, celebrated in numerous historical and fictional accounts and films. Soviet and 
Russian authorities have always been keen to co-opt this moment and elevate to the 
status of a national success. However, this facet of the  ‘collective consciousness’ of 
Russia has been shown to have palpable consequences. Indeed, some observers of 
contemporary Russian have been keen to point out how such war myths fuel the 
separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, despite none of its participant having 
any personal recollection of the War151. In an even more surprising connection, several of 
those actively involved in the separatist movement or in charge of producing propaganda 
war on the Russian side are authors of fantasy literature – a hugely popular genre in 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russia152. This led popular writer Dmitry Bykov to say with 
intentional hyperbole:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 http://m.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/07/25_a_6146089.shtml 
152 Separatist leader and Head of Donetsk People’s Republic Igor Strelkov published a series of military fantasy 
novels, while his former right-hand man Fyodor Berezin in fact published an alternative history novel 
called War 2010- The Ukrainian Front. 
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This is above all a literary war, unleashed by writers, and without having taken 
into account the interests of the readership.[…] Fantasy literature has played 
the role of our almost non-existent futurology. It has taken it upon itself to 
develop new projects for the nation, and as we can see, it has been highly 
successful153.  
 
Bykov claims that while most highbrow Russian authors turned their back on Russian 
politics, these ‘literary futurologists’ spent more time and resources than anyone else 
imagining Russia’s geopolitical future, relying on one of contemporary Russia’s most 
robust and long-standing myths. Indeed, the hyperrealism that marks much of Russian 
contemporary political life, with its virtual presidents and dissidents, together with the 
potential of discourse to transform latent identifications into those that insist on avowal, 
is present in both chapters making up the second part of the thesis’ empirical element.  
 
Pussy Riot as a symptom of Putinism  
Judith Butler’s idea of taking injury on behalf of another as a possible indicator of 
identification was addressed in chapters II and V (Butler, 1990). It posits that in the case 
of ‘injurious identification’, one is only able to leap to the object’s defense when it is 
openly mocked or insulted by others, even when previously not having been aware of 
this ‘vulnerable place’ in oneself. Those actively supporting the verdict or other forms of 
punishment against Pussy Riot similarly felt that the precious pillars of propriety holding 
the nation in place were endangered.  On the other hand, those defending the women in 
the name of political and artistic freedom saw in them an alternative vision of Russia, so 
far existing mainly as a possibility when not enacted in such performances.   
         
When first writing about Pussy Riot in 2012 and 2013, I therefore considered the 
treatment and reception of the group as a symptom or indication of the desire to ‘enjoy 
the nation’. In participating in the debate, Russians sought to achieve this enjoyment in 
two wholly disparate ways: either in rejection of all that the group is seen to represent, or 
in a celebration and elevation of the women and their work. Liudmila Borusyak (2012) 
seemed justified in saying that a more stable society would have been able to tolerate the 
potential ‘danger’ that Pussy Riot represents, but in these volatile times, it was relatively 
easy to present one of the many acts of protest as a threat to the very foundations of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/64337.html 	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nation. However, this is not to say that Pussy Riot was selected as an arbitrary target for 
attention and punishment. The disconcerting nature of their particular configuration of 
femininity, together with their brazen criticism of the country’s two major authorities, 
provided a perfect target. For the group’s opponents, their public displays of protest 
represent a form of ‘stolen enjoyment’, from which they themselves were barred and to 
which the only reaction possible was therefore one of a rejection that demands 
punishment.  Opponents and supporters of Pussy Riot encountered a form of temporary 
unity in these wounded attachments, fostered by a solidarity of jouissance. This also 
provided further evidence for the paradoxical nature of enjoyment, whereby the double 
meaning of passionate attachments can imply both a collective celebration of positive 
affect, as well as a modality of collective complaint and outrage. Russian reactions to 
Pussy Riot therefore revealed not only the tensions and antagonisms in Russian society 
generally – they also pointed to a split at the heart of the intelligentsia, whereby some 
find enjoyment in the new type of jouissance the women represent, while others celebrate 
their outrage at the group’s contempt for traditional values. 
  
Temporality 
In contrast to Western commentators, a number of Russian scholars insisted that 
Vladimir Putin’s popularity is not deeply connected to his persona, instead merely 
representing economic stability and a decisive turn away from the difficult 1990s. His 
persona’s indeterminacy was presented either as responsible for the system of Putinism’s 
inability to truly govern subjects in a Foucaultian sense (Prozorov, 2005, 2009) or as 
productively open-ended and thus able to contain a multitude of investments154.  In other 
words: the absence of a more ideological and less personified point de capiton meant that 
the Putin regime was inherently reliant on processes of identification in order to secure 
its place in the national body. Positioning Putin as such a master signifier to tie together 
the free-floating meanings and symbols of post-1990s Russia was presented as an 
inherently unstable project, as what may have seemed impressive at one time could seem 
worthy of ridicule in another, at that point only serving to further alienate the President 
from the populace.  
                
The non-ideological, personalised edifice of Putinism was therefore seen to contain the 
seeds of its own failure. Putin’s leadership style was treated as an appeal to the nation, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/elections2000/e0317_1.stm	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as its personification. Despite or because of the regime’s authoritarian nature – which in 
part was able to rely on the all-pervasive cynicism towards political figures - Putin’s 
leadership needed to be supplemented with personal charisma. With the effect of the 
famous age of stability of early Putinism wearing off, and the global financial crisis’ 
increasing impact on citizens’ lives, the chapter noted attempts to become more loveable. 
The President’s more recent show of emotions, whether authentic or not, was read as a 
clear attempt to humanise him, simultaneously and inadvertently making him more 
vulnerable to more personalised speculation and attacks by the press.  
                
Revisiting these observations from the temporal location of 2014, with Putin’s approval 
ratings at an all-time high of 83%155, it now appears that a more effective way of suturing 
the split in Russian society has since been found. To achieve this, the government relies 
less on the President as the sole master signifier, and more on ways of turning these 
inherent tensions outward. Indeed, the surge of patriotism that followed the annexation 
of Crimea and subsequent armed conflict in Ukraine may have secured Putin’s reign for 
another term.  The newly drafted social contract no longer merely agrees to provide 
relative economic stability to enable consumption for obedient, apolitical subjects. 
Rather, it gratifies the longing for moments of national greatness and unity by literalising 
the notion of a “theft of enjoyment”: the beautiful peninsula with its resorts and 
Mediterranean climate had been ‘cruelly’ given away by Khrushchev in 1954, only to be 
returned to its rightful owners – the Russian people – by Putin’s government in 2014.  
Lev Gudkov, together with colleagues from Levada-Center, illustrates how the 
antagonisms of Russian society have been effectively channelled in a process of ‘negative 
mobilization’156, whose targets are in turn influenced by the existence of anti-Western 
myths: 
 
In the Spring of this year, the negative mobilization of Russian society ensured 
that social tensions were [safely] channelled, and re-established the legitimacy 
of the Putin regime by transforming discontent with his leadership into 
hostility towards the West (and Ukraine). Soviet myths about the essential 
difference between "the West" and Russia", and the inevitability of 
confrontation between the two cultures, have been revived along with a sense 
of the impossibility not only of convergence, but of "modernization" in line 
with western models of development. The West appears, just as it did 40 years 
ago, in the form of a symbolic opponent, an "enemy" posing a threat to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  According to a poll conducted by Levada-Center: http://www.levada.ru/eng/ 
156 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-10-01-gudkov-en.html 
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very existence of Russia and to Russian values, traditions and "national 
interests" (all of which conceals the anxiety of a despotic and corrupt 
leadership about maintaining power). 
 
It is important to remember here that the antagonisms and tensions of Russian society 
have not been resolved. They have merely been given new targets in the service of 
nationalistic sentiment, which requires the spectre of ever-new enemies. The 
intelligentsia, too, has once more found itself in a marginalised position it had not 
occupied since the 1980s, with the group now frequently referred to as traitors or as 
members of the ‘5th column’157, a term itself dating back to the Spanish Civil War.  It 
appears as if the necessary appearance of stability can only be retained “by blaming 
someone else, even a previously friendly out-group” (Stavrakakis, 2008: 195), the former 
‘brother-nation’ of Ukraine as one case in point. The reaction to Pussy Riot should here 
be interpreted as a moment when these tensions erupted, and as a symptom of their 
prior repression.  As a matter of fact, the presence and role of certain myths 
encapsulating conflict capture the sense of an ‘eternal return’ of violence already referred 
to in the chapter I.  It is now making a transfer from language to deed, as if in illustration 
of the powers of discourse:  
 
This resolution of the traumas of Russian collective consciousness […] has 
led not to a "healing" of [Russian] society but to a surge of relief following 
the break with Europe, a sense of liberation from repressive demands to be 
moral, to follow legal norms, to "behave" in a "civilized society" (Gudkov, 
ibid.). 
 
Commentators have been keen to read the Russian present in terms of a return to 
previous models and temporalities, be it at times rather starkly as an attempt to “return 
Russia to the Middle Ages”158. Analyses of contemporary ‘transitional’ or ‘post-
transitional’ societies frequently operate in the register of temporality – indeed, their very 
denomination suggests the lens through which one is encouraged to view them. 
However, not only does it make for a limited perspective, in some occasions it also offers 
the temptation to harvest current events for their potential to engage in historical 
parallels. With this in mind, Gleb Napreenko insists that the recent past does not 
represent a simple ‘return to the USSR’: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 http://slon.ru/insights/1190639/ 
158 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2021499 
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[…] to uncritically repeat the myths of Russian totalitarianism’s eternal 
return does nothing but distort the situation, blocking all ways out of our 
common predicament.159 
 
In fact, the nature of periods of latency (Gumbrecht, 2012) as the current one is that they 
may come to rather unexpected ends. In the very case of the Soviet Union, it has been 
observed that its collapse came as a surprise to almost everyone. The state edifice had 
become so ossified that even those working hardest to erode it from within – the 
dissidents – were surprised by its seemingly sudden demise, as were international scholars 
(e.g. Cox, 2009). In the words of Alexey Yurchak, it appeared that “everything was 
forever until it was no more” (Yurchak, 2005). The experience of the ‘sudden’ collapse of 
the Soviet Union may thus be illustrative of how one’s gaze is necessarily reliant on 
surface phenomena, while subterranean forces continue their work, that is “the 
underground disintegration of the spiritual substance of a community which precedes and 
prepares the way for its spectacular public collapse” (Žižek, 1993: 285). In a separate 
publication, Gudkov, too, insists that this artificially created sense of collectivity cannot 
last forever160.   
Reflections on research design 
Two factors facilitated a sense of being embedded in the life world (Lebenswelt) of the 
participants and discourses which formed the subject of the thesis, without being 
embedded (at the time of research) in their life conditions (Lebenslage). The first is the 
historically transnational consciousness of the Russian intelligentsia, which meant that 
even though the interview portion of the study took place in London, this is in no way at 
odds with the life trajectories of this group in Russia. In fact, the geographical distance 
may have been enabling of a novel kind of engagement with Russianness. The second 
factor is the increasing possibility of conducting research online (Chapter V), as well as 
the possibility of studying reactions to events through online discussions and forums, 
such as in the case of Pussy Riot’s performance and subsequent arrest. However, along 
with providing new types of material to investigate, the Internet as a medium also creates 
or enables certain types of reaction – the notorious degree of vitriol imbuing frequently 
anonymous online discussions is just one such example. It is yet to be determined how 
this specific, and relatively new medium affects users, in terms of the forms of 
expression which it allows, but also the affective registers it may tap into, or even create. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 http://www.e-flux.com/journal/back-in-the-ussr/ 160	  http://www.snob.ru/profile/10069/blog/79594 
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These medium-specific effects have therefore been disregarded for the most part, 
although they are alluded to in Chapters III and V. Furthermore, while keeping to few 
questions, the survey component (see appendix F) did not always produce the kind of 
narratives it sought to elicit. I had previously conducted an open-ended survey as part of 
a research project on memory practises in the former German Democratic Republic, and, 
while it yielded many interesting responses, these too, varied greatly in length. However, 
the advantage of interviews in giving the interviewer the chance to delve deeper or ask 
for clarification, was seen not to outweigh the survey’s ability to function as a kind of 
projection screen for these ‘discourse rich’ respondents (Halliday, 2004).  
 
Further directions for research 
Masculinity and femininity 
Being concerned with moments in which identification with the nation becomes 
observable in discourse, questions that centre on ideas of masculinity and femininity have 
only been alluded to at their most salient, specifically in chapters VI and VII. However, 
this is not to ignore the fact that images of the nation are always gendered (Mosse, 1985), 
as manifest in the different connotations or ‘fatherland’ and ‘ motherland’- отечество 
and родина in the case of Russia. Different configurations of masculine and feminine 
ideals appear in instantiations of the leader as personified by Vladimir Putin, and in the 
punk femininity of members of Pussy Riot.  
 
Future research more explicitly focused on these aspects could investigate how Putin’s 
hypermasculinity has historic roots in Russian discourses of the nation. More 
psychoanalytically focused work could also shed light on his embodiment as the nation’s 
'father' who roots subjects in the sociopolitical, that is, symbolic order through processes 
of identification (Radstone, 2007; Treacher, 2013). As a leader he embodies both paternal 
and maternal characteristics, that is, his 'pure masculinity' is tempered by moments of 
tenderness towards animals and children. Indeed, the paternal aspect of his leadership is 
given additional poignancy by the fact that this youngest generation of voters in Russia is 
barely able to recall and hence imagine a political horizon that did not feature Putin at its 
zenith. It has even been referred to as ‘Generation P’161. Potentially, such research could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexandr-litoy/for-generation-p-putin-is-russia-cult-of-
personality-youth-russia  
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highlight not only the performative dimension of leadership, but also that, even if gender 
binaries have hardly been transcended, Putin as a leader needs to mediate between them 
so as to extend his appeal as widely as possible. Some of the representational 
mechanisms recruited to do so have been analysed in chapter VII, albeit with a 
somewhat different focal point.  
 
Chapter VI indicated the link between the outrage following the performance and arrest 
of Pussy Riot, and a desire to police both their femininity and sexuality.  While the 
degree to which they are representative of the Russian feminist movement is disputed, 
further analysis could place the group in the context of the feminist movement in the 
post-soviet world162. One obvious point of comparison hereby is Ukraine-based 
FEMEN, a group of feminist activists whose tactics – usually involving the display of 
naked bodies – and politics have attracted a fair degree of criticism over the years163. 
Another worthwhile line of discourse analysis is the ways in which Pussy Riot’s political 
project is being diminished through strategies of personalisation. This applies to both 
supporters and opponents, in that one side insists on connecting their achievements to 
their physical appearance (e.g. Der Spiegel, 33/2012, cited in chapter VI), while the other 
speculates whether it was 'broken hearts' or even ‘mental deficiency’ that turned them 
into feminists164.  
 
One existing body of work which engages directly with Pussy Riot in terms of their 
femininity is a public discussion by Irina Sandomirskaja and colleagues on the treatment 
the case has had in Russia, which locates the group’s performance and reception within 
the history of the Russian and Soviet feminist movement 165. Unlike my own analysis in 
chapter VI, their debate places greater emphasis on the women’s feminist agenda and 
how “the deepest collective anxiety that surfaced in the discussion, was the fear of the 
active and politically conscious woman, a woman who does not hesitate to use violence 
in claiming her subjectivity from the authority of the church, the family, the 
establishment, or the state” (Gradskaya et al, ibid.). Their analysis, despite its different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The ‘P’ here clearly stands for Putin, though it is also meant to evoke Victor Pelevin’s eponymous novel 
published in 1999. 162	  For example in ways similar to Lynne Segal’s recent overview of feminist critiques of the state in 
relation to citizenship (Segal, 2012).  
163 http://www.newstatesman.com/bim-adewunmi/2013/04/inconsistency-femens-imperialist-one-size-
fits-all-attitude 
164 http://sobesednik.ru/incident/20120831-tainy-biografii-uchastnits-pussy-riot	  
165 http://balticworlds.com/reflections-on-receptions/ 
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focal point, comes to similar conclusions about the societal tensions the case revealed:  
 
In Pussy Riot’s actions, the repressed social erupted like a volcano. It was a 
great shock for the enlightened public […] to hear their own program 
screamed out — in shrill voices, in a “holy place”, accompanied by bad 
guitar playing and indecent gestures and formulated in a cascade of deeply 
abusing profane language – by higher-educated “girls” (devushki), defying 
their origin in “good families” and the assumptions concerning the propriety 
of a woman’s artistic inclinations. This breach of the “clean” public’s 
expectations became a veritable class-and-gender trouble for the 
progressives.  
 
 
Indeed, in further agreement with the conclusions of chapter VI, the split they 
refer to is diagnosed as going through the very heart of the Russian liberal, 
educated elite, in that some felt unable to partake in the transgressive type of 
enjoyment offered in the women’s performance.  
Cinematic imagination and fantasy 
Earlier in this chapter, the prevalence and significance of image-rich signifiers was 
described and explained in detail. While interviews and surveys featured a general 
tendency to mythologise certain aspects of Russian history, respondents used film scenes 
as a kind of imaginary supplement to an otherwise fractured representation of the past, 
both as an illustration of what the past ‘felt like’, or as a narrative device that ‘explained’ 
certain historical events or sequences166. Additional research could therefore investigate 
whether cinematic images help identify particularly modes of identification with the 
nation via fantasmatic processes.  
 
De Lauretis appears to have a similar question in mind when she states that “ today 
cinema’s unique effectivity in the production of a social imaginary (public fantasies) is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166Some interview excerpts that illustrate this argument:  
   Katia: […]actually, there were lots of..my present image of life in this, er, Soviet Union, was shaped by different films 
[…]… 
   * 
   Masha: Ah...suddenly there was this...i don't know...there was a lot of Mafia things, and I don't know, it just ticked in 
my      
   mind, a lot of these kinds of guys in leather jackets hanging around, a lot of these stupid films, like, really rubbish film     
   (interviewer laughs), horrible, horrible films.  
   * 
   Natasha (referencing the film Tsar): It explains Russian mentality nowadays. 
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understood to work through the fantasmatic production it elicits and shapes in individual 
spectators (private fantasies)” (Lauretis, 2008: 16). Her explanation is that: 
 
[…] one might say that fantasy is the psychic mechanism that governs the 
translation of social representations into subjectivity and self-
representation by a sort of adaptation or reworking of the social 
imaginary, or public fantasies, into individual, or private, fantasies. In turn, 
the latter may provide the imaginary scenarios by which events of the 
world are given dramatic or narrative coherence. (Lauretis, 2008: 17) 
 
Therefore the key to approaching an answer to the abovementioned question may lie in a 
re-evaluation of Freud’s writing on conscious fantasies (see Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973) 
together with later insights into both psychoanalytically inflected film theory (such as 
Metz’ Imaginary Signifier) and a Žižekian approach to fantasy and ideology (Žižek, 1997). 
As Judith Butler has demonstrated in The Force of Fantasy (2000), even pornographic 
imagery, which is seemingly straightforward in its constellation and available points of 
entry into the scene, in fact offers multiple axes of identification, creating another explicit 
link between image and fantasy: “Fantasy, however, is not the object of desire, but its 
setting. In fantasy, the subject does not pursue the object or its sign: he appears caught 
up in himself in the sequence of images.” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1968: 17). Further 
research into the fate of cinematic objects in the formation of subjectivity could also help 
clarify the distinction between identification and incorporation laid out in chapter II, 
whereby the former represents a “modification of the self-representation” (Sandler, 1989: 
11), while the latter leads to “the setting up of unconscious, internal "phantom" 
companions, felt to be a part of one's inner world, yet external to one's self-
representation” (ibid.). 
 
One attempt at explaining how myths as reflections of ideology make their way into 
subjects’ fantasies is offered by Bert Olivier (2000). He relates the impact and intensity of 
media images to accounts of the unconscious primary process as described by Freud, 
which “discourages individuals from engaging in the secondary process” (Olivier, 2000: 
170), that is, from making the move from thing- to word-presentations. Olivier locates 
the impact cinematic images have on the viewer in the context of postmodernity, which 
is characterised by a flood of images so all-encompassing that Baudrillard has argued that 
the social universe has been eroded and replaced by ‘hyperreality’, which ‘encourages 
social actors to make no fundamental distinction between ‘concrete’ reality and the 
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‘hyperreality’ of images, a mode of gratification termed ’hallucinatory’ by Freud” (Olivier, 
2000: 167).  
 
Lauren Berlant argues that the social researcher can even turn to cinematic images to 
capture the attrition of certain forms of social fantasy, as “cinema and other forms not 
only archive what is being lost but track what happens in the time that we inhabit before 
this is necessarily reflected in the 'sovereign fantasies' that govern life” (Berlant, 2011:7). 
By insisting that “certain times produce specific genres and tropes” (Berlant, ibid.) and 
thereby stressing the primacy of form over content, the question becomes not what is 
being conveyed in terms of story, but how particular genre tropes come to represent or 
anticipate changes to ‘sovereign fantasies’ that structure subjects’ reality.  
 
Indeed, as will have become apparent from this final section, the fundamental aspects 
outlined for the study of the incorporation of cinematic imagery are also those that 
featured prominently in this thesis, as it tracked the patterns and prevalent formations of 
Russian subjectivities and identifications across several instantiations of discourse. In the 
discursive conditions of an absence of new symbolic forms, coupled with the power of 
certain archaic signifiers to draw individuals back into the past, some of these myths were 
allowed to proliferate. This situation was in turn exploited by the government. A further 
direction for future research could therefore apply one of this thesis’ distinctive 
contributions highlighting the role of myths and images as vehicles of national fantasy to 
a psychosocial study of their interaction with hyperrealism, which marks much of 
contemporary life, leading to a blurring of boundaries between the factual and the 
fictional.  
 
The bleeding of one realm into another has reached a kind of apogee in contemporary 
Russia, whose government “does not appeal to any of the dimensions of truth, neither its 
universality nor its subjective intimacy. Instead, it operates in the horizonless register of 
illusions“ (Napreenko, 2014). However, rather than a complete absence of symbolic 
functions unable to provide the post-Soviet subjects with identificatory positions, as was 
claimed in some of the literature, this thesis has found that such a lack of subjective 
formations is always relative rather than absolute. It is filled by the diverse modes of 
identification and disidentification detailed in this study. They allow a movement in and 
out of belonging, whether through upholding an imagined and imaginary past as idyll, 
	   207	  
through finding temporary solidarity in suffering as in the case of Pussy Riot, or in 
moments of collective euphoria in mass events. Indeed, Vladimir Putin relies on an 
unstable amalgam of these symbols and instances to build his persona, which is 
supplemented with violence when this fails to elicit the desired effect. As this thesis 
demonstrated, when so much of the symbolic realm of contemporary Russia is given 
over to either a recycling and celebration of the past, or a mourning of the losses 
associated with its passing, attachments to Russianness will invariably be characterised by 
ambiguity and tension.  
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Appendix	  A	  	  
Email	  forwarded	  to	  University	  of	  London	  departments	  in	  November	  2010	  	  
	  
Subject:	  PhD	  research	  (looking	  for	  Russians	  as	  interview	  participants)	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
Dear	  MSc	  and	  MPhil/PhD	  students,	  
	  
My	  name	  is	  Maria	  Brock,	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  at	  the	  Institute	  of	  Social	  
Psychology	  at	  the	  LSE,	  and	  I	  am	  currently	  conducting	  research	  on	  
national	  identity	  and	  views	  on	  the	  political	  landscape	  in	  Russia.	  It	  
would	  help	  me	  greatly	  if	  for	  this	  purpose	  I	  could	  speak	  to	  Russians	  
studying	  here	  in	  London.	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  meet	  up	  for	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  
interviews	  lasting	  around	  20-­‐30	  mins.	  Tea	  or	  coffee	  is	  on	  me!	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  Russian	  yourself,	  or	  know	  of	  anyone	  you	  could	  forward	  this	  
to,	  I	  would	  be	  very	  grateful.	  
	  
Any	  questions,	  just	  ask.	  
	  
Looking	  forward	  to	  hearing	  from	  you,	  
	  
Maria	  
m.brock@lse.ac.uk	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Appendix	  B	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Loose topic guide interviews: 
	  
• How	  would	  you	  describe	  to	  someone	  who's	  never	  been	  to	  Russia,	  what	  it's	  
like	  to	  live	  in	  it?	  
• How	  would	  you	  compare	  the	  UK	  and	  Russia?	  Main	  differences?	  
• If	  I	  asked	  you	  to	  describe	  the	  state	  of	  Russia/its	  political	  landscape	  in	  2010,	  
what	  would	  you	  say?	  
• What	  is	  the	  desirable	  state	  for	  a	  society?	  Does	  it	  correspond	  to	  Russia?	  	  
• What	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  it	  not	  corresponding?	  
• What	  would	  need	  to	  change	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  correspond?	  
• Would	  your	  parents	  agree?	  Or	  what	  would	  they	  change?	  
• Where/how	  do	  you	  see	  Russia	  in	  25	  years'	  time	  (another	  generation)?	  
	  
• How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  living	  in	  it?	  
• What	  were	  your	  dreams	  or	  ambitions	  when	  you	  finished	  school?	  
• What	  about	  your	  parents?	  
• What	  is	  different	  between	  now	  and	  the	  time	  before	  1992?	  What	  has	  
actually	  changed?	  
• Do	  you	  think	  that	  there	  is	  some	  nostalgia	  associated	  with	  the	  SU?	  
Why/not?	  
	  
• What	  does	  being	  Russian	  mean	  for	  you?	  Does	  it	  have	  a	  meaning?	  
• Any	  specific	  thoughts	  or	  feelings	  associated	  with	  the	  notion,	  say	  when	  you	  
introduce	  yourself	  as	  Russian?	  
• Are	  these	  things	  you	  find	  yourself	  thinking	  about	  or	  discussing	  with	  others?	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Appendix	  C	  	  
	  
TRANSCRIPT	  OF	  INTERVIEW	  5	  	  –	  	  MASHA	  E.	  
	  
	  
Maria:	  Ok,	  and	  my	  first	  question	  is...actually	  quite	  simple,	  hopefully.	  Imagine	  you	  
meet	  someone	  who's	  never	  been	  to	  Russia,	  and	  doesn't	  know	  much	  about	  Russia...	  
	  
Masha:	  Uh-­‐huh.	  
	  
Maria:..	  and	  they	  just	  ask	  you:	  'Well,	  Masha,	  tell	  me,	  what	  is	  it	  like	  to	  live	  in	  Russia?'	  
	  
Masha:	  Er....I'll	  probably	  say	  it's	  quite	  tough.	  Em....but	  it's	  fun	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  And	  I	  
think	  I	  struggle	  with	  finding	  life	  abroad	  quite	  boring	  in	  comparison	  to	  Russia.	  
Er...(long	  pause)	  I	  think	  it's	  hard	  to	  really	  understand	  this	  country	  without	  living	  
there	  for	  a	  while.	  I	  know	  many	  people	  who	  had	  a	  very	  romantic	  idea	  of	  it	  and	  got	  
disillusioned	  very	  quickly.	  Er....it's	  a	  very	  big	  country,	  so	  you	  know,	  when	  you	  ask	  me	  
about	  Russia,	  it's	  going	  to	  be	  very	  limited,	  because	  I	  know	  only	  St	  Petersburg,	  and	  a	  
bit	  of	  the	  South	  of	  Russia,	  part,	  but	  there	  is	  so	  much	  more	  to	  it,	  and	  I	  myself	  didn't	  
travel	  nearly	  enough	  to	  actually	  say,	  because	  Moscow	  is	  just...Often,	  what	  you	  read	  
or	  learn	  about	  Russia	  is	  from	  a	  	  kind	  of	  Moscow	  perspective,	  and	  that	  is	  such	  a	  small	  
part	  of	  Russia,	  even	  though	  probably	  the	  most	  important	  one.	  But,	  er,	  yeah,	  so	  
Russia	  is	  really	  kind	  of....it's	  not	  very	  homogenous,	  it's	  very,	  very	  kind	  of	  different.	  If	  
you	  go	  outside	  the	  big	  city,	  life	  there	  is	  going	  to	  be	  completely	  different.	  (Long	  
Pause)	  Yeah,	  there	  are	  many	  contrasts	  in	  the	  country	  as	  well,	  so	  it's	  quite	  confusing	  
as	  well	  for	  people	  who	  come	  there.	  Sometimes	  it's	  really	  often	  just	  to	  see	  one	  side,	  
just	  to	  see	  the	  very	  rich,	  kind	  of	  nouveau	  riche-­‐kind	  of	  behaviour	  of	  people.	  Or	  to	  
see,	  just	  very	  poor,	  kind	  of	  grumpy,	  moods.	  But	  there	  is	  always	  a	  middle,	  
which....you	  know,	  not	  often	  people	  see.	  So	  yeah,	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  contrasts,	  a	  lot	  of	  
extremes	  as	  well.	  But	  it's	  very	  different	  from,	  very	  different	  from	  the	  West,	  Europe,	  
it's	  very	  different	  from	  America.	  And	  when	  I	  travel,	  it's	  very	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  compare	  
it	  with	  anywhere.	  But	  I	  find	  that	  maybe	  Italians,	  or	  Italians'	  kind	  of	  style	  of	  life,	  way	  
of	  life,	  the	  most	  maybe	  similar.	  I	  personally	  find	  it	  very	  easy	  to	  get	  on	  with	  Italians,	  
because	  maybe	  they	  are	  more	  open,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Russians	  are,	  which	  is	  quite	  
strange,	  but	  that's	  how	  it	  works.	  And	  in	  general,	  maybe	  South	  of	  Europe,	  is	  a	  bit	  
maybe	  more	  similar.	  
	  
Maria:	  And	  why	  do	  you	  think	  that	  is?	  
	  
Masha:	  Em...I	  don't	  know	  why	  it	  happened	  historically,	  but,	  em,	  (long	  pause)	  I	  don't	  
know,	  I	  just	  think,	  it'S	  just	  pure	  coincidence,	  that	  some	  of	  the	  features	  of	  their	  
culture	  kind	  of	  correspond	  to	  ours,	  such	  as...I	  don't	  know...recklessness,	  behaviour,	  
or,	  bad	  control	  of	  the...uncontrolled	  kind	  of	  speech,	  and	  em,	  don't	  know,	  abundance	  
in	  everything,	  extremes,	  and,	  ups	  and	  downs,	  constant	  ups	  and	  downs.	  Yeah.	  It	  
might	  be	  just	  a	  coincidence,	  but	  I	  am	  sure	  there	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  theory	  about	  that.	  
(both	  laugh).	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Maria:	  You	  were	  saying	  that,	  in	  the	  beginning,	  that	  life	  in	  Russia	  is	  tough	  yet	  more	  
interesting.	  Can	  you	  expand	  on	  that	  a	  little	  bit?	  
	  
Masha:	  Yeah,	  I	  just	  think	  it's	  again,	  it's,	  it's	  because	  of	  these	  ups	  and	  downs.	  
It's....unless,	  like,	  em...you	  know,	  like,	  families,	  that	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  problems	  inside	  
them,	  like,	  external	  problems,	  they	  are	  often	  very	  close	  to	  each	  other	  And	  I	  think	  
Russia	  is	  very	  similar	  in	  this	  way.	  You	  can	  see	  how	  all	  this	  kind	  of	  stuff,	  like,	  financial	  
kind	  of	  problems	  made	  the	  country	  kind	  of,	  make	  people	  very	  close	  to	  each	  other.	  
Like,	  very	  painfully	  close,	  sometimes.	  And	  I	  don't	  know,	  it	  makes	  it	  kiNd	  of	  more	  
interesting	  to	  live.	  People	  don't	  just	  kind	  of	  keep	  polite	  face,	  but	  really	  say	  what	  they	  
think.	  And	  sometimes	  it	  can	  be	  like,	  really	  painful,	  really	  hurtful,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  I	  don't	  know,	  it	  feels	  a	  bit	  more	  fun,	  you	  know,	  when	  people	  really	  say	  what	  
they	  think	  about	  you,	  and	  about	  life,	  and	  about	  politics,	  and	  about	  religion,	  and	  
about	  everything.	  Em....so	  yeah,	  I	  guess	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  kind	  of,	  much	  
more	  open.	  And	  they	  kind	  of	  behave	  the	  way	  they	  feel	  right	  now,	  at	  the	  moment.	  
	  
Maria:	  So	  kind	  of	  spontaneous....	  
	  
Masha:	  Yeah,	  yeah.	  There	  is	  really,	  really	  bad	  self-­‐control.	  Living	  abroad	  made	  me	  
realise	  how	  badly	  they	  control	  themselves,	  and	  it	  takes	  me....of	  course,	  personal	  
qualities	  play	  a	  part	  in	  that,	  but	  	  yeah,	  I	  am	  really	  amazed	  how	  badly	  people	  in	  Russia	  
can	  control	  themselves.	  Em....em...so	  yeah,	  there	  is	  this	  part	  of,	  kind	  of,	  people	  just	  
being	  more	  open,	  and,	  obviously,	  people's	  vices	  are	  more	  open,	  which	  is	  very	  fun	  to	  
watch	  sometimes.	  Em...but	  people's...at	  the	  same	  time,	  people's	  virtues	  are	  more	  
open	  as	  well,	  somehow.	  People	  are	  very	  generous,	  and	  do	  it	  very	  openly,	  and	  give	  
you	  hugs	  and	  kisses,	  and	  they	  say,	  you	  know,	  they	  say	  what	  you	  feel	  to	  you	  right	  
now,	  at	  this	  moment.	  Even	  though	  you	  know	  it's	  something	  very	  momentary,	  but	  
Russians	  like	  making	  these	  big	  speeches.	  Like	  really	  tell	  you	  you	  are	  their	  best	  friend	  
right	  now.	  And	  everyone	  knows	  its	  not	  going	  to	  last,	  it's	  just	  the	  moment	  and	  
everything,	  but	  it's,	  yeah,	  it's	  kind	  of	  fun.	  
	  
Maria:	  So	  do	  you	  think	  your	  view,	  or,	  you	  kind	  of	  indicated	  your	  view	  of	  Russians	  and	  
Russia	  changed,	  having	  lived	  abroad...does	  it	  give	  you	  a	  different	  perspective?	  
	  
Masha:	  Oh,	  definitely.	  I	  think	  when	  I	  lived	  in	  Russia	  I	  had	  this	  kind	  of	  ,	  I	  don't	  know,	  
illusion	  of	  ...On	  the	  one	  hand,	  I	  thought	  that,	  I	  had	  this	  kind	  of	  imperialistic	  sort	  of	  ,	  	  
kind	  of	  illusions.	  I	  don't	  know,	  it's	  amazing,	  you	  just	  are	  born	  with	  it,	  or	  whatever.	  
And,	  em,	  I	  really	  felt	  that	  in	  certain	  ways	  we	  are	  superior.	  I	  don't	  know,	  you	  just	  grow	  
up	  learning	  that	  the	  education	  is	  better	  in	  Russia,	  and	  er,	  	  the	  girls	  are	  prettier,	  and	  
all	  this	  sort	  of	  stuff,	  you	  know.	  And	  then	  you	  go	  abroad	  and	  you	  think	  'um,	  yeah,	  it's	  
not	  like	  that	  at	  all'.	  And	  when	  I	  did	  my	  Master's	  in	  Belgium	  I	  realised	  what	  was	  the	  
real	  kind	  of	  studying	  hard,	  what	  it	  is.	  That	  was	  for	  me	  a	  big	  shock.	  And,	  em,	  but	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  I	  also	  thought	  that	  life	  in	  the	  West,	  obviously,	  you	  know,	  it	  was	  very	  
appealing,	  and	  you	  know,	  the	  grass	  is	  always	  greener	  and	  things,	  so	  I	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  
disappointments,	  as	  well,	  living	  in	  the	  West,	  and	  er....(long	  pause).	  Yeah,	  so	  it's	  kind	  
of	  worked	  both	  ways.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  I	  don't	  think	  anymore	  that	  Russians	  are	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more	  superior.	  I	  actually	  think	  that	  they	  lack	  a	  lot	  of	  qualities	  to	  become	  successful,	  
and	  to	  get	  out	  of	  this,	  economical	  pitfall	  they	  are	  in	  now.	  I	  think	  they	  have	  a	  lot,	  a	  lot	  
to	  learn,	  it's	  a	  long	  way	  out	  of	  there.	  And,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  though	  I	  sort	  of	  learned	  
that,	  I	  learned	  that	  there	  are	  qualities	  that	  the	  West	  maybe	  doesn't	  quite	  have,	  
qualities	  that	  I	  really	  miss,	  and	  yeah,	  sort	  of	  things.	  
	  
Maria:	  You	  say	  Russians	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  learn..	  
	  
Masha:	  Yeah.	  
	  
Maria:	  What	  do	  you	  mean	  by	  that?	  
	  
Masha:	  Learn	  to	  work	  hard.	  Somehow	  Russians,	  kind	  of,	  considered	  to	  be	  hard-­‐
working,	  but	  I	  wouldn't	  say	  so,	  to	  be	  honest.	  I	  realise	  that	  working	  hard	  and	  studying	  
hard,	  that's	  not	  something	  that	  is	  that	  common	  in	  Russia.	  Particular,	  maybe,	  
particular	  kind	  of	  groups	  of	  population	  perhaps,	  but	  maybe	  for	  working-­‐class,	  sort	  of	  
groups,	  I	  don't	  think	  it's	  as	  kind	  of	  ,	  they	  know	  much	  about	  that.	  Yeah,	  things	  like,	  
professionalism,	  things	  like,	  	  er	  (long	  pause)....maybe,	  I'm	  not	  sure	  about	  the	  word,	  
but,	  sort	  of	  being...politeness	  and	  correctness,	  and	  er,	  respect	  to	  other	  people	  and	  
to	  other	  people's	  opinion.	  Like,	  when	  you	  listen	  to	  debates	  on	  the	  	  radio	  in	  Russia	  it's	  
just...its	  a	  nightmare,	  it	  	  makes	  me...	  I	  just	  can't	  believe	  it,	  it's	  ridiculous.	  I	  go	  to	  
Russia,	  and	  my	  mum,	  she	  normally	  listens	  to	  Ekho	  Moskvy,	  a	  supposedly,	  sort	  of	  
intellectual	  radio,	  but	  it's	  just	  ridiculous,	  they	  just	  shout	  and	  scream	  at	  each	  other,	  
and	  er...like	  mad.	  So	  people	  don't	  really	  listen	  to	  each	  other	  very	  much,	  and	  don's	  
respect	  each	  other	  very	  much.	  And	  unfortunately,	  they	  judge	  very	  much	  by	  how	  
much	  people	  earn,	  quite	  a	  bit.	  It's	  very	  materialistic.	  I	  hope	  that's	  something	  that	  is	  
just	  passing,	  you	  know,	  like	  in	  many	  developing	  countries	  I	  think	  they	  become	  very	  
materialistic.	  And	  this	  phase	  Russia	  is	  in	  very	  much.	  It's	  funny	  meeting	  my	  friends,	  for	  
example,	  em....and	  for	  me	  it's	  kind	  of,	  I	  can	  see	  how	  much	  they	  changed	  since,	  sort	  
of	  ,	  90s.	  They	  are	  very	  much	  concerned	  about	  buying	  a	  flat	  and	  buying...you	  know,	  
taking	  out	  loans,	  and	  cars,	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  	  Which	  people	  are	  here	  as	  well,	  but	  
the	  scale	  is	  just	  ,	  you	  know...People	  are	  so	  much	  more...that's	  all	  they	  talk	  pretty	  
much	  about.	  Em,	  yeah.	  I	  mean,	  I	  struggled	  with	  my	  own	  family,	  just	  to	  explain	  to	  
them,	  that,	  you	  know,	  money	  is	  not	  everything,	  and	  giving	  up	  my	  job	  was,	  like	  a	  big	  
decision,	  because	  I	  don't	  think	  they	  quite	  realised	  what	  it	  was	  all	  about.	  They	  think	  
that	  char...like,	  for	  example,	  doing	  some	  charity	  or	  not	  working	  is	  just,	  like,	  for	  fools,	  
or	  for	  people	  who	  have	  money	  already,	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  And	  that's	  like,	  a	  lot	  of	  
people	  in	  Russia	  think.	  Because	  I	  think	  I	  have	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  what	  working-­‐
class	  people	  in	  Russia	  think,	  because	  it's	  where	  my	  family	  are.	  Because	  I'm	  sure,	  I'm	  
only	  talking	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  kind	  of,	  limited	  circle	  of	  people.	  I'm	  sure	  there	  
are	  people	  who	  are	  very	  different.	  I	  do	  meet	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  who	  amaze	  me	  how	  
different	  they	  are.	  But	  they	  always	  have	  some	  kind	  of...I	  don't	  know.	  They	  either	  
study	  abroad,	  or,	  don't	  know,	  their	  parents	  are	  some	  kind	  of,	  I	  don't	  know,	  diplomat	  
or	  something.	  They	  would	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  little	  privilege	  that	  would	  make	  them	  
this	  one	  step	  more	  advanced	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  
potential.	  It's	  just...it's	  kind	  of	  a	  shame	  that	  at	  the	  moment	  it's	  all	  sort	  of	  focused	  on	  
money	  so	  much.	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Maria:	  You	  were	  saying	  earlier	  that	  maybe	  this	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  developing	  
world.	  So	  do	  you	  see	  Russia	  as	  a	  developing	  country?	  
	  
Masha:	  Definitely,	  yeah.	  Yeah.	  I	  mean,it's	  again,	  it's	  maybe	  not	  that	  straightforward,	  
as	  with	  some	  other	  countries,	  because	  in	  Russia	  there	  are	  so	  many	  kind	  of...On	  the	  
surface,	  you	  might	  see	  it's	  all	  very	  glossy,	  like	  Moscow,	  for	  example,	  but	  on	  the	  
whole	  it's	  definitely	  a	  developing	  country.	  I	  mean,	  that's	  what	  I'm	  sure....	  
	  
Maria:	  Er..I	  don't	  know	  how	  interes...well,	  I'm	  sure	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  politics	  in	  
Russia.	  If	  someone	  asked	  you	  to	  explain	  to	  them	  what	  the	  political	  landscape	  looks	  
like	  at	  the	  moment...could	  you...how	  you	  would	  describe	  it?	  
	  
Masha:	  Well,	  I	  would	  say	  that	  nominally	  Russia	  is	  a	  democracy	  and	  er...but,	  I	  would	  
also	  say	  that	  we	  used	  to	  be	  a	  communist	  country,	  and	  there	  is	  still	  a	  bit	  of	  that.	  
There	  is	  sort...the	  communist	  burden	  is	  always	  there,	  and	  it	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  effects	  on	  
how	  the	  country	  is	  being	  kind	  of	  managed.	  Firstly,	  because	  people,	  the	  nation,	  is	  very	  
much	  used	  to	  being	  told	  what	  to	  do.	  And	  they	  don't	  feel	  they	  are	  free	  to	  say.	  And	  
they	  are	  afraid,	  they	  are	  very	  much	  afraid	  to	  protest,	  and	  to	  kind	  of	  stand	  for	  their	  
rights.	  Em...and	  I	  don't	  think	  they	  really	  appreciate	  democracy	  very	  much.	  And	  
understand	  what	  it's	  all	  about,	  and	  don't	  understand	  the	  long-­‐term	  benefits.	  They	  
are	  very	  short-­‐term	  focused.	  Em...which	  is	  probably	  the	  effect	  of,	  I	  don't	  know,	  
(muffled	  word).	  Yeah,	  but,	  so	  in	  Russia	  you	  probably	  won't	  be	  in	  prison	  for	  saying	  
what	  you	  think,	  but	  there	  are	  definitely	  a	  lot	  of	  limitations	  for	  people's	  ...on	  people's	  
lives	  and	  freedoms.	  Freedom	  of	  speech,	  I	  think,	  like	  media	  is	  very	  much	  governed,	  
kind	  of,	  controlled.	  There	  aren't	  many,	  I	  mean,	  I	  don't	  know,	  there	  aren't	  many	  free	  
sources	  of	  information.	  Novaya	  Gazeta	  and	  Ekho	  Moskvy	  ,	  but,	  I	  mean,	  that's	  
ridiculous	  for	  a	  country,	  such	  a	  big	  country.	  Yeah,	  again,	  I	  don't	  know	  how	  much	  
people	  care	  about	  that.	  Not	  at	  the	  moment,	  though.	  And	  people's	  passiveness,	  
political	  passiveness	  is	  completely	  being	  taken	  advantage	  of.	  	  
	  
Maria:	  Where	  do	  you	  think	  that	  comes	  from,	  that	  passivity?	  You	  said	  you	  take	  it	  back	  
to	  communism...	  
	  
Masha:	  Hmm.	  Yeah,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  it's	  because	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  communist	  past.	  But	  
on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  time	  of	  perestroika	  .	  The	  times	  of	  real	  hardships	  for	  people	  
and	  economical	  instability	  I	  think	  had	  a	  very	  bad	  effect.	  It's	  sort	  of	  a	  trauma	  in	  way.	  
People	  are	  so	  afraid	  to	  lose	  everything	  once	  again...and	  they	  are	  so	  appreciative	  I	  
think,	  like,	  you	  know,	  any	  poor	  person	  would	  be	  appreciative	  of	  a	  little	  something	  
someone	  gives	  him.	  Yeah,	  they	  just	  so	  kind	  of	  appreciate	  and	  cherish	  this	  little	  
economic	  stability	  that	  they've	  had	  for,	  I	  don't	  know,	  a	  few	  years	  now.	  And	  then	  
people	  do	  live	  better.	  I	  mean,	  I	  know	  what	  it's	  been	  in	  the	  90s,	  it	  was	  a	  real	  
nightmare.	  People	  don't	  struggle	  anymore,	  you	  know,	  anyone	  can	  buy	  food,	  as	  much	  
food	  as	  they	  want,	  and	  I	  think....it	  will	  probably	  take	  a	  while	  till	  people	  have	  enough	  
of	  this	  food,	  enjoy	  it	  and	  then	  sort	  of	  look	  around	  and	  say	  'right,	  so	  maybe	  now	  we	  
want	  to	  read	  true,	  you	  know,	  truth	  in	  the	  newspapers.'	  But	  it	  will	  take	  while,so...	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Maria:	  Do	  you	  think	  there	  is	  kind	  of	  a	  consensus	  in	  Russia,	  or	  do	  you	  see	  one	  from	  
abroad,	  about	  what	  people,	  what	  the	  society	  wants	  or	  needs	  right	  now?	  
	  
Masha:	  You	  mean	  the	  Russian	  society?	  
	  
Maria:	  Yeah.	  
	  
Masha:	  What	  people	  in	  the	  West	  think	  the	  Russian	  society	  needs?	  
	  
Maria:	  What	  you,	  looking	  at	  it	  from	  the	  West,	  or	  whenever	  you	  are	  in	  Russia,	  do	  you	  
feel	  that	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  common,	  commonality	  in	  what	  people	  want,	  what	  society	  
wants?	  
	  
Masha:	  Er,	  well,	  they	  definitely,	  they	  definitely	  want...(laughs)	  more	  money	  (both	  
laugh).	  	  I	  think	  people	  just	  want	  stability	  and	  financial	  stability.	  They	  need	  to	  regain	  
kind	  of	  trust	  that	  things	  are	  not	  gonna	  change	  overnight.	  Yeah....so	  maybe	  once	  they	  
have	  their	  kind	  of	  economical,	  don't	  know	  (long	  pause)...success,	  and	  things	  like	  
that,	  maybe	  after	  a	  while,	  if	  it's	  not	  too	  late,	  they	  can,	  sort	  of,	  	  be	  developed	  and	  
think	  about	  what	  they	  want	  in	  terms	  of	  government	  and	  politics,	  and	  who	  they	  want	  
to	  kind	  of	  be	  in	  charge,	  and	  er...	  
	  
Maria:	  You	  said:	  'If	  it's	  not	  too	  late'?	  
	  
Masha:	  Well,	  I	  just	  think	  the	  country	  is	  becoming	  terribly	  corrupt,	  and	  I	  am	  just	  not	  
sure	  how	  long	  it	  can	  last	  and	  what's	  going	  to	  take	  the	  country	  to..Yeah,	  I	  don't	  know	  
what's	  going	  to	  be	  in	  10	  years,	  if	  it's	  going	  to	  go	  on	  like	  that,	  if	  there	  won't	  be	  a	  new	  
generation	  of	  people	  in	  power...decent	  people,	  who	  don't	  take	  bribes	  and,	  er,	  who	  
actually	  believe	  what	  they	  say.	  I	  mean,	  I	  know	  it's	  the	  case	  for	  many,	  many	  countries,	  
but	  the	  scale	  of	  it	  in	  Russia	  is	  just	  ridiculous.	  
	  
Maria:	  Ok,	  you	  said...I	  am	  just	  going	  to	  take	  you	  by	  your	  word,	  you	  said	  you	  don't	  
know	  what	  it's	  going	  to	  be	  like	  in	  10	  years...	  
	  
Masha:	  Hmm.	  
	  
Maria:	  ...but	  let	  us	  speculate:	  what	  do	  you	  think	  will	  happen,	  what	  will	  the	  country	  
be	  like	  in	  another	  generation's	  time,	  so	  25,	  30	  years?	  What's	  your,	  kind	  of	  gut	  
feeling?	  
	  
Masha:	  I	  don't	  know,	  it's	  really	  hard	  to	  say.	  Em,	  I	  mean,	  seeing	  from	  what	  young,	  
what	  kind	  of	  young	  people,	  the	  politics...I	  wouldn't	  be	  very	  optimistic.	  
	  
Maria:	  Ok....	  
	  
Masha:	  I	  think	  they	  will	  follow	  very	  much	  the	  way	  of	  their	  parents.	  Because	  there	  is	  a	  
lot	  of	  nepotism	  in	  Russia,	  so	  if	  there	  is	  not,	  like,	  a	  big	  kind	  of	  revolution,	  people	  don't	  
stand	  up,	  then	  probably	  the	  children	  of	  the	  people	  who	  are	  in	  power	  now,	  they	  will	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be	  in	  power	  in	  10	  years,	  10	  years	  later.	  It's	  very	  likely.	  And	  looking	  at	  them	  now,	  yes,	  
they	  are	  more	  educated	  than	  their	  parents,	  they	  went	  to,	  a	  lot	  of	  them	  went	  to	  
English	  universities	  and	  English	  schools,	  em,	  so	  probably	  it	  will	  be	  a	  bit	  better.	  But	  I	  
also	  know	  how	  well	  people	  can	  adapt	  what	  they've	  learned	  in	  England	  to	  their	  kind	  
of	  Russian...Russian	  customs.	  	  I	  don't	  think	  they	  will	  be	  brave	  enough	  to	  change	  
things	  very	  quickly.	  But	  hopefully,	  hopefully,	  if	  there	  will	  be	  enough	  educated,	  well-­‐
educated	  people	  in	  power,	  they	  will	  be	  more	  concerned	  about	  what	  the	  West	  thinks	  
about	  them.	  And	  they	  would	  like	  to	  be	  more	  like	  the	  West,	  and	  hopefully	  they	  will	  be	  
kind	  of	  constrained	  by	  the	  West	  more	  than	  the	  leaders	  today	  are.	  So,	  yeah,	  probably	  
that's	  more	  realistic.	  
	  
Maria:	  So	  you	  see	  the	  West	  as	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  Russia?	  
	  
Masha:	  I	  think	  so,	  yeah,	  definitely.	  I	  think	  the	  West's	  been	  a	  constraint,	  even	  during	  
Soviet,	  communist	  times.	  The	  only	  reasons	  why...I	  mean,	  I	  know	  that	  a	  lot	  of	  
atrocities	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  didn't	  happen,	  didn't	  take	  place	  only	  because	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  was	  so	  dependent	  on	  the	  West	  as	  its	  biggest	  buyer	  and	  er....yeah,	  and	  
there	  are	  many	  other	  incidences,	  even	  in	  Russia	  since.	  Yeah,	  I	  definitely	  think...I	  
mean,	  people	  say	  that	  America	  is	  a	  big	  policeman	  and	  etcetera,	  but	  I	  don't	  know.	  I	  
personally,	  especially	  when	  I	  lived	  in	  Russia,	  em,	  thought	  that	  it's	  nice	  to	  have	  like	  a	  
balance	  of	  power,	  someone	  to	  balance	  off	  Russia,	  and	  it's	  not	  China	  (laughs).	  I	  don't	  
know.	  I	  know,	  no	  one	  is	  perfect	  and	  I	  know	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  corruption	  in	  America	  as	  
well	  and	  in	  the	  West,	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  but,	  I	  don't	  know,	  I	  just	  think	  that	  they	  are	  
more	  developed,	  more	  advanced,	  more	  professional.	  
	  
Maria:	  You	  were	  born...I'm	  just	  wondering,	  in	  '84?	  
	  
Masha:	  Yeah.	  
	  
Maria:	  So	  you	  didn't	  get	  to	  experience	  that	  much	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union...	  
	  
Masha:	  Well,	  a	  little	  bit,	  a	  little	  bit.	  I	  was	  an	  oktyabrenek.	  
	  
Maria:	  Ah,	  you	  made	  it,	  like	  me,	  yeah.	  
	  
Masha:	  Just	  one	  year,	  and	  er,	  yeah,	  so	  a	  little	  bit.	  
	  
Maria:	  Would	  you	  mind	  telling	  me,	  what	  your	  image	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  now?	  
	  
Masha:	  My	  personal	  image...it	  was	  a	  very	  happy,	  kind	  of,	  personal	  time	  of	  my	  life.	  
My	  parents	  got	  divorced	  after	  perestroika,	  so	  before	  that,	  you	  know,	  it	  was	  a	  great	  
time	  for	  me.	  We	  lived	  in	  the	  South	  of	  Russia	  and	  my,	  both	  parents	  worked	  in	  the	  
university.	  I	  had	  a	  lovely,	  you	  know,	  university	  professors,	  they	  had	  a,	  my	  father	  got	  
a	  very	  decent	  salary,	  and	  we	  had	  a	  very	  decent	  style	  of	  life.	  A	  big	  flat,	  a	  big	  dacha,	  
and	  it	  was	  fine.	  After	  the	  collapse,	  it	  coincided	  with	  the	  divorce	  of	  my	  parents,	  things	  
changed.	  So	  that..I	  hate	  the	  90s,	  I	  hate	  perestroika,	  that	  for	  me	  was	  just	  such	  a	  mess	  
and	  suddenly	  this	  flood	  of	  everything,	  from	  everywhere,	  em,	  yeah,	  so...but	  now...But	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it's	  funny	  now,	  somehow	  I	  grew	  up	  without	  learning	  much	  about	  gulags,	  and	  about,	  
you	  know	  what	  was	  happening	  before,	  in	  the	  60s	  and	  the	  30s	  in	  Russia,	  and	  then,	  
now,	  I	  am	  learning	  about	  it	  and	  I	  realise,	  actually,	  what	  it	  was	  all	  about.	  So	  probably,	  
yes,	  you	  are	  right,	  I	  didn't	  really	  live	  in	  the	  Soviet	  union.	  
	  
Maria:	  No,	  no,	  I	  didn't	  mean	  it	  like	  that.	  
	  
Masha:	  Because	  I	  think	  that	  part	  of	  it,	  kind	  of	  the	  biggest	  part	  of	  it,	  that's	  something	  
that	  I	  really	  had	  no	  idea	  about	  and	  I	  only	  learned	  about	  it	  being	  here.	  So...yeah...you	  
know,	  people	  are	  quite,	  even	  my	  generation,	  I	  think,	  they	  are	  quite	  nostalgic	  about	  
Soviet	  times.	  Like,	  a	  lot	  of	  their	  parents	  divorced	  as	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  collapsed,	  
because	  this	  is	  when	  husbands	  suddenly,	  you	  know,	  husbands	  who	  were	  engineers	  
and	  people,	  they	  were	  suddenly	  off	  work	  and	  had	  often,	  had	  to	  do,	  like,	  dirty	  jobs	  to	  
survive,	  to	  keep	  the	  family.	  A	  lot	  of	  men	  were	  quite	  passive,	  a	  lot	  of	  divorces	  
happened	  like	  that.	  My	  brother	  tells	  me	  (laughs)	  the	  story	  that	  happened	  with	  his	  
friend.	  He	  lost	  his	  job	  and	  his	  wife	  was	  so	  desperate	  for	  him	  to	  go	  tp	  work,	  and	  she	  
kept	  sort	  of	  nagging	  him	  every	  day	  'you	  have	  to	  go	  and	  get	  a	  job'.	  And	  one	  day	  she	  
said	  'Why	  don't	  you	  go	  and	  rob	  someone?'	  And	  he	  did,	  and	  went	  to	  prison	  right	  
away.	  I	  think	  he	  was	  really	  depressed	  and	  very	  desperate	  and	  just	  went	  to	  the	  shop	  
and	  just	  did	  something	  very	  stupid	  and	  got	  into	  prison	  right	  there	  and	  right	  now.	  It's	  
a	  school	  friend	  of	  my	  brother's.	  Yeah,	  it's	  just	  stupid	  (laughs).	  But	  yeah,	  you	  know,	  
the	  thing	  that	  we	  were	  all	  kind	  of	  equal,	  and	  then	  suddenly	  at	  school	  after,	  after	  the	  
perestroika,	  suddenly	  there	  were	  children	  who	  were	  rich,	  and	  who	  were	  not	  rich.	  
Suddenly,	  these	  differences,	  social	  differences,	  came	  up.	  Something	  that	  we	  never	  
knew,	  were	  not	  prepared	  as	  well.	  Like,	  in	  England,	  people,	  at	  least	  growing	  up,	  they	  
know	  what	  class	  they	  belong	  to	  and	  they	  are	  kind	  of	  proud	  being	  a	  part	  of	  this	  class,	  
but	  in	  Russia	  it	  was	  a	  really	  big	  shock	  for	  some	  people	  to	  realise	  that	  they	  are	  not	  
equal	  and...really.	  
	  
Maria:	  So	  you	  say	  that	  the	  associations	  for	  you,	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  are	  mainly	  
positive.	  Do	  you	  think	  it's	  because	  of	  what	  came	  after,	  because	  of	  the	  90s	  being	  
what	  they	  were?	  Such	  a	  big	  change,	  you	  said	  so	  much,	  suddenly....	  
	  
Masha:	  Hmm...well,	  but	  if	  you	  look	  at	  it	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  what	  was	  happening	  
in	  the	  late	  80s.	  I	  mean,	  obviously,	  as	  a	  child,	  I	  couldn't	  care	  less	  about,	  you	  know,	  
freedoms	  and	  stuff	  like	  that.	  But	  economically,	  I	  know	  it	  was	  all,	  it	  wasn't	  all	  real,	  but	  
economically	  the	  country	  was	  doing...you	  know,	  people	  had	  their	  salaries,	  my	  family	  
had	  their	  salaries	  and	  they	  could	  buy	  whatever	  they	  wanted.	  I	  mean,	  there	  wasn't	  
much	  in	  the	  shops,	  but	  you	  know...So,	  I	  don't	  know	  even	  looking	  just	  from	  this	  kind	  
of	  perspective,	  it	  couldn't	  go	  on	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  but	  80s	  was	  ,	  80s	  was	  like,	  
yeah.....but	  I	  agree,	  it's	  probably	  the	  shock	  of	  the	  90s	  as	  well.	  Especially	  in	  
comparison	  to	  the	  relatively	  calm	  80s.	  
	  
Maria:	  Would	  you	  mind	  talking	  about	  the	  90s,	  as	  in,	  what	  you	  remember,	  what	  was	  
it	  like?	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Masha:	  Ah...suddenly	  there	  was	  this...i	  don't	  know...there	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  Mafia	  things,	  
and	  I	  don't	  know,	  it	  just	  ticked	  in	  my	  mind,	  a	  lot	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  guys	  in	  leather	  
jackets	  hanging	  around,	  a	  lot	  of	  these	  stupid	  films,	  like,	  really	  rubbish	  film	  
(interviewer	  laughs),	  horrible,	  horrible	  films.	  Em,	  yeah,	  just	  a	  lot	  of...and	  I	  mean,	  
money	  then	  became...even	  not	  money,	  but	  getting	  stuff.	  Stuff	  became	  really	  
important.	  Clothes	  and,	  em,	  suddenly.	  And	  just	  changes,	  a	  lot	  of	  changes.	  Changes	  in	  
prices,	  and	  like,	  all	  the	  time,	  and	  I	  remember	  	  '98,	  and	  it	  was	  horrible,	  I	  mean,	  
overnight	  everything	  just	  changed,	  unbelievable.	  I	  don't	  know,	  it	  was	  really	  stressful	  
being	  at	  school.	  Looking	  back	  at	  it	  now,	  and	  just	  remembering	  how	  stressed	  our	  
teachers	  were,	  I	  mean,	  it's	  ridiculous.	  A	  lot	  of,	  kind	  of,	  screaming.	  Teachers,	  
especially	  women,	  they	  were	  quite	  aggressive.	  Looking	  back	  at	  it	  now	  you	  might	  
think	  that	  they	  had	  obviously	  been	  affected	  as	  well.	  (long	  pause)	  Yeah,	  just	  not	  really	  
knowing	  what's	  going	  on,	  what's	  happening,	  that	  was	  a	  bit	  scary.	  (long	  pause).	  Hm.	  
Just	  kind	  of,	  just	  going	  to	  the	  markets,	  because	  there	  weren't	  many	  shops,	  and	  I	  just	  
remember	  it	  being	  very,	  just	  messy	  and...getting	  something	  or	  doing	  something	  
bureaucratic	  was	  always,	  yeah,	  I	  just	  remember	  these	  queues	  and	  all	  these	  offices.	  I	  
mean,	  things	  didn't	  change	  very	  much,	  but	  it	  was	  really,	  really	  worse	  then.	  (long	  
pause)	  But	  probably	  what	  gets	  me	  more	  is	  how	  poor	  culturally	  the	  country	  was	  in	  
the	  90s.	  
	  
Maria:	  Culturally...	  
	  
Masha:	  yeah.	  	  
	  
Maria:	  Do	  you	  think	  it's	  different	  now?	  
	  
Masha:	  Well,	  I	  don't	  know.	  I	  didn't,	  I	  ….I	  just	  think	  it	  was	  worse	  then.	  And,	  er,	  I'm	  	  
really	  lucky	  that	  I	  had	  a	  few	  kind	  of	  old-­‐school	  teachers,	  a	  few	  amazing	  people	  that	  
taught	  me.	  Just	  lucky,	  really.	  But	  otherwise,	  yeah,	  just	  ...i	  don't	  think	  there	  was	  much	  
going	  on	  for	  children	  in	  terms	  of,	  like,	  culture,	  or...and	  Russian	  classics,	  I	  think	  ,	  also,	  I	  
mean,	  that's	  what	  I	  think	  	  was	  my	  source	  of	  education,	  sort	  of	  self-­‐education.	  
Because,	  after	  school	  I	  don't	  know,	  what	  did	  we	  do	  after	  school?	  I	  mean,	  everything	  
was	  in	  such	  a	  mess,	  it	  was...	  I	  remember	  when	  I	  was	  a	  bit	  older	  I	  started	  doing	  things	  
after	  school,	  I	  did	  	  a	  course	  at	  the	  Hermitage	  as	  a	  child.	  It	  was	  quite	  good.	  But	  it	  was	  
kind	  of	  very...very	  basic.	  Just	  some	  people	  who	  were	  very	  enthusiastic	  about	  it....but	  
I	  remember	  we	  would	  be	  sitting	  in	  very	  cold	  rooms,	  things	  like	  that.	  But,	  I	  was	  just	  
lucky.	  And	  because	  of	  my	  mother,	  she	  really	  believed	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  things,	  she	  
really	  tried...for	  me	  to	  learn	  English.	  Because,	  obviously,	  if	  I	  wouldn't	  take	  courses	  
outside	  my	  school	  I	  would	  never	  learn	  English.	  So	  she	  kind	  of	  really	  tried	  hard	  for	  me	  
to	  do	  it....yeah,	  	  I	  don't	  think	  school	  gave	  me	  a	  lot	  of...to	  be	  honest,	  a	  lot	  of	  anything.	  
Neither	  did	  my	  university	  in	  Russia.	  I	  don't	  know,	  it's	  hard	  to	  say.	  Hm...	  
	  
Maria:	  So,	  being	  Russian,	  what	  do	  you	  think	  you	  have	  taken	  with	  you	  now,	  to	  
England	  from...sort	  of,	  you	  know	  what	  I	  mean,	  mentally?	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  you	  
to	  be	  Russian,	  in	  the	  UK?	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Masha:	  I	  don't	  know.	  It	  might	  sound	  a	  bit	  sort	  of...I	  don't	  know...like	  it	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  
pathos.	  Or	  whatever	  it	  is	  Russians	  are	  famous	  for.	  My	  husband	  is	  like,	  he	  finds	  it	  
ridiculous,	  he	  always	  makes	  faces	  when	  I	  say	  things	  like	  that...	  
	  
Maria:	  It's	  free	  space	  for	  pathos	  here..	  
	  
Masha:	  Exactly,	  exactly.	  Taking	  my	  chance	  (both	  laugh).	  Em,	  I	  really	  think	  that	  
Russian	  kind	  of	  inheritance	  in	  terms	  of	  literature	  and	  culture,	  everything	  that	  was	  
written	  and	  done	  before...I	  don't	  know...before	  1917,	  before	  the	  Revolution,	  
basically,	  I	  think	  that	  still	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  effect	  on	  people.	  And	  hopefully	  this	  is	  what	  one	  
day	  what,	  I	  don't	  know,	  people	  will	  kind	  of	  go	  back	  to.	  They'll	  realise	  that	  that's	  
what's	  really	  really	  precious.	  And	  that's	  what	  Russia	  is	  about.	  About	  charity,	  about	  
patriotism,	  about	  people	  giving	  up	  their	  lives	  for	  their	  country.	  Em....about	  people	  
being	  reckless,	  but	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  amazing,	  heroic	  way.Yeah,	  these	  kinds	  of	  things.That	  I	  
can	  only...well,	  not	  only,	  but	  you	  read	  about	  it	  in	  Russian	  literature.	  They	  are	  very	  
dear	  to	  me.	  I	  am	  really	  proud	  of	  that,	  really	  proud	  of	  this.	  Especially	  as	  I	  studied	  
Russian	  literature,	  it	  made	  me	  so	  happy	  to	  be	  Russian.	  It's	  not	  that	  I	  chose	  to	  study	  
Russian	  literature	  because	  I'm	  Russian,	  because	  it's	  that	  I	  really	  loved....em...but	  
actually	  being	  Russian,	  that	  always	  made	  me	  think:	  I	  am	  so	  proud	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  it.	  
And	  that's	  amazing.	  That's	  what	  I	  only	  felt	  when	  I	  did	  Russian	  literature	  being	  abroad	  
here,	  which	  is	  ridiculous,	  but,	  never	  mind...But	  also,	  I	  mean,	  I	  see	  as	  I	  said	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  lot	  of	  potential	  in	  Russia,	  and	  I	  meet	  a	  lot	  of	  amazing	  people	  when	  I	  go	  there.	  A	  
lot	  of	  my	  friends	  are	  very	  talented	  musicians,	  operators,	  you	  know,	  film	  operators,	  
and,	  yeah,	  some	  of	  them	  are	  just	  amazing,	  and	  they	  are	  amazingly	  graceful	  people,	  
amazingly	  generous,	  amazingly	  open.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  so	  there	  is	  this	  kind	  
of..definitely,	  there	  are	  these	  people	  who	  are	  kind	  of,	  for	  me,	  associated	  with	  
Russian	  classical	  literature,	  who	  kind	  of	  embody	  that	  for	  me.	  
	  
Maria:	  So	  do	  you	  believe	  in	  something	  like	  a,	  you	  know,	  Russian	  soul,	  Russian	  spirit?	  
	  
Masha:	  Em...yeah,	  definitely,	  there	  is	  something	  like	  that.	  	  I	  mean,	  it's	  probably	  
exaggerated	  a	  bit.	  I...I	  think	  there	  is	  something	  like	  a	  British	  spirit,	  and	  a	  British	  soul,	  
em,	  which	  is	  equally	  as	  amazing,	  it's	  just	  not	  as	  maybe	  showy	  as	  the	  Russian	  one.	  I	  
know	  that	  my	  husband,	  I	  can...he's	  an	  amazingly	  reliable	  person,	  an	  amazingly	  
committed	  person,	  very	  hard-­‐working	  and	  trustworthy	  and...yeah,	  all	  these	  qualities	  
that	  look	  maybe	  quite	  boring	  from	  the	  outside	  but,	  you	  know,	  in	  the	  end	  
(laughs)....so	  yeah,	  there	  is	  something	  as	  a	  Russian	  soul,	  but	  it's	  just	  like	  any	  other	  
nationality's	  soul.	  It's	  just	  I	  think	  that	  Russian	  writers	  can	  write	  about	  it	  better.	  
Maybe	  again,	  because	  of	  those	  qualities	  that	  Russians	  have,	  it	  becomes	  more	  
apparent...	  
	  
Maria:	  Well,	  I	  think	  that's	  it	  from	  my	  side.	  The	  kind	  of	  questions	  I	  asked	  you,	  is	  that	  
something	  you	  find	  yourself	  talking	  about?	  
	  
Masha:	  Em,	  no,	  not	  at	  all.	  I	  think	  about	  it,	  I	  think	  about	  these	  things.	  I	  do	  sometimes	  
have	  to	  talk	  about	  politics	  though.	  Very	  often,	  actually,	  people	  get	  me	  to	  talk	  about	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Putin...Pyutin,	  shall	  I	  say?	  (laughs)	  That's	  how	  they	  call	  him,	  and,	  you	  know,	  about	  
Russian	  oligarchs	  and	  things	  like	  that,	  poisonings,	  and	  things	  like	  that	  (laughs)	  
	  
Maria:	  The	  scandalous	  aspects...	  
	  
Masha:	  Yeah,	  exactly.	  Em,	  or	  you	  know,	  like,	  just	  about	  St	  Petersburg	  and	  how	  hard	  
it	  is	  to	  get	  a	  visa	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  But	  yeah,	  practical	  things,	  practical	  things	  of	  
politics	  and	  everything.	  But	  I	  often	  think	  about	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  Russian.	  I	  often	  think	  
about	  how	  differently	  things	  would	  have	  been,	  what	  it	  would	  be	  to	  be	  Russian,	  if	  
there	  wouldn't	  be	  1917,	  there	  wouldn't	  be	  revolution,	  there	  wouldn't	  be	  
communism...things	  would	  just	  go	  on	  after	  1917	  as	  they	  were.	  I	  think	  that's	  quite	  
interesting.	  What	  it	  would	  be	  like...what	  it	  would	  be	  like	  then.	  Would	  we	  be	  more	  
Russian?	  Or	  is	  the	  Communist	  Party	  part	  of	  being	  truly	  Russian,	  or	  is	  just	  a	  group	  of	  
some	  kind	  of	  mad	  guys?	  Yeah,	  these	  kinds	  of	  things	  I	  think	  about.	  I	  don't	  know	  what	  I	  
should	  be	  associating	  myself	  with.	  Should	  I	  be	  associating	  myself	  with	  communism	  
as	  well,	  or	  should	  I	  just,	  you	  know,	  associate	  myself,	  kind	  of	  choose	  and	  pick	  what	  to	  
be	  Russian,	  or	  is	  it	  a	  whole	  kind	  of	  box?	  Do	  I	  have	  to	  take	  it...	  
	  
Maria:	  Take	  it	  as	  it	  is...or	  as	  it	  was.	  
	  
Masha:	  Yeah,	  as	  it	  was.	  Because	  I	  don't	  feel	  like.	  I	  mean,	  I	  know	  a	  lot	  of	  Russians	  sort	  
of	  consider	  communism	  as	  a	  part	  of	  their	  history...yeah...and	  sometimes	  they	  even,	  
well,	  they	  say	  they	  are	  even	  kind	  of	  proud	  of	  it.	  But	  I	  personally,	  I	  don't	  want	  it	  to	  be	  
a	  part	  of	  my	  history.	  	  I	  mean,	  it's	  the	  same	  for	  me	  as	  Nazi,	  it's	  the	  same	  as	  Hitler	  is	  for	  
Germany.	  Yeah,	  I	  should	  ask	  some	  Germans,	  some	  young	  Germans..I	  should	  ask	  you	  
(both	  laugh)	  what	  you	  think	  about	  that.	  Whether	  you	  can..is	  it	  something	  where	  you	  
would	  sort	  of	  think	  'yeah,	  that's	  part	  of	  my	  history',	  or	  is	  it	  something	  you	  just	  want	  
to	  erase,	  and	  just	  not	  consider....I	  mean,	  is	  it	  worth	  really	  being	  part	  of	  your	  history?	  
	  
	  
	  
[End	  of	  recording]	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Appendix	  D	  	  	  
	   Sociodemographics	  –	  interview	  participants	  
No.	   Gender	   Name	   Age	   Place	  of	  
Birth	  
Current	  
location	  	  
Profession	  
1	   m	   Yura	   30	   Moscow	   London	   PhD	  student	  
2	   f	   Katia	   22	   Moscow	   London	   MSc	  student	  
3	   f	   Natasha	   27	   Moscow	   London	   MSc	  student	  
4	   m	   Andrey	   34	   St	  
Petersburg	  
London	   Msc	  student	  
5	   f	   Masha	   26	  	   St	  
Petersburg	  
London	   MA	  student	  
6	   f	   Irina	   22	   Yoshkar-­‐Ola	   London	   MA	  student	  
7	   f	   Anelya	   22	   Moscow	   London	   MBA	  
8	   f	   Natasha	   26	   Krasnodar	   London	   MA	  student	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Appendix	  E	  	  
Text	  of	  email	  from	  27.03.2012	  inviting	  participation	  in	  online	  survey:	  	  
	  
Приветствую!	  
	  
Как	  Вы,	  наверное,	  уже	  знаете,	  одним	  из	  аспектов	  моей	  кандидатской	  
диссертации	  в	  Биркбекском	  Университете	  Лондона,	  является	  анализ	  того,	  
что	  русские	  говорят	  и	  как	  они	  относятся	  к	  тому,	  что	  это	  значит	  -­‐-­‐	  быть	  
русским.	  После	  первой	  стадии,	  состоявшей	  непосредственно	  из	  интервью,	  я	  
надеюсь	  теперь	  собрать	  онлайн-­‐нарративы,	  т.е.	  короткие	  повествования,	  с	  
последующими	  онлайн-­‐интервью.	  
	  
Для	  этого	  я	  подготовила	  небольшой	  опрос	  (на	  русском)	  и	  буду	  чрезвычайно	  
благодарна,	  если	  Вы	  ответите	  на	  мои	  вопросы,	  посвятив	  им	  несколько	  
минут	  свего	  времени.	  
	  
Не	  могли	  бы	  Вы,	  кроме	  того,	  переслать	  эту	  ссылку	  по	  электронной	  почте	  
друзьям,	  родителям,	  знакомым,	  всем,	  кому	  бы	  это	  с	  Вашей	  точки	  зрения	  
могло	  бы	  быть	  интересно.	  Единственным	  квалификационным	  критерием	  
явяется	  то,	  что	  участник	  должен	  быть	  уроженцем	  России	  (Советского	  
Союза).	  
	  
Очень	  надеюсь,	  что	  по	  завершению	  у	  Вас	  не	  возникнет	  ощущения	  
потерянного	  времени.	  
	  
Большое	  Спасибо,	  
	  
Мария	  
	  
PS:	  если	  появятся	  дополнительные	  вопросы,	  не	  стесняйтесь	  задавайте	  их,	  
пишите.	  
М.	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English	  Translation:	  
	  
Hello,	  
	  
As	  you	  may	  know,	  in	  my	  PhD	  project	  at	  the	  Dept.	  of	  Psychosocial	  Studies	  at	  Birkbeck	  
College	  (University	  of	  London)	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  ways	  Russians	  talk	  about,	  and	  relate	  
to,	  Russianness.	  After	  a	  first	  stage	  comprising	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews,	  I	  am	  now	  
hoping	  to	  collect	  online	  narratives,	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  email	  interviews.	  
	  
For	  this	  purpose,	  I	  have	  designed	  a	  short	  survey	  (in	  Russian)	  and	  would	  greatly	  
appreciate	  if	  you	  could	  take	  the	  time	  to	  fill	  it	  in:	  
	  	  
Additionally,	  it	  would	  be	  great	  if	  you	  could	  forward	  this	  link	  via	  email	  to	  as	  many	  
friends,	  family	  members	  and	  acquaintances	  as	  possible,	  the	  only	  condition	  being	  that	  
individuals	  were	  born	  in	  Russia.	  
	  
I	  hope	  you	  will	  enjoy	  participating	  in	  my	  study!	  
	  	  
Thank	  you	  very	  much,	  	  
	  	  
Maria	  
	  
	  PS:	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions,	  do	  let	  me	  know.	  M.	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Appendix	  F	  	  
Survey	  questions	  
	  
	  
• 	  	  Please	  describe	  or	  provide	  the	  link	  to	  an	  image	  or	  picture	  which	  would	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  convey	  a	  sense	  of	  Russia	  or	  Russianness.	  Please	  explain	  why	  you	  have	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  chosen	  this	  image.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• What	  does	  it	  take	  to	  become	  Russian?	  	  
Please	  answer	  in	  as	  much	  detail	  as	  possible.	  
	  
• Try	  to	  think	  of	  a	  moment	  or	  incident	  that	  made	  you	  feel	  especially	  
Russian.	  
Please	  describe	  it	  in	  as	  much	  detail	  as	  possible.	  
	  
• Can	  you	  list	  a	  number	  of	  items	  (objects,	  sensations)	  that	  are	  truly	  Russian?	  
Could	  you	  please	  explain	  why	  you	  have	  chosen	  them?	  
	  
• Has	  the	  meaning	  of	  Russianness/of	  being	  Russian	  changed	  over	  time?	  If	  
so,	  how	  and	  why?	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Appendix	  G	  
	  
Pictures	  utilised	  in	  online	  survey	  
(in	  order	  of	  their	  appearance)	  
	  
Picture	  A:	  Isaac	  Levitan’s	  Birch	  Grove	  
	  
	  
Picture	  B:	  Russian	  dolls	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Picture	  C:	  Young	  Pioneers	  in	  central	  Moscow	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Picture	  D:	  Commuters	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Picture	  E:	  Vladimir	  Putin	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Appendix	  H	  	  
Sociodemographics	  –	  survey	  participants	  
No.	   Gender	   Age	   Place	  of	  
Birth	  
Current	  
location	  	  
Profession	  
1	   m	   39	   Leningrad	   London	   Mathematician	  
2	   f	   38	   Kurgan	   Moscow	   translator	  
3	   f	   35	   Samara	   Samara	   engineer	  
4	   m	   33	   Yaroslavl	   London	   Bank	  clerk	  
5	   f	   24	   Olenogorsk	   Moscow	   journalist	  
6	   f	   30	   Yakutsk	   Moscow	   journalist	  
7	   f	   28	   China	   Moscow	   Medical	  equipment	  
specialist	  
8	   m	   33	   Moscow	   Moscow	   manager	  
9	   f	   34	   Moscow	   Moscow	   economist	  
10	   f	   28	   Chelyabinsk	   Chelyabinsk	   Internet	  analyst	  
11	   m	   32	   Moscow	   Moscow	   sociologist	  
12	   f	   61	   Saratov	   Moscow	   proofreader	  
13	   f	   26	   Tomsk	   Moscow	   journalist	  
14	   f	   29	   Moscow	   Moscow	   lawyer	  
15	   f	   40	   Arkhangelsk	   Moscow	   Designer	  (florist)	  
16	   m	   40	   Chita	   Moscow	   Event	  organiser	  
17	   f	   30	   Moscow	   Moscow	   Entrepreneur	  
18	   f	   31	   Tomsk	   Tomsk	   Lawyer	  
19	   f	   28	   Ukraine	   Moscow	   musician	  
20	   f	   29	   Moscow	   Germany	   Market	  analyst	  
*21	   m	   48	   Leningrad	   St	  Petersburg	   doctor	  
22	   m	   75	   Moscow	   Moscow	   architect	  
23	   f	   35	   Germany	   Italy	   Employee	  (private	  
sector)	  
24	   f	   39	   Moscow	   Italy	   journalist	  
25	   m	   38	   Moscow	   Toronto	   IT	  Marketing	  
26	   f	   50	   Moscow	   Moscow	   “expert”	  
27	   m	   41	   Moscow	   London	   Translator/historian	  
28	   f	   45	   Aleksin	   Moscow	   accountant	  
29	   f	   35	   Moscow	  
region	  
Moscow	   Producer/journalist	  
30	   f	   39	   Russia	   Kaliningrad	   Primary	  school	  
teacher	  
31	   m	   44	   Kaliningrad	   Kaliningrad	   manager	  
32	   f	   28	   Ekaterinburg	   Pennsylvania,	  
US	  
Assistant	  professor	  of	  
energy	  economics	  
33	   m	   44	   Kaliningrad	   London	   University	  lecturer	  
34	   m	   50	   Vilnius	   Kaliningrad	   University	  professor	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Appendix	  I	  
	  
Consent	  form	  
	  
Research	  study	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  &	  Political	  Science,	  Institute	  of	  
Social	  Psychology	  
	  
You	  are	  asked	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  interview	  about	  national	  identity	  and	  views	  on	  the	  
political	  landscape	  in	  Russia.	  This	  interview	  will	  contribute	  to	  research	  towards	  a	  PhD	  
in	  Social	  Psychology	  at	  the	  LSE,	  Institute	  of	  Social	  Psychology.	  My	  supervisor	  at	  the	  
Institute	  is	  Dr	  Derek	  Hook	  (D.W.Hook@lse.ac.uk).	  
	  
The	  interview	  will	  last	  approximately	  30	  minutes.	  With	  your	  consent	  I	  will	  record	  it	  
on	  tape.	  
The	  interview	  will	  consist	  of	  questions	  regarding	  your	  personal	  experiences	  and	  
views	  of	  Russia.	  
Participation	  in	  this	  interviews	  is	  voluntary.	  The	  interview	  can	  be	  interrupted	  at	  any	  
time	  or	  you	  can	  ask	  me	  not	  to	  use	  or	  delete	  parts	  of	  the	  interview	  afterwards.	  
	  
You	  name	  will	  not	  appear	  or	  be	  used	  anywhere.	  I	  will	  use	  pseudonyms	  only.	  
	  	  
Thank	  you	  for	  your	  participation!	  
	  
	  
	  
_____________________	  
Maria	  Brock	  
	  
	  
I	  agree	  to	  the	  conditions	  above	  and	  agree	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  study.	  
	  
Date	  and	  signature:	  
	  
	  
___________________	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Appendix	  J	  
	  
Disclaimer	  for	  survey	  participants	  
	  
Добро	  пожаловать!	  
ЦЕЛЬ	  ПРОЕКТА:	  	  Вы	  приглашаетесь	  принять	  участие	  в	  онлайн-­‐опросе,	  который	  
является	  частью	  масштабного	  проекта	  по	  изучению	  аспектов	  современной	  
национальной	  идентификации.	  Проект	  осуществляется	  Биркбекским	  
Университетом	  Лондона	  под	  руководством	  Доктора	  Дерека	  Хука	  (Derek	  Hook)	  и	  
Профессора	  Линн	  Сегал	  (Lynne	  Segal).	  Участникам	  	  опроса	  предлагается	  ответить	  
на	  ряд	  коротких	  вопросов.	  	  	  
ТЕХНИЧЕСКИЕ	  АСПЕКТЫ:	  	  Если	  Вы	  согласны	  принять	  учасие	  в	  Проекте,	  
пожалуйста	  выберите	  "continue"	  в	  конце	  страницы	  и	  следуйте	  дальнейшим	  
указаниям.	  	  	  
ПРАВА	  УЧАСТНИКОВ:	  	  Участвовать	  или	  не	  участвовать	  в	  Проекте	  -­‐-­‐	  дело	  Вашего	  
свободного	  выбора.	  Если	  Вы	  сначала	  решите	  участвовать	  в	  Проекте,	  а	  затем	  
передумаете,	  Вы	  можете	  прекратить	  Ваше	  участие	  в	  любой	  момент.	  	  	  
Собранная	  информация	  сугубо	  конфиденциальна	  и	  будет	  использоваться	  
исключительно	  в	  научных	  целях	  в	  рамках	  Проекта.	  	  	  
Данный	  исследовательский	  проект	  соответствует	  этическим	  нормам	  и	  
принципам	  Британского	  Психологического	  Общества.	  	  	  
Если	  у	  Вас	  возникнут	  дополнительные	  вопросы,	  пожалуйста	  пишите	  
исследователю	  по	  электронной	  почте,	  по	  адресу	  mbrock01@mail.bbk.ac.uk	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English	  translation:	  	  
	  
Welcome	  
PURPOSE	  OF	  RESEARCH	  
You	  are	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  survey,	  which	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  project	  on	  
contemporary	  national	  identity.	  The	  project	  is	  being	  undertaken	  at	  Birkbeck	  College,	  
University	  of	  London	  and	  is	  being	  supervised	  by	  Dr	  Derek	  Hook	  and	  Prof	  Lynne	  Segal.	  
Participants	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  read	  and	  answer	  a	  few	  short	  questions.	  	  	  
	  
PROCEDURES	  
If	  you	  choose	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  study,	  please	  select	  'next'	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  
page	  and	  you	  will	  be	  given	  further	  instructions	  
	  
PARTICIPANTS'	  RIGHTS	  
You	  should	  not	  feel	  obliged	  to	  agree	  to	  participate.	  
	  
If	  you	  first	  agree	  to	  participate	  and	  then	  you	  change	  your	  mind,	  you	  are	  free	  to	  
withdraw	  your	  consent	  and	  discontinue	  your	  participation	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  
survey.	  
	  
All	  information	  collected	  is	  confidential	  and	  will	  only	  be	  used	  for	  scientific	  and	  
research	  purposes.	  
	  
This	  research	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  ethical	  principles	  set	  down	  by	  the	  British	  
Psychological	  Society.	  
	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  further	  questions,	  please	  do	  not	  hesitate	  to	  contact	  the	  researcher	  
by	  email:	  mbrock01@mail.bbk.ac.uk	  	  
	  
 
